

CONFIDENTIAL

NEWS, VIEWS and ISSUES

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11 JUNE 1976

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DESTROY AFTER BACKGROUNDER HAS
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CONFIDENTIAL

Governmental Affairs

WASHINGTON POST
11 JUN 1976

Charles B. Seib

CIA Taint on the Press

There's no point in beating a dead horse. But I want to take just one more swing at the one that daily becomes more aromatic out behind CIA headquarters.

I'm talking about the CIA's involvement with the press—this country's and the world's. The superspies persist in their refusal to provide details of this relationship, past or present. And the press, for all its investigative zeal, just can't seem to get interested in doing anything about it.

Two developments prompt me to return to this unpopular subject. The first is the recent Soviet charge that three leading American correspondents in Moscow work for the CIA. The second is correspondence between CIA director George Bush and several journalistic organizations.

To set the stage, the CIA's stated position on its use of the media is that, as of last Feb. 11, it has sworn off "paid or contractual relationships with any full-time or part-time correspondent accredited by any U.S. news service, newspaper, periodical, radio or television network or station."

The agency insists that its past relationships with journalists involved no impropriety or any intention to influence or harm the American press. It also says it has no intention of revealing, now or later, the names of journalists who have worked for it.

What does all this mean in concrete terms? Just what does CIA mean by "accredited," for example? The Senate Intelligence Committee recently reported that until early this year the CIA had undercover "relationships" with about 50 American journalists, and that more than half these ties were continuing despite the Feb. 11 statement. The Senate report also said that staff investigators found that two employees of "general circulation U.S. news organizations" were still functioning as paid undercover CIA contacts.

And that brings us to the Russian charges. Literaturnaya Gazeta, the publication of the Union of Soviet Writers, asserted late last month that Christopher S. Wren of The New York Times, George Krimsky of the Associated Press and Alfred Friendly Jr. of Newsweek were associated with the CIA.

There is no reason to believe the charges. No hard evidence was produced, and there have been strong denials from the men, highly regarded journalists, and their publications.

But is it not reasonable to believe that the CIA's unwillingness to cut its ties to American journalism feeds the suspicions that lead to such charges? Does not that same unwillingness make it more difficult to refute the charges?

A number of journalists and journalistic organizations have called for the publication of the names of news people who have been in the pay of the

CIA, and of news organizations that have knowingly provided CIA cover.

That, it is argued, is the only way the American press can be cleansed of the taint of spy work. Also, to be pragmatic, such publication would be quite effective in discouraging future CIA-press relationships. But, as it noted in its Feb. 11 policy statement, the CIA has no intention of doing that. Which brings us to the Bush letters.

On May 3, the National News Council, a press-monitoring body, wrote to Bush expressing deep concern about reports of CIA-press ties and asking for more information on the ties and the portent they hold for a free press in a free society. The council noted that it was not asking for publication of names of individuals employed by CIA.

In reply, Bush said that he had hoped the Feb. 11 statement "would relieve the minds of those in the field of journalism." He said that "it has reassured many with whom I have spoken privately."

On May 14, directors of the Fund for Investigative Journalism, which underwrites journalistic projects, wrote a much stronger letter than the News Council's. It said the clandestine use of American news people by the CIA is "destructive of the fundamental premises of a free press and corrosive of the First Amendment."

The Fund's board urged that the CIA go beyond its earlier statement and announce termination of the use of all

journalists, including freelancers, stringers and part-time reporters and editors, whether or not accredited.

That brought a reply in which Bush said he had "talked privately to a number of members of the Fourth Estate. Although not all of them are totally happy with the situation as it is, I have met with considerable quiet understanding. One top figure in the national media told me privately that he thought that after issuance of my statement, no more could properly be demanded of us."

Bush went on to say that "in a perfect world, we might be able to run the intelligence business in response to the criticisms of each and every point of view, but I'm afraid that perfect world is not yet here."

Bush is right about the imperfection of the world. But questions must be raised about his claims of support for his position within the news business. Who are those members of the Fourth Estate who have privately given Bush their "quiet understanding," whatever that is? Who is the top figure in the national media who said he was satisfied with the CIA position?

What we are faced with now is not only the knowledge that the CIA has been and continues to be the employer of an undisclosed number of unnamed American journalists, but that its stonewalling has the support, or at least the acquiescence, of a number of media people—at the top level, we must assume. But they, too, are unnamed. Could there be a Catch-22 here by which some of those who have shown "quiet understanding" also have or have had an involvement, direct or indirect, with the agency?

We don't know. What we do know is that the taint of CIA involvement continues to pollute the American press as a whole. We also know that because of the taint, charges such as those leveled by the Soviet magazine are bound to find a more accepting audience.

BALTIMORE SUN
11 June 1976

Senate panel wants delay in CIA's destroying of files

Washington (AP)—The new Senate intelligence committee has unanimously recommended a six-month moratorium on Central Intelligence Agency plans to destroy files of improper and illegal activities.

The decision was reached by the panel in a closed-door session Wednesday and publicly disclosed yesterday by its chairman, Senator Daniel K. Inouye (D., Hawaii) in a letter to Senate leaders.

"It is the further recommen-

dation of the committee that the CIA and other intelligence agencies should submit an inventory of the records to be destroyed" to the panel, Mr. Inouye said in a letter to the Senate majority leader, Mike Mansfield (D., Mont.), and minority leader, Hugh Scott (R., Pa.).

Senator Mansfield and Senator Scott earlier in the week had left it to the new panel to decide whether the CIA should be allowed to destroy its files on its past misdeeds.

The controversy was prompted when the CIA director, George Bush, wrote to Mr.

Mansfield and Mr. Scott to tell them he planned to destroy the files now that congressional investigations into allegations of improper conduct had been completed.

These same Senate leaders had been the ones who had asked the CIA to save the files while Congress was investigating the alleged misdeeds.

WASHINGTON STAR
27 MAY 1976

CIA Won't Sever All Free-Lancer Ties

CIA Director George Bush has turned down an appeal that the agency sever all ties with its estimated 25 free-lance journalists overseas, he Fund for Investigative Journalism had asked for a total ban on CIA use of journalists, including free-lancers.

NEW YORK TIMES

7 JUN 1976

Text of Findings on C.I.A.

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 6—Following is the text of the conclusions of the final report of the Senate Intelligence Committee on the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency. In the text, D.C.I. is the Director of Central Intelligence, D.D.I. is the Directorate for Intelligence, D.D.O. is the Directorate for Operations and N.S.C. is the National Security Council.

The C.I.A. was conceived and established to provide high-quality intelligence to senior policymakers. Since 1947 the agency—its structure, its place within the Government and its function—has undergone dramatic change and expansion. Sharing characteristics common to most large, complex organizations, the C.I.A. has responded to rather than anticipated the forces of change; it has accumulated functions rather than redefining them; its internal patterns were established early and have solidified; success has come to those who have made visible contributions in high-priority areas. These general characteristics have affected the specifics of the agency's development.

The notion that the C.I.A. could serve as a coordinating body for departmental intelligence activities and that the D.C.I. could orchestrate the process did not take into account the inherent institutional obstacles posed by the departments. From the outset no department was willing to concede a centralized intelligence function to the C.I.A. Each insisted on the maintenance of its independent capabilities to support its policy role. With budgetary and management authority vested in the departments, the agency was left powerless in the execution of interdepartmental coordination. Even in the area of coordinated national intelligence estimates the departments did not readily provide the agency with the data required.

It was not until John McCone's term as D.C.I. that the agency aggressively sought to assert its position as a coordinating body. That effort demonstrated the complex factors that determined the relative success of community management. One of the principal influences was the support accorded the D.C.I. by the President and the cooperation of the Secretary of Defense. In a situation where the D.C.I. commanded no resource or outright authority, the position of these two individuals was crucial. While Kennedy and McNamara provided McCone with consistent backing in a variety of areas, Nixon and Laird failed to provide Helms with enough support to give him the necessary bureaucratic leverage.

It is clear that the D.C.I.'s own priorities, derived from their backgrounds and interests, influenced the relative success of the agency's role in interdepartmental coordination. Given the limitations on the D.C.I.'s authority, only by making community activities a first-order concern and by pursuing the problems assertively could a D.C.I. begin to make a difference in effecting better management. During Allen Dulles' term interagency coordination went neglected, and the results were expansion of competing capabilities among the departments. For McCone, community intelligence activities were clearly a priority, and his definition of the D.C.I.'s role contributed to whatever advances were

made. Helms' fundamental interests and inclinations lay within the agency, and he did not push his mandate to its possible limits.

The D.C.I.'s basic problems have been competing claims on his time and attention and the lack of real authority for the execution of the central intelligence function. As presently defined, the D.C.I.'s job is burdensome in the extreme. He is to serve the roles of chief intelligence adviser to the President, manager of community intelligence activities, and senior executive in the C.I.A. History has demonstrated that the job of the D.C.I. as community manager and as head of the C.I.A. are competing, not complementary roles. In terms of both the demands imposed by each function and the expertise required to fulfill the responsibilities, the two roles differ considerably. In the future separating the functions with precise definitions of authority and responsibilities may prove a plausible alternative.

Although the agency was established primarily for the purpose of providing intelligence analysis to senior policymakers, within three years clandestine operations became and continued to be the agency's pre-eminent activity. The single most important factor in the transformation was policymakers' perception of the Soviet Union as a world-wide threat to United States security. The agency's large-scale clandestine activities have mirrored American foreign policy priorities. With political operations in Europe in the 1950's, paramilitary operations in Korea, Third World activities, Cuba, Southeast Asia, and currently narcotics control, the C.I.A.'s major programs paralleled the international concerns of the United States. For nearly two decades American policymakers considered covert action vital in the struggle against international Communism. The generality of the definition or "threat perception" motivated the continual development and justification of covert activities from the senior policymaking level to the field stations. Apart from the overall anti-Communist motivation, successive Presidential administrations regarded covert actions as a quick and convenient means of advancing their particular objectives.

Internal incentives contributed to the expansion in covert action. Within the agency D.D.O. careerists have traditionally been rewarded more quickly for the visible accomplishments of covert action than for the long term development of agents required for clandestine collection. Clandestine activities will remain an element of United States foreign policy, and policymakers will directly affect the level of operations. The prominence of the Clandestine Service within the agency may moderate as money for and high-level executive interest in covert actions diminish. However, D.D.O. incentives which emphasize operations over collection and which create an internal demand for projects will continue to foster covert action unless an internal conversion process forces a change.

In the past the orientation of D.C.I.s such as Dulles and Helms also contributed to the agency's emphasis on clandestine activities. It is no coincidence that of those D.C.I.s who have been Agency careerists, all have come from the Clandestine Service. Except for James Schlesinger's brief appointment,

the agency has never been directed by a trained analyst. The qualities demanded of individuals in the D.D.O.—essentially, management of people—serve as the basis for bureaucratic skills in the organization. As a result, the agency's leadership has been dominated by D.D.O. careerists.

Clandestine collection and covert action have had their successes, i.e., individual activities have attained their stated objectives. What the relative contribution of clandestine activities has been—the extent to which they have contributed to or detracted from the implementation of United States foreign policy and whether the results have been worth the risk—cannot be evaluated without wide access to records on covert operations, access the committee did not have.

Organizational arrangements within the agency and the decision-making structure outside the agency have permitted the extremes in C.I.A. activity. The ethos of secrecy which pervaded the D.D.O. had the effect of setting the directorate apart within the agency and allowed the Clandestine Service a measure of autonomy not accorded other directorates. More importantly, the compartmentation principle allowed units of the D.D.O. freedom in defining operations. In many cases the burden of responsibility fell on individual judgments—a situation in which lapses and deviations are inevitable. Previous excesses of drug testing, assassination planning and domestic activities were supported by an internal structure that permitted individuals to conduct operations without the consistent necessity or expectation of justifying or revealing their activities.

'Blurred Accountability'

Ultimately, much of the responsibility for the scale of covert action and for whatever abuses occurred must fall to senior policymakers. The decision-making arrangements at the N.S.C. level created an environment of blurred accountability which allowed consideration of actions without the constraints of individual responsibility. Historically the ambiguity and imprecision derived from the initial expectation that covert operations would be limited and therefore could be managed by a small, informal group. Such was the intention in 1948. By 1951 with the impetus of the Korean war, covert action had become a fixed element in the U.S. foreign policy repertoire. The frequency of covert action forced the development of more formalized decision-making arrangements. Yet structural changes did not alter ambiguous procedures. In the late 1950's the relationship between Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and Allen Dulles allowed informal agreements and personal understandings to prevail over explicit and precise decisions. In addition, as the scale of covert action expanded, policymakers found it useful to maintain the ambiguity of the decision-making process to insure secrecy and to allow "plausible deniability" of covert operations.

No one in the executive—least of all the President—was required to formally sign off on a decision to implement a covert action program. The D.C.I. was responsible for the execution of a project but not for taking the decision to implement it. Within the N.S.C. a group of individuals held joint responsibility for defining policy objectives, but they did not attempt to establish criteria placing moral and constitutional limits on activities undertaken to achieve the

objectives. Congress has functioned under similar conditions. Within the Congress a handful of committee members passed the agency's budget. Some members were informed of most of the CIA's major activities; others preferred not to be informed. The result was twenty-nine years of acquiescence.

At each level of scrutiny in the National Security Council and in the Congress a small group of individuals controlled the approval processes. The restricted number of individuals involved as well as the assumption that their actions would not be subject to outside scrutiny contributed to the scale of covert action and to the development of questionable practices.

Independent Development

The D.D.O. and the D.D.I. evolved out of separate independent organizations. Essentially, the two directorates functioned as separate organizations. They maintain totally independent career tracks and once recruited into one, individuals are rarely posted to the other.

In theory the D.D.O.'s clandestine collection function should have contributed to the D.D.I.'s analytic capacity. However, D.D.O. concerns about maintaining the security of its operations and protecting the identity of its agents, and D.D.I. concerns about measuring the reliability of its sources restricted interchange between the two directorates. Fundamentally, this has deprived the D.D.I. of a major source of information. Although D.D.I.-D.D.O. contact has increased during the last five years, it remains limited.

The D.D.I. has traditionally not been informed of sensitive covert operations undertaken by the D.D.O. This has affected the respective missions of both directorates. The Clandestine Service has not had the benefit of intelligence support during consideration and implementation of its operations. The Bay of Pigs invasion was an instance in which D.D.I. analysts, even the Deputy Director for Intelligence, were uninformed, and represents a situation in which timely analysis of political trends and basic geography might have made a difference—either in the decision to embark on the operation or in the plans for the operation. In the D.D.I. lack of knowledge about operations has complicated and undermined the analytic effort. Information on a CIA-sponsored political action program would affect judgments about the results of a forth-

coming election; information provided by a foreign government official would be invaluable in assessing the motives, policies, and dynamics of that government; information on a CIA-sponsored propaganda campaign might alter analyses of the press or public opinion in that country. Essentially, the potential quality of the finished intelligence product suffers.

Duplication a Problem

The agency was created in part to rectify the problem of duplication among the departmental intelligence services. Rather than minimizing the problem, the agency has contributed to it by becoming yet another source of intelligence production. Growth in the range of American foreign policy interests and the D.D.I.'s response to additional requirements have resulted in an increased scale of collection and analysis. Today the CIA's intelligence products include: current intelligence in such disparate areas as science, economics, politics, strategic affairs and technology; quick response to specific requests from government agencies and officials; basic or long-term research; and national intelligence estimates. With the exception of national intelligence estimates other intelligence organizations engage in overlapping intelligence analysis.

Rather than fulfilling the limited mission in intelligence analysis and coordination for which it was created, the agency became a producer of finished intelligence and consistently expanded its areas of responsibility. In political and strategic intelligence the inadequacy of analysis by the State Department and by the military services allowed the agency to lay claim to the two areas. As the need for specialized research in other subjects developed, the D.D.I. responded—as the only potential source for objective national intelligence. Over time the D.D.I. has addressed itself to a full range of consumers in the broadest number of subject areas. Yet the extent to which the analysis satisfied policymakers' needs and was an integral part of the policy process has been limited.

The size of the D.D.I. and the administrative process involved in the production of finished intelligence—a process which involves numerous stages of drafting and review by large numbers of individuals—precluded close association between policymakers and analysts, between the intelligence product and policy informed by intelligence analysis. Even the national intelligence estimates were relegated to briefing papers for

second and third level officials rather than the principal intelligence source for senior policymakers that they were intended to be. Recent efforts to improve the interaction include creating the NED system and assigning two fulltime analysts on location at the Treasury Department. Yet these changes cannot compensate for the failure of the intelligence production system itself, which employs hundreds of analysts, most of whom have little sustained contact with their consumers.

Reciprocal Relationship

At the Presidential level the D.C.I.'s position is essential to the utilization of intelligence. The D.C.I. must be constantly informed, must press for access, must vigorously sell his product, and must anticipate future demands. Those D.C.I.'s who have been most successful in this dimension have been those whose primary identification was not with the D.D.O.

Yet the relationship between intelligence analysis and policymaking is a reciprocal one. Senior policymakers must actively utilize the intelligence capabilities at their disposal. Presidents have looked to the agency more for covert operations than for intelligence analysis. While only the agency could perform covert operations, decision-making methods determined Presidential reliance on the CIA's intelligence capabilities. Preference for small staffs, individual advisers, the need for specialized information, quickly—all of these factors circumscribe a President's channel of information, of which intelligence analysis may be a part. It was John F. Kennedy who largely determined John McCone's relative influence by defining the D.C.I.'s role and by including McCone in the policy process; it was Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon who limited the roles of Richard Helms and William Colby. Although in the abstract objectivity may be the most desirable quality in intelligence analysis, objective judgments are frequently not what senior officials want to hear about their policies. In most cases, Presidents are inclined to look to the judgments of individuals they know and trust. Whether or not a D.C.I. is included among them is the President's choice.

Over the past 30 years the United States has developed an institution and a corps of individuals who constitute the U.S. intelligence profession. The question remains as to how the institution and the individual will best be utilized.

NEW YORK TIMES

30 May 1976

U.S. Is Challenging Rule Making Public Kissinger Briefing

WASHINGTON, May 29 (AP)

—The State Department has decided to appeal a Federal Court ruling in an effort to keep four comments at a news briefing on the Vladivostok arms accord from being attributed directly to Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, a spokesman says.

A State Department lawyer said the practice of attributing

some of Mr. Kissinger's remarks to a senior United States official is important, even though "it may sound silly to people who don't know how the game is played."

He said official public statements by Mr. Kissinger could force other governments to react, but they could choose to ignore remarks attributed only to a United States official.

The ruling, if it stands, would identify Mr. Kissinger as the official who briefed the press on Dec. 3, 1974, when "a senior United States official" reportedly gave details of the nuclear arms accord reached by President Ford and Leonid

Brezhnev, the Soviet leader.

United States District Judge June Green ordered a transcript of the briefing turned over to Morton Halperin, who filed suit to obtain it under the Freedom of Information Act. Mr. Halperin disclosed the ruling on Friday.

The State Department has distributed a transcript of most of the 1974 briefing and gave a copy to Mr. Halperin, but it classified four passages as confidential, contending "attribution of these remarks to the Secretary of State could damage the national security."

Judge Green ruled that there was no authority in any statute

to use that as a reason for classifying information. The judge also noted that the remarks had been made to 32 reporters, two of them foreign, who had no security clearances.

Mr. Halperin, director of a Center for National Security project, is seeking public disclosure of a variety of Federal actions for "open public debate."

Remarks at the briefing, according to Judge Green's ruling, were originally to be attributed to a senior official and remarks identified as being on "deep background" were not to be attributed to anyone.

The State Department lawyer said he could not recall whether the four censored passages were background or deep background. Both Mr. Halperin and the lawyer said they did not know what the four comments were.

NEW YORK TIMES

7 JUN 1976

STUDY FINDS C.I.A. FAILED TO FULFILL SOME KEY TASKS

Report to Senate Unit Says
Analytic Work Suffered
as Covert Acts Grew

PRIORITIES QUESTIONED

Lag Is Seen in Operations
on Economics, Drugs
and Communism

By DAVID BINDER

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 6—An authoritative history of the Central Intelligence Agency released today holds that the agency has failed over the last three decades to fulfill several of its essential missions.

The study, prepared with the cooperation of the agency for the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, further concludes that the agency, over the years, became a bureaucracy that ran amok because of conflicting interests.

It says that the agency, despite its successes, especially in scientific and technical fields, was "distorted" very early by both its directors and their superiors, and moved away from its prime task of providing high quality intelligence analysis for the American political leadership.

Others Share Blame

For example, the history notes that the agency had no estimate of Communist intentions in Korea before the North Korean attack on South Korea in 1950. It also notes that economic intelligence and international narcotics traffic intelligence were given priority only in the last decade and that attention to underdeveloped countries did not begin until the 1960's.

The history, which has been thoroughly read and declassified line for line by agency officials, also says the agency failed to become a truly "central" intelligence service coordinating all espionage resources of the United States.

The study blames a succession of Presidents, Congress, the armed services and the agency itself for the shortcomings. But its principal conclu-

sion is that the C.I.A., because of its peculiar nature, was destined to develop controversial qualities.

The 95-page history was written by Anne Karalekas, a young Harvard-trained historian.

It contains no shocking disclosures about individual aberrations or covert action disasters. But it does tell about rivalry in the American intelligence community, a lack of accountability to the executive and some peculiar priorities.

Miss Karalekas spent two months studying the agency's own histories, numbering 75 volumes, and eight months interviewing 60 present and former agency officials.

Her five-page conclusion says the agency "responded to rather than anticipated the force of change" over the last 30 years and "accumulated functions rather than redefining them."

"Its internal patterns were established early and have so hardened," she said.

Rivalries Persist

She further concludes that the agency never succeeded in overcoming rivalry from other intelligence services, operated by the four armed service branches. The one man to blame for this, she says, was Allen W. Dulles, who directed the agency from 1953 to 1961.

The history suggests that the chief C.I.A. job, Director of Central Intelligence, involves too many tasks.

It says, giving evidence, that the agency was very early pointed in the direction of covert operations abroad at the expense of classical analytic intelligence work and that the agency "complicated" rather than minimized problems of duplication of intelligence. It says that, even after 30 years of operation, the agency remains an organization with sharp rivalries between its clandestine and analytical sections.

Finally, it says the agency's main product, its so-called national intelligence estimates, have largely gone unread by its intended consumers, including a succession of Presidents.

Miss Karalekas writes that the evolution of the agency, which she describes as "undirected," was determined by four factors—the international environment, as perceived by the Administration of President Truman, the milieu of intelligence institutions, the agency's structures and values and the personalities of the agency Directors.

In other terms, she said, this meant the growing cold war with the Soviet Union, the jealousy of the military intelligence services and the temptation for C.I.A. officials to seek spectacular "successes."

Miss Karalekas notes that at the end of World War II there was a predisposition among American policymakers to centralize the Government's many intelligence functions.

The reason, she writes, was the experience of the Pearl Harbor attack in 1941 by Japan when bits of intelligence gathered by one agency never reached other intelligence analysts who could have used them to predict the assault.

Miss Karalekas names Gen. William Donovan, the wartime head of the Office of Strategic Services; James V. Forrestal, Secretary of the Navy, President Truman and Ferdinand Eberstadt, an investment banker, as the founding spirits of the C.I.A.

But she notes that the Central Intelligence Group, the predecessor organization of the C.I.A., established in January 1946, lacked money and personnel and was contested by the military services and the State Department. At that, three of the four initial Directors of the Central Intelligence Group were military men.

In the beginning J. Edgar Hoover's Federal Bureau of Investigation refused to allow the central intelligence organization to touch Latin America. And until 1950 Gen. Douglas A. MacArthur barred clandestine operations in the Far East.

Clandestine intelligence collection began about 1950 under Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, who became Director three years after the C.I.A. was formally constituted.

Under General Smith, and under the pressures of the Korean war, the agency swiftly assumed the basic shape it now has, the history says.

That is, it was formed to handle overt and clandestine collection of intelligence, covert operations, analysis and coordination of overall American intelligence activities.

The Soviet Union was made the principal target of American intelligence in March 1946, three years before the Russians exploded their first atomic weapon. The agency then had 1,816 employees. Five years later, under General Smith, the number was 3,338.

But Miss Karalekas also

found strange elements in the expanding American intelligence effort, such as no correct estimate in 1950 on Communist intentions in Korea, virtual dependence on friendly foreign intelligence agencies for clandestine reporting and a heavy concentration on turning out a "daily intelligence summary" instead of long-range estimates.

"Its intelligence became directed to a working-level audience rather than to senior policymakers," she says. "In attempting to do everything it was contributing almost nothing."

Miss Karalekas also reports that four years after the agency was established 24 Government departments and agencies were still "producing economic intelligence." In 1962 there were three military research groups in the C.I.A. alone, a situation that was not rectified until 1965.

The history attributes this continuing duplication of effort to the ambition of the agency leaders to outstrip the military intelligence services and to gain greater access to the White House.

As a result, it concludes, there "tension" within the agency and a proliferation of intelligence products unused by the officials they were intended for. One retired analyst is quoted as having said: "Our biggest problem was whether or not anybody would read our product." It was a complaint also frequently made by William E. Colby when he was director from 1973 to 1976.

The agency's covert actions began in 1948, a year after the establishment of the C.I.A. Miss Karalekas attributes their conception to George F. Kennan, then director of policy planning at the State Department.

She quotes Mr. Kennan as having said he was alarmed later over the massive covert operations undertaken on what he had regarded as a modest suggestion.

WASHINGTON STAR
18 MAY 1976

Defense Intelligence Agency Gets Chief

Lt. Gen. Samuel V. Wilson, who has served in Vietnam, the Soviet Union and with the CIA, was named yesterday as head of the Defense Intelligence Agency.

DIA collects information through the military attaché officers in embassies throughout the world. Wilson will succeed Lt. Gen. Daniel O. Graham, who resigned last fall after James R. Schlesinger was replaced as secretary of defense.

Wilson, 54, served in Vietnam with the Agency for International Development from 1964 to 1967, and was U.S. defense attaché in Moscow from 1971 to 1973. He has been deputy CIA director and most recently was deputy assistant secretary of defense for intelligence.

The DIA has been under intensive congressional investigation, along with other U.S. intelligence agencies, during the past 15 months.

NEW YORK TIMES
7 JUN 1976

An Authority on the History of the C.I.A.

Anne Karalekas

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 6—Until last summer, Anne Karalekas's only acquaintance with the nether world of foreign intelligence services was her study, for her doctoral thesis, of records of British and American espionage efforts in Greece in World War II. Since then, by dint of what she describes as "20-hour weeks," and a special entree into the dead files and living memories of American spies and agents, she has become an authority on the history of the United States Central Intelligence Agency.

Miss Karalekas's assignment was to write the 30-year institutional history of postwar American intelligence operations for the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities.

The tall, slender Boston native was chosen from a field of 15 candidates partly on the recommendation of her associates at Harvard and partly on the basis of her doctoral dissertation on American and British activities in wartime Greece.

"Anne was always interested in history," said her mother, Helen Karalekas, who works for the State Street Bank and Trust Company in Boston. "She always seemed to know what she wanted to do."

Lillian Lapidus, who taught Miss Karalekas ancient history

at the Girls' Latin School in Boston, recalled her as "one of the brightest, well-qualified students I ever had — she always wanted to know why."

Miss Karalekas was born Nov. 6, 1946, about 10 months before the Central Intelligence Group, the predecessor of the C.I.A., was founded. Her father, Chris, a second-generation Greek-American, was in the bakery business. She attended elementary schools in Boston and Florida.

No Greek was spoken in the Karalekas home, "which made it harder," she said, for her to absorb the language at a Greek school she attended three times a week for five years. But she can converse in Greek, can cook Greek dishes and occasionally wears Greek costume jewelry.

Thankful for 'Standards'

At Girls' Latin, she was an honor student all four years, and she remains grateful to teachers such as Mrs. Lapidus, Elizabeth Condon and Edith Campbell, all retired, for their demanding "standards."

On a Merit scholarship, she attended Wheaton College, where it was still called a "girls' school" rather than a "women's college," as today. After briefly considering a career in art history, Miss Karalekas concentrated on straight history and wrote her senior thesis on "the termination of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1921" for Prof. Paul Helmreich.

She worked summer vacations from school as a clerical assistant at the Boston Symphony, a receptionist at a law firm and a research assistant at a university.

Professor Helmreich encouraged her to go to graduate school and introduced her to Ernest R. May, a Harvard history professor who had been his teacher.

While working toward a master's degree, Miss Karalekas "took a year off" to work at Massachusetts General Hospital in administrative and supervisory capacities.

Her doctoral thesis stemmed from her being "interested in Greece and wanting to incorporate something from the war." During one summer, she researched recently released British diplomatic files at the Public Record Office in London. The thesis, "Britain, the United States and Greece—1942 to 1945," was completed in August 1974, and her degree was granted three months later.

In the meantime Graham T. Allison, Professor of Politics at Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government, asked Miss Karalekas to work on a series of projects on defense and arms-control policy.

He said that she had proven to be "bright and industrious" in managing a project on military operations in the Indochina conflict and in writing a report on foreign policy for an independent commission headed by former Ambassador Robert D. Murphy.

When William B. Bader of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities began looking for academically trained candidates to write the C.I.A. history, he turned to Professor May. "She was the first one who came to my mind," Mr. May recalled in a telephone conversation about Miss Karalekas. "She's very quick, writes well and has a clear mind." He added that Miss Karalekas was particularly qualified because she had studied "bureaucratic politics" at Harvard.

Studied Secret Volumes

She arrived in Washington one year ago on an assignment that carried an annual salary of \$18,000. She said she had been "completely free" to decide how to approach the subject and had spent the first two months browsing through a secret 75-volume compendium of C.I.A. history.

Then she began a series of 60 interviews with working and retired agency employees. Miss Karalekas completed the history in early spring, but it had to pass through agonizing bargaining sessions with top C.I.A. personnel over what could and could not be published.

Miss Karalekas is not sure whether she wants to continue delving into the intelligence field, now that her assignment is over. "I might write a few articles on intelligence," she said. "I guess that's it, sad to say. I'm not really set on a career ladder. I might like to work in the

NEWSDAY
27 May 1976

CIA: No Newsmen Need Apply

Your editorial "A Case of Subversion From Within" (May 5) has come to my attention. In it you said my statement of last February 11 "seemed to promise that journalists would no longer be hired."

My statement said: "Effective immediately, CIA will not enter into any paid or contractual relationship with any full-time or part-time news correspondent accredited by any U.S. new service, newspaper, periodical, radio or television network or station. As soon as feasible, the agency will bring existing relationships with individuals in these groups into conformity with this new policy."

This policy is being carried out.

You may base the views in your editorial on statements in the Senate Select Committee report. The committee was working from brief and necessarily highly sanitized case summaries. We do not necessarily agree with their conclusions.

Although the body of your editorial says nothing about subversion, the caption over it does. I can assure you it has never been the intent, nor is it the intent now, nor will it be the intent in the future, for the CIA to attempt to "subvert" the American press.

George Bush, Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C.

LONDON TIMES
18 May 1976

Penkovsky Papers

From Dr Robert Conquest

Sir, Owing to travel, I have only today seen *The Times* Diary in your issue of April 29, which alleges that the *Penkovsky Papers* have now been proved a fabrication, and attacks me for maintaining the opposite.

It is true that students of Soviet affairs have on occasion endorsed, or partially endorsed, fakes (as with Deutscher and Carr in the cases of "Budu Mdvani" and the "Litvinov Diaries" respectively); and had your Diarist's assertion been true, I would naturally have admitted my error. But it is not.

All that even the egregious Senate Committee's report on Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans, which your Diarist quotes, in fact says is that the book was prepared and written by CIA "agency assets", but on the basis of the "actual case materials". But this is no more than a hostile way of saying that the materials came through the CIA (who were, rather naturally, Colonel Penkovsky's American contacts), and that thereafter they were translated and edited by someone in the CIA's confidence. There is nothing new here, let alone any proof of "palpable forgery". And that such editing

took place has never been disputed: it is indeed stated in the book itself.

This is obviously not an entirely satisfactory situation, but it leaves the question of authenticity as one of judgment of the actual text. Criticism of it, as against mere anti-CIA abuse, has been based solely on critics' misunderstandings of trivia, and on amateur telepsychology ("Colonel Penkovsky would not have..."). Until the CIA releases the original "case material", as I hope it will, one can only say that the arguments for general authenticity (and the negative arguments against "forgery") remain incomparably stronger than their contraries. At the very least, the inexperienced intuitions of Mr Brogan cannot be taken very seriously, any more than your Diarist's attempt to squeeze implications out of the report of the Church Committee. That Committee has itself been attacked in the United States even by liberal columnists as largely a politically motivated farce. To find *Times* contributors who go a good deal further is a little disturbing.

Yours faithfully,
ROBERT CONQUEST,
Woodrow Wilson International
Center for Scholars,
Smithsonian Institution,
Washington,
May 12.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY, JUNE 6, 1976

C.I.A. Analyst Cites U.S. Risk in Delayed China Links

By LESLIE H. GELB

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 3—A senior analyst of the Central Intelligence Agency, in an unusual published critique of the Administration's policy, says that further delay in formally recognizing China runs the risk of destroying the new American relationship with Peking.

In the issue of Foreign Policy magazine released today, Roger Glenn Brown argues that the new relationship may not be strong enough to survive the death of Chairman Mao Tse-tung and that without Mr. Mao to hold the Western-oriented groups together, China will move either toward a new isolationism or toward accommodation with the Soviet Union.

Either move, Mr. Brown concludes, would undermine Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger's balancing act with Moscow and Peking and undercut an important source of leverage on Moscow.

Views in the Minority

The views expressed in the article are specifically stated to be the author's own. But it is nonetheless, highly unusual for a Central Intelligence Agency

analyst to publish on policy questions, particularly when the article represents an implicit attack on the Ford Administration's go-slow policy in a Presidential election year.

The significance of the article is that it represents the first surface indication of a running dispute among the Administration's China specialists over how deeply rooted the anti-Soviet line is within Peking's power structure.

An agency spokesman, when asked yesterday, stressed that Mr. Brown was presenting his own opinions and that the agency encouraged the publication of scholarly articles, but did not comment on Administration policy.

Today, the spokesman telephoned to say that Mr. Brown was not a senior analyst, that he was only 35 years old, that he has been with the agency for nine years, only four of which were spent on China, that the article was written last year and that he was not currently working on anything to do with China.

Several Administration officials said that Mr. Brown was a well-established China analyst and that as far as they

knew he was still working on matters related to China. They suggested that the agency must be under heavy criticism for allowing the publication of the article and that it was now attempting to put distance between itself and Mr. Brown.

The dispute is not over whether the United States should now be engaged in negotiations on the full normalization of relations with China, including the dissolution of the American mutual defense treaty with Taiwan. The experts have been virtually unanimous in recommending that these talks get underway. Their latest effort to bring this about failed last summer after the capture of Saigon and with the Presidential elections looming.

Place in Alarmist Group

Rather, the debate occurs over more specific issues about which the analysts have little hard evidence: is foreign policy a major factor in the recurring struggles for power in Peking? If it is, does the opening to the West depend on Mr. Mao and his well-known distrust of Moscow? If, as seems likely to most analysts, Mr. Mao dies before the end of the year, should the

United States move urgently to settle the Taiwan issue and perhaps establish some kind of military relationship with China? If China after Mao is to move away from Washington, how far might it move toward Moscow?

Mr. Brown's article, according to Administration officials, places him squarely in the most alarmist group of experts about the future of Chinese-American relations. His school of thought, however, looked valid recently when the dominant group of experts missed badly on an important prediction.

That group predicted that Premier Chou En-lai was almost certain to be succeeded by acting Prime Minister Teng Hsiao-ping. The successor, however, was Hua Kuo-feng, whose commitment to recent foreign policy is reportedly less than Mr. Teng's.

Mr. Brown argues in his article that foreign policy issues are a major factor in internal Chinese politics. He also suggests that Mr. Teng's recent fall from power may be tied in part to his efforts to seek western technology, including military technology.

WASHINGTON POST

4 JUN 1976

Victor Zorza

Debate About a Sino-Soviet Rapprochement

The possibility of a reconciliation between China and Russia is no longer dismissed in Washington as readily as it once was. An article in the new issue of Foreign Policy by Roger Brown, a senior analyst at the CIA, warns the Administration that U.S. policy could lead Peking to seek an accommodation with Moscow. To avert this, he recommends full U.S. recognition of China, which would entail the breaking of diplomatic ties with Taiwan, and the provision of U.S. military equipment to the Peking regime.

It is unusual not to say unprecedented, for the CIA to join in a public debate about the direction of U.S. policy. An editorial note explains that Brown is presenting his own views, not those of the CIA. But the article will, inevitably, be seen in some foreign capitals as a deliberate signal of the Administration's intentions.

Nothing could be further from the truth. Indeed, administration officials fear that the appearance of the article may complicate U.S. relations with both Moscow and Peking. They are angry with the CIA for clearing the article for publication. They are also concerned that some of the issues raised by Brown may become involved in the election campaign. Ronald Reagan has already denounced the Administration's plans to "sacrifice" Taiwan, and Kissinger has promptly denied that

there is any such intention.

Brown's article is a contribution to a high-level debate that the Administration has tried hard to keep private. There is a similar debate within the CIA itself—not, indeed, about the policy the U.S. should follow, since the CIA is supposed to keep out of policy-making, but about the analysis that should be supplied to the policy-makers.

The overwhelming weight of opinion within the intelligence community—of which the CIA is only one segment—has long been on the side of those who believed that there was no serious possibility of a Sino-Soviet reconciliation. It therefore followed that there was no pressing need to mollify Peking either by ditching Taiwan or by offering arms to China. But a small minority of analysts, made up of seven men who were listed as "dissenters" in a State Department memorandum last year, believed otherwise.

Brown says that it has been a premise of U.S. policy since 1949 that relations between Peking and Moscow are likely to remain hostile, and then proceeds to question its validity. He argues that prolonged stagnation in Sino-U.S. relations could help to undermine the power of those Chinese leaders who are favorably disposed toward Washington, and strengthen the pro-Soviet elements in the leadership. Then, in the power struggle that follows the death of Mao, China might "seek a general accommodation with Moscow."

Since these eventualities are clearly not in the best interest of the United States," he says, "I believe that Washington should consider recognizing Peking" before Mao's death. This, he argues, might influence the configuration of political power in China, and the course of the post-Mao succession struggle.

He sees China's recent purchase of Rolls Royce fighter aircraft engines from Britain as a strong indication of its interest in Western military technology. He argues, by implication, in favor of similar U.S. sales, since these would lead to increased Sino-Soviet tension, "thus inhibiting any moves toward Sino-Soviet reconciliation."

The first serious proposal along these lines was made last fall in a Foreign Policy article by Michael Pillsbury, a Rand analyst who was strongly attacked by Washington officials for what they described as a wrongheaded and irresponsible approach. But the very vehemence of their attack showed the importance of the issue they were trying to play down. Now comes the Brown article, hard on the heels of a full-scale CIA study entitled "Prospects for a Sino-Soviet Rapprochement after Mao," which clings to the established line.

The CIA's basic conclusions are that even if a desire to reduce differences should emerge among Chinese and Soviet leaders after Mao's death, Peking

and Moscow would each find that formidable obstacles, created by conflicting national interests, would circumscribe the concessions each could offer to the other. But the questions first raised by Pillsbury have had a considerable impact on Washington's policymakers, if not on the analysts.

A memorandum recently sent to the China-watching section of the State De-

partment's own intelligence organization listed a series of questions posed by Kissinger. "What should we be doing," it asked, "to deter a Chinese-Soviet rapprochement?"

"We doubt," said a response dated May 6, "that any faction (in Peking) would dare to undertake a major foreign policy re-orientation. . . . Rather than ask what we should do to deter a Sino-Soviet rapprochement, perhaps

we should examine the basic assumptions." But even this, the memorandum suggested, should wait until later in the year, when the analysis might be found useful by a new administration. But what if Mao dies first? If Kissinger really wants to know what to do, he will have to read Brown's article.

—GARY VICTOR ZORN

The Washington Star

Saturday, June 5, 1976

State Irritated by China Article

CIA to Review Publication Policy

By Henry S. Bradsher
Washington Star Staff Writer

CIA Director George Bush has ordered a review of the agency's policy on allowing its employees to publish articles following what a CIA spokesman called misinterpretation of an article on America's China policy.

The article, appearing in the current issue of the quarterly magazine Foreign Policy, says the United States should consider establishing full diplomatic relations with Peking before the aged and feeble Mao Tse-tung dies, in hopes that this might influence Chinese policies.

China might turn isolationist or patch up relations with the Soviet Union after Mao dies, according to the author, Roger Glenn Brown of the CIA. He suggests that U.S. recognition of Peking could give Washington some influence on this.

THE ARTICLE caused irritation yesterday at the State Department, which had become aware of it only a day or two earlier. Senior officials felt the CIA name was being used to jostle official policy of working quietly toward full relations with China.

That policy has been stymied, however, by the U.S. defense treaty with the Chinese Nationalist regime on Taiwan, with which Washington has full diplomatic relations.

While the formalities of diplomatic recognition were switched from Taiwan to Peking fairly easily by countries such as Japan, these countries lacked the complication of being committed to Taiwan's defense against Peking.

Brown simply suggested that "the United States could follow the 'Japanese model' without explaining what to do about the defense tie. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger said at the close of President Ford's visit to Peking in

December that the U.S.-Taiwan treaty was an unresolved problem in switching relations. This still is true.

THE STATE Department's spokesman, Robert L. Funseth, said yesterday that commentaries by government officials on foreign policy "should be cleared in advance by the State Department."

A CIA spokesman said Bush's order for a review of the agency's publication policy was not the result of any complaints from outside the agency. It was decided upon in order to avoid problems of misinterpretation such as occurred over Brown's article, he said.

The article was published with a statement disclaim-

ing that it represented CIA attitudes, although Brown was identified as a senior analyst at the agency's office of political research.

Bush does not intend to prevent all publication of CIA material, the spokesman said. In recent years CIA analysts have been publishing increasingly widely in academic journals, congressional studies and other forms. Most articles have dealt with factual material on foreign countries assembled and analyzed by them, rather than U.S. governmental policies.

AT THE TIME of escalating U.S. involvement in Vietnam, the quarterly magazine Foreign Affairs

— a different publication from Foreign Policy — published an article supporting the commitment written by George A. Carver. He was identified only as a specialist in Vietnamese affairs.

This caused an outcry in Washington. Carver was then a senior CIA official helping shape Vietnam policy, and the failure to tell readers of this connection brought congressional and press complaints.

The identification of Brown in the present article apparently was intended to head off such complaints. But despite the disclaimer,

his article appeared as a reflection of a viewpoint within the government.

EDITOR & PUBLISHER

1 MAY 1976

CIA doubletalk

In February, CIA Director George Bush issued a statement saying: "Effective immediately, the CIA will not enter into any paid or contractual relationship with any full-time or part-time news correspondent accredited by any U.S. news service, newspaper, periodical, radio or television network or station." E&P (Feb. 21, page 6) applauded the statement as did many publications.

Mr. Bush repeated that statement last week in response to a question before the annual meeting of the American Society of Newspaper Editors in Washington.

Now the report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities discloses that "of the approximately 50 U.S. journalists or personnel of U.S. media organizations who were employed by the CIA or maintained some other covert relationship with it at the time of the announcement, fewer than one-half will be terminated under the new CIA guidelines."

The committee says the key word is "accredited" and the agency interprets it as applying to those who are "formally authorized by contract or issuance of press credentials to represent themselves as correspondents" leaving all others (executives and free lancers) as not included.

This is CIA doubletalk.

The damage to the integrity of all responsible news people continues with this sham.

Mr. Bush should immediately clarify the CIA position by saying "all news people" are included in the prohibition, not just some.

BALTIMORE SUN
5 JUNE 1976

Funseth rebukes CIA on China recognition call

By HENRY L. TREWITT
Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington—The State Department frostily rebuked the Central Intelligence Agency yesterday for an article advocating early formal recognition of China.

Robert L. Funseth, the State Department spokesman, did not quite put his comments in those terms. But he left no other obvious inference.

Yes, he said, the State Department felt articles by government officials on foreign policy should be cleared through the department, even when they were framed as personal opinions. No, that had not been done in this case.

He refused to comment on the substance of the article by Roger Glenn Brown in the magazine *Foreign Policy*. Mr. Brown, 35, was described as a former specialist on China for the CIA, now assigned to another area.

of area.

His article is labeled as a reflection of his own personal, unofficial judgment. It advocates complete normalization of United States-China relations before the death of Mao Tse-tung, the Chinese leader, who is 82 years old and visibly feeble.

As Mr. Funseth implied, it is impossible for a CIA analyst to publish anything without its carrying policy overtones. President Ford already is under fire politically for alleged plans to sever formal ties with the Nationalist government on Taiwan quickly if he is elected in November.

That accusation first was made by several members of Congress. Ronald Reagan, Mr. Ford's Republican challenger, has translated it into a suggestion that the administration plans to "sacrifice" its defense commitment of a generation to Taiwan.

The administration's re-

sponse has been the one repeated by Mr. Funseth. He recalled that the Shanghai communique, issued during former President Richard M. Nixon's trip to China in 1972, committed the two governments to eventual normalization of relations.

"We have been proceeding step by step," he said, but there was no commitment to the specific form normalization would take or the timing. The timing was said to remain open, but many specialists in the U.S. argue for sooner rather than later.

The critical question on terms of normalization concerns the U.S. defense treaty with Taiwan. China, at least publicly, has said it must be abandoned as a precondition for normalization. The U.S. has hedged, and Mr. Funseth said yesterday he did not know U.S. plans in that regard.

Otherwise it generally is ac-

cepted that the normalization will follow the pattern set by Japan, political recognition of Peking while maintaining economic ties with Taipei. But given the uncertainties of domestic politics, the issue is a hard one for the administration to deal with now.

Mr. Funseth sidestepped the question whether swift recognition was advocated by many in the administration but prevented essentially by Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State. Normally, he said, there was a wide range of views on foreign policy issues within the bureaucracy.

The Brown article was symbolic, at least, of how such conflicting interests sometimes are translated into pressure for a specific goal. But several officials with otherwise conflicting views rejected the idea that the publication represented in any way a disguised effort to test public opinion.

WASHINGTON POST
9 JUN 1976

Black-Market Money Deals Laid to CIA

By Lewis H. Diuguid
and Don Oberdorfer

Washington Post Staff Writers

The Central Intelligence Agency used black-market transactions to finance its activities in Vietnam and Chile even while other U.S. agencies worked to stamp out corruption and shore up those economies, according to former officials familiar with CIA funding.

The Vietnam transactions involved millions of dollars traded for piasters on the black market in Hong Kong, according to these sources.

One former CIA official said that at some points during the war nearly all the foreign currency spent by the Saigon station of the CIA was acquired through such transactions.

Charles A. Cooper, who served as an economic adviser to the U.S. embassy in Saigon in 1968-9 and minister counselor for economics there in 1970-3, said in response to questions that CIA officials told him they preferred to obtain funds through "the black bag" from Hong Kong due to "operational reasons" and because such transactions made their budget go further.

Cooper said he did not know what proportion of Saigon CIA expenditures were financed through black-market transactions.

The scale of CIA spending,

in Saigon during his time was "too small for an overall economic effect" in view of much larger outlays through legal markets by the U.S. military and foreign aid agencies, he said.

During the intensive phase of U.S. military operations in the 1960s the official exchange rate applying to U.S. government transactions was 118 piasters to the dollar. Black-market rates were often two or three times higher.

Vietnam devalued the piaster for most purposes to 275 to the dollar in October 1970, under heavy U.S. pressure, and successive adjustments in later years brought legal rates to over 600 piasters per dollar.

While pushing for more realistic rates, U.S. policy opposed black-market transactions.

Testimony by a U.S. embassy official before a Senate subcommittee in November, 1969, said those dealing in the black market "give aid and comfort to the enemy" and make the Vietnamese economy more unstable and subvert efforts to establish economic stability in Vietnam.

A former CIA official who asked not to be quoted by name said he believed the agency's resort to the black market in the early 1970s was due at least in part to a heavy budgetary drain

caused by the effort to secretly raise a sunken Russian submarine in the Pacific.

The CIA effort to raise the Soviet sub with a specially constructed research ship, the Hughes Glomar Explorer, began early in 1970 and its cost has been estimated as high as \$500 million.

CIA purchases of Chilean currency on the black market were at a time when the U.S. embassy there was purchasing about \$30,000 monthly in Chilean escudos outside the country in Argentina.

During this period the United States was seeking to shore up the Chilean economy in support of Presi-

dent Eduardo Frei.

After the election of Salvador Allende as president of Chile in November 1970 black-market rates, which previously maintained a 25 per cent premium above the legal market, soared as high as 2 to 1.

U.S. policy turned sharply against the new regime. The CIA is said to have increased its black-market transactions during the Allende period to include operational funds.

U.S. regulations forbid any American official abroad from dealing in black-market currency.

A CIA spokesman said yesterday that the agency had no comment on the reports of black-market transactions.

NEWSWEEK

7 June 1976

SHAKE-UP AT THE CIA

When the dust settles, six of the CIA's top eight men will be new to the job. The replacement of CIA chief William Colby by George Bush and the ascension of veteran agency administrator Henry Knoche into the No. 2 spot are only the most prominent changings of the guard. William Wells will become the new head of clandestine operations, replacing William Nelson, who recently resigned. Others reportedly planning to leave office include Edward Proctor, deputy director for intelligence; George Carver, in charge of final "estimates" on intelligence, and Carl Duckett, chief of science and technology, who led the attempt to raise a sunken Russian sub with the Glomar Explorer.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, SUNDAY, JUNE 6, 1976

Ex-C.I.A. Head For Penalizing Aides Who Leak Data

Special to The New York Times

PRINCETON, N.J., June 5—William E. Colby, the former director of Central Intelligence, proposed today that any restraints or penalties on the release of secret documents to the press should be placed on Federal officials instead of on reporters.

"I think our intelligence needs the same sort of protection—and no more—that we afford to your income tax returns," Mr. Colby said. "If an Internal Revenue man reveals your return, he commits a crime."

In explaining his proposal, Mr. Colby added that it applies only to the individual who joined the intelligence service, not to Daniel Schorr or who ever got the agent to tell, because Mr. Schorr and all other reporters are protected under the First Amendment.

Mr. Colby made his remarks at a round-table discussion on "The Ethics of Leaks: The Right to Withhold Versus the

Right to Know," which was attended by seven journalists, including Mr. Schorr, the CBS-TV investigative reporter who gave The Village Voice a copy of the House Intelligence Committee's report on the C.I.A.

The symposium was sponsored by The Daily Princetonian, the student newspaper at Princeton University, as one part of the alumni reunion festivities that have been going on here all weekend.

In discussing ways to eliminate unauthorized disclosures, he rejected the idea of an official secrets act with criminal penalties against the transfer of confidential information to nongovernmental personnel, such as reporters.

"There you do conflict with the First Amendment," he said. "There are instead ways to improve the discipline of those who know the secrets."

Mr. Schorr said he concurred with some of Mr. Colby's suggestions for preventing unauthorized disclosures.

"It's the job of Government

to keep secrets, and it's the job of the press to try to find out what's going on," Mr. Schorr said. "But once a journalist has a secret, there is no constitutional power for the Government to try to grab it back."

Mr. Schorr warned that "until we get back on an even course in this country and get away from Watergate, we will need a certain amount of whistle-blowing and leaking." He added:

"If our intelligence agencies, in a great and painful inquest, can cover up anything as they have done in the past, one way to be sure they will not in the future is to have a young man who will leak and leave the salutary benefits of leaking to society."

Edward Barrett, director of the Communications Institute and former dean of the Columbia Journalism School, suggested that Mr. Colby's proposal be modified to include a bipartisan blue-ribbon appeals panel composed of citizens with

security clearances.

"This should be an independent body that people like Daniel Ellsberg can appeal to if they feel information is being improperly withheld," Mr. Barrett explained. Daniel Ellsberg has said that he gave the "Pentagon Papers" to the press.

Jose Ferrer 3d, editor of the law section of Time magazine, disagreed with Mr. Colby's proposal.

"I'm not convinced that the depth of the problem calls for new laws," Mr. Ferrer said. "Watergate seems to point in the other direction. Legislation to push back to an era of greater secrecy is not now called for."

Others on the panel were William Attwood, the publisher of Newsday; William Ewing of Philadelphia, a lawyer; and Donald Oberdorfer, a national-affairs reporter for The Washington Post. John B. Oakes, editorial page editor of The New York Times, was the moderator.

NEW YORK TIMES
5 June 1976

U.S. Disavows C.I.A. Analyst On Article About China Ties

WASHINGTON, June 4 (AP)—The United States dissociated itself today from a recommendation by a senior analyst of the Central Intelligence Agency that the United States consider full recognition of China before the death of Mao Tse-tung.

A State Department spokesman, Robert Funseth, said the United States remained committed to normalizing relations with Peking but has not set a deadline for accomplishing it.

Writing in the quarterly magazine Foreign Policy, Roger Glenn Brown, the C.I.A. analyst, said that failure to act before Mr. Mao dies could undermine the pro-American faction in Peking and strengthen pro-Soviet forces. Mr. Mao is 82 and is reported to be in frail health.

NEW YORK TIMES
16 May 1976

John Adams's Wisdom

To the Editor:

At a time when we are taking a close look at the activities of the C.I.A. and the F.B.I., I would like to nominate for the quotation of the day the following:

Let us preserve our temper, our wisdom, our humanity and civility, though our enemies are every day renouncing theirs. John Adams

Adams wrote this in a letter to Joseph Ward when the British were making destructive raids and burning towns on the New England coast.

ROBERT J. TAYLOR

Editor in Chief, The Adams Papers
Boston, May 4, 1976

WASHINGTON POST
27 MAY '76

CIA Policy on Journalists Draws Assent, Bush Says

By Laurence Stern
Washington Post Staff Writer

CIA Director George Bush has said that his policy on the use of journalists for foreign intelligence operations had met with "considerable quiet understanding" by "a number of members of the Fourth Estate."

Bush made the statement in a letter to The Fund For Investigative Journalism, a Washington-based organization of journalists which had requested that he prohibit the recruitment and use by the Central Intelligence Agency of all journalists, including free-lancers, stringers and part-time editors and reporters.

The CIA director's May 21 letter was made public by the Fund in the wake of charges by the Soviet weekly Literary Gazette that three American correspondents in Moscow are working for the CIA.

Although Bush did not specify whose opinions he sought in the U.S. journalistic community, he recalled that he had enunciated his

new policy in recent appearances before the American Society of Newspaper Editors and the Overseas Press Club.

"I have also talked privately to a number of members of the Fourth Estate," wrote Bush. "Although not all of them are totally happy with the situation as it is, I have met with considerable quiet understanding."

"One top figure in the national media told me privately that he thought that after issuance of my statement, no more could properly be demanded of us."

In a statement issued on Feb. 11, shortly after he took over as CIA director, Bush announced that the agency would no longer enter into paid or contractual relations with any full-time or part-time news correspondent "accredited by a U.S. news service, newspaper, periodical, radio or television network or station." There was no elaboration of what accredited means.

He also said that the agency would bring existing relationships with such jour-

nalists to an end "as soon as feasible."

However, both Bush and his predecessor, William E. Colby, made it clear that the agency would still retain the services of free-lance and part-time journalists who did not fall into the category of those "accredited" to U.S. media.

The Senate Intelligence Committee, in a recent report on the agency's use of journalists, said that, as many as 50 stringers, who are paid on the basis of articles written, were on contract as intelligence operatives.

The report also said that two full-time, accredited correspondents abroad had working relationships with the CIA as of last February.

While Bush did not name the journalists he consulted on his policy, he conferred with editors of The New York Times and executives of both CBS and the Westinghouse network shortly after his installation as CIA director. The three sessions were conducted privately during a visit by Bush to New York.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, WEDNESDAY, MAY 26, 1976

Paper in Moscow Links 3 U.S. Correspondents to the C.I.A.

MOSCOW, May 25 (UPI)—

The Soviet weekly Literaturnaya Gazeta, in its issue for tomorrow, suggested that three American news correspondents accredited in Moscow were associated with the United States Central Intelligence Agency.

The correspondents were Christopher S. Wren of the New York Times, George Krimsky of The Associated Press and Alfred Friendly Jr. of Newsweek.

Literaturnaya Gazeta, the publication of the Union of Soviet Writers, gave no evidence to support its allegation.

A United States Embassy spokesman denied the allegation.

"We certainly know of no journalist in this town who has any connection with the C.I.A.," the spokesman said.

In Washington, the Central Intelligence Agency said that pending study of the full Soviet article, it would stand by the statement by the embassy spokesman in Moscow that he knew of no American journalist in the Soviet capital with any C.I.A. connections, United Press International reported.

Much of the article, two full columns on page 9, quoted extensively from the American press about the alleged involvement of some newsmen with the C.I.A.

Of the three newsmen in Moscow, it said:

"Their loyalty to the C.I.A. is surprisingly combined with their commitment to the free press."

The literary publication said it had received letters from readers in Moscow, Tbilisi and Tallinn "confirming this."

"These letters concretely and convincingly described the hostile, subversive activity of these correspondents in plain clothes," Literaturnaya Gazeta said.

It gave no indication of who had sent such letters or what they contained.

"In particular," the article said, "the letters spoke about the heightened interest of these correspondents in certain information and objects that evidently exceeded the framework of the journalists' profession."

It added that the correspondents "do not bother their professional conscience" about journalistic ideals and alleged "They receive their payments from places other than the cash offices of their newspapers."

A senior Western diplomat said the allegation was clearly "preposterous" but could not immediately offer any explanation for it. The three correspondents are competent in the Russian language and have worked in the Soviet Union for two years or more.

Although the Russians have often made accusations in the past against American and other foreign reporters accredited in Moscow, this was the first time in recent memory that the Russians have alleged any link between a correspondent and the Central Intelligence Agency.

Allegations Strongly Denied

The Associated Press, Newsweek and The New York Times each denied charges yesterday by the Soviet weekly Literaturnaya Gazeta that their Moscow correspondents were associated with the Central Intelligence Agency.

"It's ridiculous," said a spokesman for the A.P.

"Newsweek correspondents work for Newsweek only," a spokesman for Newsweek said.

In a statement, The New York Times Company said that "The Times emphatically denies the charge." The statement said that The Times had received assurances in the past from George Bush, Director of Central Intelligence, that no staff member or employee of The

New York Times was used operationally by the C.I.A. The Times said that it would once again seek to get assurances from Mr. Bush that no Times employees or part-time employees were involved in C.I.A. activities.

The Times said that if these assurances were not forthcoming, it would consider filing suit to compel the C.I.A. to make the information known. Arthur Ochs Sulzberger, publisher of The New York Times, said that the present C.I.A. policy of refusing to reveal its full association with American journalists had the effect of casting suspicion on all newsmen and making them "susceptible to any unsubstantiated charges that anyone might wish to bring against them."

Neither Mr. Krimsky nor Mr. Friendly could be reached for comment. Mr. Wren, speaking from The Times Moscow bureau, said that the charges were "totally fabricated."

"I am looking forward to having them present me with the evidence," Mr. Wren said.

Wren in Moscow 3 Years

Mr. Wren became Moscow bureau chief in December 1974 after a year as a Times correspondent in the Soviet Union. Before that he worked on the metropolitan staff in New York for a year. He came to The New York Times from Newsweek Magazine, where he was a general editor, and before that he worked at Look magazine. A graduate of Dartmouth College, he lives in Moscow with his wife and two children.

Mr. Krimsky joined the Associated Press in 1969. He worked for two years as a correspondent in Los Angeles and then on the world service desk in New York. He was transferred to the A.P. Moscow bureau in 1974. He is married and has one child.

Mr. Friendly worked for Newsweek in Chicago and Rome from 1962 to 1965. He then joined The New York Times and worked in Indonesia, Nigeria, Italy and Yugoslavia. In 1972 he became counsel to the Senate subcommittee on intergovernmental relations. Two years later, he rejoined Newsweek as Moscow bureau chief. He is married with two sons.

STATEMENT BY TIMES

The following statement was issued yesterday by The New York Times Company:

The Soviet Literary Gazette, an official organ of the U.S.S.R., alleged today that one of The New York Times correspondents in Moscow, Christopher Wren, was associated with the Central Intelligence Agency. The Times emphatically denies the charge, and Mr. Wren, reached in Moscow, said, "The charges are totally fabricated. I never worked for the C.I.A."

The bases of The Times's denial are Mr. Wren's own statement and two letters from George Bush, Director of the C.I.A., in response to queries directed to the agency by A. M. Rosenthal, managing editor, and Arthur Ochs Sulzberger, chairman and president of the company and publisher of the newspaper.

These letters were dated Feb. 3, 1976, and Feb. 9, 1976.

In the Feb. 3 letter, Mr. Bush reported that "no staff member or employee of The New York Times is used operationally by the C.I.A." A similar assurance to Mr. Sulzberger was made in the Feb. 9 letter in response to a request by The New York Times under the Freedom of Information Act. The Times was seeking to know if any of its employees or stringers had acted knowingly or unknowingly as United States intelligence agents or as in-

formants for the United States intelligence community. Mr. Bush's assurances dealt only with full-time staff members. Mr. Wren is a full-time employee.

"This event," Mr. Sulzberger said, "dramatically confirms The Times's view that The Times and all other news organizations cannot maintain their reputation for independence as long as the C.I.A. continues to obscure the facts by refusing to reveal its full association with American journalists. The present C.I.A. policy of withholding the full extent of these associations results only in casting suspicion on all newsmen and makes them susceptible to any unsubstantiated charges that anyone might wish to bring against them."

"It is essential that not only the readers of the newspaper but our news sources have assurance that they are dealing only with us and not with some secret branch of the Government," he added.

In the light of the latest developments The New York Times will, once again, seek to get the necessary assurance from Mr. Bush and the Central Intelligence Agency that none of its employees and stringers are involved in intelligence activities. In the event that such assurances are not forthcoming, The Times will consider filing a suit to compel the agency to make the information known.

NEW YORK TIMES
29 May 1976

Newsman in Soviet Backed By Overseas Press Club

The Overseas Press Club asked the Soviet Union yesterday to withdraw charges that three American reporters in Moscow are agents of the Central Intelligence Agency.

The club president, Matthew Bassity, sent a telegram from New York to Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin of the Soviet Union in Washington, saying:

"The Overseas Press Club of America strenuously objects to the accusation that three American journalists were associated with the Central Intelligence Agency. George A. Krimsky of The Associated Press, Christopher Wren, bureau Chief of The New York Times, and Alfred Friendly Jr. of Newsweek magazine have established reputations of integrity and it can only be assumed that the false charges leveled against them were motivated by a desire to impair their usefulness."

"This contravenes the spirit of the Helsinki pact and the U.S.S.R. is requested to withdraw the charges and set the record straight," the wire said.

THE CHICAGO TRIBUNE
30 May 1976

James O. Jackson

Soviet libel of U. S. newsmen requires a CIA unmasking

MOSCOW—A false and scurrilous Soviet attack on three United States newsmen last week underscored the urgent need to identify and disown all quasi-correspondents who have ever been on the payroll of the Central Intelligence Agency.

The attack, published by the weekly Literaturnaya Gazeta [Literary Gazette], showed that the CIA's shortsighted policy of employing journalist-agents has armed America's ideological enemies with a powerful new weapon.

Literaturnaya Gazeta [itself a notorious tool of the Soviet secret intelligence services] was able to allege, with absolutely no supporting evidence, that the three reporters were in the service of the CIA. The libel was made believable by the CIA's own admission that it employs reporters abroad.

There is nothing new, of course, about Soviet newspapers attacking American reporters. What is new is the use of the CIA smear, which is a marvelously neat

and useful one as far as Soviet propaganda hacks are concerned. It explains everything in the three little letters, CIA. The Soviets might say:

Why did the reporters write stories about Soviet problems? The CIA paid them to do it. Why do they talk to dissidents? The CIA pays them to do it. Why would they write ~~for~~? The CIA pays them to do it.

Before the CIA smear became available, Soviet propagandists could charge American newsmen and women with sexual misbehavior, black marketeering, or alcoholism. Those were weak and vulnerable libels, because they did not contain within themselves an explanation of why reporters wrote critically of the Soviet Union.

In the old days, a typical Literaturnaya Gazeta attack might have accused a correspondent of going to bed with young women. But that did not necessarily mean that he was anti-communist, since pro-communists, one would presume, also sleep with young women.

The same is true of black marketeering or boozing. Half the population of the Soviet Union engages in those two activities, so it hardly makes a correspondent anti-Soviet if he does the same.

But the CIA smear has a beautiful symmetry to it: It not only undermines the journalist's integrity, it also explains why he writes as he does. It saves space, it saves time. And it saves the hacks of the Soviet press the uncomfortable necessity of trying to challenge the truth of what American journalists write.

But there is more to it than that. The CIA smear not only endangers a journalist's credibility, it also endangers his life.

There are enough misguided tools in this world who believe what they read in the Soviet press to make a reporter's life uncertain in such places as Ulster or Beirut, where guerrillas, terrorists, zealots, and assorted crazies run around armed to the sideburns.

A correspondent falsely labeled as a CIA agent by an irresponsible Soviet newspaper will face an extra measure of danger in covering the news, especially in trouble spots of the Third World. He will never know when some mad Marxist, taking a Communist libel at face value, will murder him in the street.

That is why those who compromised the press must be named, and why they must be purged from its ranks. It may happen that in this process some great reputations will be ruined. It may happen that careers will be wrecked, that friendships will be ended, that promises will be broken, and that illusions will be shattered.

But better that, far better, than to allow this ugly shadow of suspicion to eat away at the honor, the credibility, and the usefulness of a fundamental American institution.

[James O. Jackson is The Tribune's Moscow correspondent.]

MANCHESTER GUARDIAN
24 May 1976

CIA may be behind mystery murder

From DAVID TONGE

Athens, May 23

The continuing mystery surrounding the murder of Richard S. Welch, Athens CIA station chief, has been highlighted by a Greek press report today claiming that Mr Welch had been shot by a man who, the paper, Eleftherotypia says, had been a CIA contract killer for 20 years and is now living in the Balkans. Senior Greek officials today said that they had indeed questioned a Greek living in Yugoslavia who, they had heard, might be connected with the murder, but that he had had a firm alibi for December 23, the night of the crime.

However, the officials add that the suggestion that the CIA ordered Mr Welch's murder to stop United States Congressional pressure on the agency is among several that cannot be totally excluded, although they express the reservation that, as far as they know, the CIA has no previous record of taking such drastic

steps against its own men.

Only two groups have claimed the murder — an "association of officers of nationalist ideals" and "November 17," a group which purports to be of the extreme Left. This second group posted a two-page tract against imperialism to journalists here but the police are extremely doubtful about whether the group really exists and suggest that the authors of the tract may have sought publicity for this to draw attention away from other possible channels of inquiry.

One week after the crime, foreign journalists were telephoned by men who claimed to have carried out the murder and who told them the location of the stolen car which they said they had used. A Simca was duly found where they said it would be, but police are still not convinced that this was used.

Since then, all Cypriots who might conceivably have been involved have been investigated, as have many Arabs in Athens. Following both these inquiries and the outcome of agents' work in various Arab countries, the Greek security services now doubt whether groups from the Middle East were involved. They have also eliminated the possibility that Mr Welch, whose name and address had been published in the local press, was murdered because of his previous activities in Peru.

Judicially, the case has now been transferred from the examining to a higher magistrate.

NEW YORK TIMES
5 June 1976

Federal Judge Rules C.I.A. May Keep Budget Secret

WASHINGTON, June 4 (AP)—A Federal judge ruled today that the Central Intelligence Agency may continue to keep its budget a secret.

"The court concludes that the 'secret' classification applied to the C.I.A. budget and expenditure files is proper, both procedurally and substantively," District Judge John Lewis Smith

Jr. said.

The decision came in a suit filed by Morton K. Halperin, who sought C.I.A. records on its budget authority for the current fiscal year and its actual expenditures for the 1974 fiscal year.

Mr. Halperin, a former national security adviser, filed his suit under the Freedom of Information Act, which requires many Government records to be disclosed to the public.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, MONDAY, MAY 31, 1976

Press betrayed. Purge due. Please tell George Bush. And publisher.

By Edward P. Morgan

WASHINGTON—What bothers me is the calm after the storm. The press has been had by the Central Intelligence Agency. That shocking fact rolled like thunder through the report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities. Yet where is the loud collective outrage from what I like to consider the honorable trade of journalism, the only one I have ever plied?

Can we minions of the news media be so busy righteously defending freedom of the press under the First Amendment that we have no time to discover (or admit) that we have been subverted?

In highlighting the committee report released by chairman Frank Church, Democrat of Idaho, *The New York Times* noted that "as of last February, some 50 American journalists or employees of domestic news-gathering organizations maintained covert links to the C.I.A. Even under new restrictive guidelines, half of these relationships will be continued."

How free is a press riddled with spies and informers? How can you argue that such a porous head of journalistic cheese is entitled to protection under the First Amendment? How do you publish or air what the public has a right to know if you don't know yourself whether it is tainted with distortion and/or lies? The insidiousness of the situation has just been intensified by totally unsubstantiated allegations of a Soviet weekly that the Moscow correspondents of *The New York Times*, *Newsweek* and *The Associated Press* are working for the C.I.A. The agency has uncorked an acid that eats at the integrity of American journalists as a whole.

That's only part of the problem. Defying a Presidential order, the agency continues "covert ties" with hundreds of academic scholars. In 1967, the Church report says, the C.I.A. "published or subsidized well over 200 books." In 1969, the total reached 250. The agency supports a press institute with a galaxy of reporters, and a foreign-based publishing institute.

Against all this, George Orwell's *Big Brother* would be too ashamed to hang his own brainwashing out on the line; Moscow editors who reputedly work day and night revising the *Soviet Encyclopedia* to conform with the changing Kremlin view of history must be green with envy. For all I know, the C.I.A. may be covertly reading even now a *Soviet Encyclopedia*—a counterfeit of a counterfeit of history.

It is easy but risky to jest on this subject. Even if the new Senate Intelligence Committee maintains a tough and skeptical overview and a tight leash on the C.I.A. budget (an iffy prospect), how can we be sure how or whether the agency actually removes its honeycomb of activities from the catacombs of official secrecy, where the skeletons of power abuse still twitch?

When I was director of CBS News, briefly, I heard our Cairo stringer worked for the C.I.A. He was home on leave. I asked him. He denied it firmly and, I thought, convincingly. But how could I really know? He resumed his Cairo post. What should I have done? How refreshing to note that it takes suspicion and insidiousness to defend an open society.

Should the media have no contact

with the intelligence community? Absurd! During the Cuban missile crisis, John Scali, then my ABC colleague, was a vital conduit of information between the White House and the Soviet Embassy, when official communications between Moscow and Washington sputtered so unreliably. Allen Dulles and other C.I.A. chiefs gave me valuable briefings and contacts before some foreign trip. Other correspondents received similar treatment.

It's when the cloak-and-dagger is thrust upon an American journalist that I draw a line. We assume that the man from Pravda, Tass or Izvestia is doing double duty with espionage. It's a different ball game if some United States news agency bureau chief in Bangkok is working for George Bush. (I have no knowledge that one is.)

The C.I.A.'s penetration of the Fourth Estate has created a treacherous and intolerable situation. It could well undermine what respect and integrity the press has left with a skeptical public.

We simply cannot pretend to have a free press if we don't purge ourselves of this subversion. To fail to do so would earn us a red badge of cowardice. I believe the names of the correspondents, publications and agencies still working for the C.I.A. should be exposed.

In this sinister age of bugs and taps and other invasions of privacy, must I be my brother's beeper? Not if I can help it.

Edward P. Morgan is a journalist and commentator.

Los Angeles Times Sat. June 6, 1976

A MacGuffin Reader

Joseph Gelms tells us (Calendar, May 2) that Robert Redford "knows the public doesn't go to political movies." One wonders if Redford really does believe this and what his understanding is of the relationship between his movies and the audiences who go to see them.

Redford has been quoted as believing that "Three Days of the Condor" is an expose of the C.I.A. It is hardly that. The villain in the film is not the C.I.A. but a bunch of "bad" C.I.A. types who have started their own organization within the C.I.A. Their exposure and destruction by the "good" C.I.A. types is merely a plot device called a MacGuffin by Hitchcock (a MacGuffin is what all the running around is about in a film). The film's view of spy organizations as possibly corrupt is hardly original. That view was a vein mined not only by many films of the '60s (e.g., "The Spy Who Came in From the Cold," "The Ipcress File" etc.), but also worked over by Hitchcock himself with cheerful cynicism for over 40 years.

The problem with "All the President's Men" is more complex. The movie seems to be, for most of its running time, a well-made, fast-paced newspaper story, although the film-makers have not entirely solved the problem of doing a film about two guys talking to a lot of people. Both the critics and the audiences seem baffled, however, by the confusion of tone of the last 20 minutes of the film. Redford, in his efforts as a producer to inflate the seriousness of the film beyond the limit the movie can support, has included a final meeting with Deep Throat that seems to suggest Woodward was onto the wrongdoings in the C.I.A. While

Woodward's investigations may be said to have led figuratively to the investigations of the C.I.A., they literally did not, and it seems out of keeping with the literalness of the rest of the film to suggest such a connection.

The scene in the film is a rather drastic misrepresentation of the same scene in the book. Simply on the factual level, the scene in the film occurs before the inauguration, whereas, according to the book, it occurred four months later, after the other papers, Judge Sirica and the Congress had gotten into the picture. Deep Throat's comments in the book seem to be referring to the Nixon administration's attempts to cover up Watergate activities by pretending they were related to C.I.A. activities. This sequence in the film further leaves the impression that Woodward were being investigated and threatened because of their work. Woodward in the book says the precautions they took against being investigated were "foolish and melodramatic," and the final sentence in that section is, "They never found any evidence that their telephones had been tapped or that anyone's life had been in danger." One does not get that feeling from the sequence in the film.

Redford seems to believe that audiences are attracted to these two films because of their "seriousness." The appeal of "Three Days of the Condor" was that of a mildly sick, pseudo-Hitchcockian thriller, and the appeal of "All the President's Men" was best defined by a student of mine at Los Angeles City College who nicknamed the film "The Sundance Kid and the Graduate Get the Press."

TOM STEMPER
Los Angeles

PUBLISHER'S WEEKLY
17 MAY 1976

Senate Group Finds CIA Now Active Only in Books Abroad

The book publishing program of the Central Intelligence Agency, once considered an important weapon of long-range propaganda, reached a high watermark in the year 1967 and has subsequently been sharply scaled down and limited almost entirely to books published abroad, according to the recently released report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

With the exception of one reference to Praeger and several other pre-1967 book publishing ventures, the report contains no names of individual authors, titles or publishers. A spokesman for the Intelligence Committee would not go beyond the contents of the report in commenting on relations between the CIA and the world of publishing. Press officer Spencer David told *PW* the Committee had an agreement with the CIA not to disclose sources of information or methods or the names of individuals and organizations involved without their consent. "The civil rights of individuals and organizations used by the CIA without their knowledge have already been abrogated," he said, "so we don't want to turn around and do the same thing."

"The publicity which in 1967 surrounded several CIA-sponsored organizations and threatened to expose others," the report noted, "caused the CIA to act quickly to limit use of U.S. publishers... Thus since 1967 the CIA's publishing activities have almost entirely been confined to books and other materials published abroad. During the past few years, some 250 books have been published abroad, most of them in foreign languages."

The CIA denied to the Committee the number of titles and names of authors of the propaganda books published since 1967. Brief descriptions provided by the Agency indicated the breadth of subject matter, however, including the following topics enumerated in the Committee report: (1) commercial ventures and commercial law in South Vietnam; (2) Indochina representation at the U.N.; (3) a memoir of the Korean War; (4) the prospects for European union; (5) Chile under Allende.

During the pre-1967 period, the CIA had developed a complex pattern of

relationships in which it could get books published or distributed abroad without revealing any U.S. influence by covertly subsidizing foreign publications or booksellers; by initiating or subsidizing indigenous national or international organizations for book publishing or distributing purposes; and by stimulating the writing of politically significant books by unknown foreign authors—either by directly subsidizing the author, if covert contact were feasible, or indirectly, through literary agents or publishers.

Prior to 1967, the CIA had produced, subsidized or sponsored well over 1000 books, the Senate Committee said. Approximately 25% of these were in English. "Many of them were published by cultural organizations which the CIA backed, and more often than not the author was unaware of CIA subsidization," the Committee report states. "Some books, however, involved direct collaboration between the CIA and the writer." Some books were published without any knowledge on the part of the publisher that the writer had been subsidized by the CIA. But there were cases where publishing houses contracted with the CIA to publish books, the Committee said.

In 1967 alone, the CIA published or subsidized well over 200 books, ranging from books on wildlife and safaris to translations of Machiavelli's "The Prince" into Swahili and works of T. S. Eliot into Russian, to a parody of the famous little red book of quotations from Mao entitled "Quotations from Chairman Liu."

According to the Committee, the CIA has recently been particularly sensitive to the charge that CIA covert relationships with the American media jeopardize the credibility of the American press and risk the possibility of propagandizing the U.S. public. Former director William Colby expressed this concern in testimony before the House Select Committee on Intelligence when he said: "We have taken particular caution to ensure that our operations are focused abroad and not at the United States in order to influence the opinion of the American people about things from a CIA point of view." The new director, George

Bush, has made similar assurances.

The Senate Committee, headed by Senator Frank Church (D., Idaho) went a step further, however, by noting that there is domestic fallout even from covert propaganda abroad, including books intended primarily for an English-speaking foreign audience. "For example, CIA records for 1967 state that certain books about China subsidized or even produced by the Agency circulated principally in the U.S. as a prelude to later distribution abroad." Several of these books on China were widely reviewed in the United States, often in juxtaposition to the sympathetic view of the emerging China as presented by Edgar Snow. At least once, a book review for an Agency book which appeared in the *New York Times*, was written by a CIA writer under contract.

E. Howard Hunt, who had been in charge of contacts with U.S. publishers in the late 1960s, acknowledged in testimony before this Committee that CIA books circulated in the U.S. and suggested that such fallout may not have been unintentional.

Question: But, with anything that was published in English, the United States citizenry would become a likely audience for publication?

Mr. Hunt: A likely audience, definitely.

Question: Did you take some sort of steps to make sure that things that were published in English were kept away from American readers?

Mr. Hunt: It was impossible because Praeger was a commercial U.S. publisher. The books had to be seen, had to be reviewed, had to be bought here, had to be read."

[Frederick A. Praeger, who in October 1968 left the firm which he had established in 1950, told *PW* in 1967 that "only 15 or 16 books" were published which had any CIA connection—fewer than 1% of the books which the company had published since its establishment—and that most had been published in the late 1950s. He declined to identify the titles but described them as dealing with Communist parties or movements abroad. He said that some had been suggested by the CIA and some by himself and that in this regard the publisher's role was "no different from our relationships with other government agencies." He insisted that "the CIA at no time had any editorial control whatsoever."]

SUSAN WAGNER

PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER
26 MAY 1976

News focus

By Charles Bartlett

EXCERPT:

Congress still wants to hear about CIA secret operations but the intelligence agency hasn't learned how to live with the leaks that result. Only a few hours after CIA Director George Bush told the House International Relations Committee that the

administration plans no covert steps to affect the Italian elections, the news was leaked on Capitol Hill.

Some hope the Senate's creation of an oversight committee will persuade Congress to repeal the Hughes-Ryan amendment, which obliges the CIA director to report all covert activities to at least six committees. Over the past 16 months, virtually none of the information conveyed to Congress under the amendment has been kept secret.

PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER
13 MAY 1976

Japanese court officials are alleged to have traveled on CIA funds.

A Communist member of parliament, Atsushi Hashimoto, charged that the San Francisco-based Asia Foundation was a CIA front. Justice Minister Osamu Inaba acknowledged that more than 50 judges and prosecutors had received money from the foundation for travel abroad between 1966 and 1975. The sums ranged from \$500 to \$700. He said the subsidies were "unpleasant" and would be barred to judicial officials in the future.

WASHINGTON POST
16 MAY 1976

The Mafia, The CIA And Castro

By George Crile III

Crile is Washington editor of Harper's magazine and is writing a book on the CIA's Cuban operations for Doubleday. His article on the CIA's man in Havana, the Cuban agent code-named AM LASH, appeared in Outlook on May 2. In this article, he examines the CIA's other major attempt to plot the assassination of Fidel Castro, which failed for what may have been similar reasons.

MANY ODD TRIBUTES have been offered to the American character, but few can rival that of Sen. Walter Mondale upon reviewing the total failure of the CIA's persistent efforts to kill Fidel Castro. "Thank God," he said, "we're just not very good at that sort of thing."

Most thoughtful observers seemed to draw the same reassuring conclusion. Even the American Mafia dons who had been recruited by the Agency to carry out Castro's execution were seen as too incompetent to be really evil. The portrait drawn by the Senate Intelligence Committee casts them more in the light of characters out of "The Gang That Couldn't Shoot Straight," bumbling after Castro but apparently never getting around to making an attempt on his life.

Such interpretations of these deadly undertakings are no doubt comforting, but they are unlikely to be more than exercises in wishful thinking. To begin with, Sen. Robert Morgan (D-N.C.) tells us "the theory that prevailed in the [Senate Intelligence] Committee was that the Mafia never tried to kill Castro, that we were being used."

The committee did not pursue this, but an independent examination of the available record of one of the key Mafia figures involved in the plot makes us consider the troubling possibility that at least some of the CIA's Mafia associates were working with Castro.

Such a combination would hardly have seemed likely in 1960 when the CIA set out to recruit the Mafia. Almost all the major underworld families had invested heavily in Cuba and Castro was fast moving to seize their holdings. He had even put some of their members in jail. The Mafia's willingness to do the CIA's dirty work would not then have required explanation.

Sam Giancana and John Roselli are the two mobsters generally identified with the Mafia-CIA plot. But a third, Santo Trafficante Jr., was perhaps the most important of the three, for it was his men, both in Miami and Havana, who were supposed to carry out the murder.

Trafficante is generally identified as the don of southern Florida, but he is also one of the chiefs in the Mafia's loose national confederation. Once the Agency decided to turn to the mob, it was inevitable that Trafficante's assistance would be sought. Alone among the principal dons, he had lived in Cuba. He had built a large organization there and still had a number of associates in Castro's Havana. Moreover, his professional experience made him ideally suited for assassination work.

He had learned the business from his father, Santo Trafficante Sr., who came from Sicily in 1904 to Tampa, where he built and ran his crime family for the next 50

years. In 1954, a year after surviving a shotgun attempt on his life, Santo Jr. succeeded his father.

In the first few years of his rule, Tampa was plagued with gangland murders. He was himself a leading suspect in the 1957 barbershop execution of Albert Anastasia, the old chief of Murder Incorporated. Accompanied by a Cuban associate, Trafficante had been in Anastasia's New York hotel suite the night before the killing.

According to reports of the Senate Permanent Investigations Committee, Anastasia had been attempting to move in on Trafficante's Cuban gambling operations.

The following month, Trafficante was arrested at the Mafia national convention at Apalachin, N.Y. Ten years later, his eminence was again confirmed by his appearance at the La Stella Restaurant in New York with Carlos Marcello, Carlo Gambino and several other of the country's leading dons.

He was, in short, one of the major crime bosses in the United States and, significantly, the don most deeply affected by Castro's revolution. Not only were his gambling casinos seized but he had been jailed in Cuba. One would assume that such a man might have contemplated taking on Castro independently. At that time, in 1960, Castro's grip on Cuba was by no means secure. Once Trafficante accepted his CIA commission, Castro's days should have been numbered.

A Question of Loyalties

THE INITIAL PLOT called for poisoning Castro in his favorite Havana restaurant, where one of Trafficante's men worked. The CIA's Technical Services Division supplied deadly botulinum toxin which Robert Maheu, who was coordinating the mob's efforts for the CIA, passed to an exile associated with Trafficante at the Fontainebleu Hotel in Miami Beach. From there Trafficante's courier was to deliver the poison pills to the man in the Havana restaurant.

All of this took place in March and April of 1961, just before the Bay of Pigs. Accounts vary as to why the plan failed. One version is that the authorization to administer the poison never came through; another, that Castro stopped going to the restaurant.

The most intriguing theory was proposed by the CIA's deputy inspector general, Scott Breckenridge, to a Senate staff member. Breckenridge, who had been responsible for investigating the CIA-Mafia plot, maintained that Trafficante had been providing Castro with details of the plot all along.

But why would Santo Trafficante, of all people, do this? One possible explanation is proposed in a July 21, 1961, report on Trafficante by the Federal Bureau of Narcotics: "There are unconfirmed rumors in the Cuban refugee population in Miami that, when Fidel Castro ran the American racketeers out of Cuba and seized the casinos, he kept Santo Trafficante Jr. in jail to make it appear that he had a personal dislike for Trafficante, when in fact Trafficante is an agent of Castro. Trafficante is allegedly Castro's outlet for illegal contraband in the country."

The report goes on to summarize contradictory reports on Trafficante's relationship with Castro but, because of its date, the allegations quoted are of great interest. Back in 1961, the Mafia's anti-Castro credentials were impeccable. The informants relied on by the narcotics agents may have been wrong in their conclusions, but it is hard to think of a possible self-serving motive for fabricating such a story.

There are other indications that there may have been some working arrangement between Castro and the mob. Several reliable witnesses — most notably Grayston Lynch, who was a senior case officer with the CIA in Miami for eight years — assert that during the crucial early 1960s Castro relied on Cuban Mafia contacts for much of his intelligence in the exile community. And once again Santo Trafficante emerges as a central fig-

ure, for Castro is reported to have paid off his Mafia agents through the Florida numbers racket — Bolita — which Trafficante runs.

Here another Bureau of Narcotics report — this one prepared by agent Eugene Marshall — is instructive: "Fidel Castro has operatives in Tampa and Miami making heavy Bolita bets with Santo Trafficante Jr.'s organization. The winning Bolita numbers are taken from the last three digits of the lottery drawing in Cuba every Saturday night." According to this report, prior to the drawing, these operatives communicate with Cuba and advise which numbers are receiving the heaviest play. The Cuba lottery officials then rig the drawing . . . According to this report and others, Castro's agents were robbing Trafficante of a large share of his profits. The Narcotics Bureau was afraid that, if Trafficante's Bolita operation were ruined, he would concentrate even more on the drug trade.

But Trafficante was in an even better position than the feds to know about raids on his profits. Had he chosen to, he could have solved the problem overnight by shifting the payoff numbers from the Havana lottery to the weekly dog races in Miami, as he finally did in the late 1960s. If, then, these reports are to be believed, Trafficante's Bolita may have served as one of the paymasters to the Cuban intelligence network in the United States.

Divided Loyalties

TO THOSE ONLY loosely familiar with Cuba in the 1950s, and the Mafia's intricate role there, it must seem absurd to suggest that the underworld could collaborate with Castro's intelligence. But the Mafia is not a monolith and not all of its branches had been Castro's enemies. The Mafia had placed most of its bets on the dictator Fulgencio Batista, but it had also served as the gun runners for the revolutionaries. Castro, as well as most other important Cuban revolutionary leaders, had previously dealt with and relied on one or another underworld family for arms to carry on the fight.

As the owners and managers of the luxury hotels and gambling casinos in old Havana, the Mafia had played a pervasive role in Cuban life. Soon after Castro's victory its leaders were no longer welcome in Cuba as its operations were progressively closed down; but it still had friends and former business associates high in Castro's government. The complexity of the Mafia-Castro relationship is exemplified by the ambiguities that surround the imprisonment and release of Trafficante himself in 1959.

It was a time when thousands of enemies of the revolution (and Trafficante clearly seemed to fall into this category) were being summarily taken out and shot. The Bureau of Narcotics report suggests the possibility that he had agreed to work with Castro and that the jailing was designed to provide cover. But officially, he got out of Cuba thanks to the services of his resourceful lawyer, Rafael Garcia Bango. Bango is himself another good example of that era's ambiguities — not least because his brother Jorge was and is one of Castro's closest friends and advisers. (He is Castro's regular handball partner and is the minister of sports, a prestigious post in Cuba.)

After getting Trafficante out of Cuba, Bango stayed on for the turbulent first seven years of the revolutionary government. Then, in 1966, he left for Miami, where he came to the attention of a federal anti-crime strike force which had Trafficante under surveillance. According to one strike force official, the two men had what amounted to a "father-son relationship." Eight months later Bango was arrested and jailed in Spain for passing counterfeit American money.

Significantly, Bango is now back in Cuba. That an important mob attorney, whatever his family connections, should find life palatable in the new Cuba is at least curious. But there seem to be nothing but contradictions in the lifestyles of Trafficante and his friends.

Mysterious Gratitude

FOR THE NEXT PART of Trafficante's history we must turn to Jose Aleman, an exile in Miami who became involved with Trafficante in 1962 through his cousin, Garcia Bango. Aleman had been a rich young revolutionary in Havana, one of the leaders of the almost successful 1957 attack on Batista's presidential palace. His then considerable wealth had enabled him to maintain a base in Florida where he owned the Tradewinds Motel and much other Miami real estate, including the Miami Stadium. The Tradewinds figured prominently in the revolution, for by 1957 most of the leading revolutionaries in Havana had fled into exile, including many of Castro's followers, and most ended up by staying there at Aleman's expense.

After the revolution, Aleman returned to Cuba and stayed a year before he was forced into exile again — this time as a counter-revolutionary. On arriving in the United States, he was met by George Davis of the FBI with a subpoena to appear as a witness against a Mafioso named Norman Rothman at a trial in Chicago.

Aleman had had frequent dealings with the Mafia when he was buying guns for the revolution. He had met Rothman in 1958 when the latter was trying to save his Cuban investments by ingratiating himself with the anti-Batista forces. Rothman offered to flood Cuba with fake currency in order to bankrupt the economy and bring down the government. In return he wanted to be able to maintain his gambling operations. Aleman had rejected his offer. He tried to avoid testifying, but the FBI reminded him that, if he did not cooperate, he might be subject to prosecution for illegal gun running.

Aleman's relationship with the FBI had initially been hostile. The Tradewinds "was an armed barracks," explained George Davis, who was assigned to monitor the exile activities, and the FBI had tried to close it down. But by late 1958 the Bureau had cause to change its mind. Aleman had visited the State Department to warn that Fidel Castro was a Communist, and he persuaded one of the Communist revolutionaries staying at the Tradewinds to brief the FBI on the nature of the party in Cuba.

All of this stood Aleman in good stead with the Miami FBI office, particularly after Castro revealed his political affiliations. And after his testimony in the Rothman trial, Aleman's relationship with the Bureau grew very close. The FBI men came to rely on him, not only as a useful source of information, but as a guide to understanding the customs and thinking of the exiles. "Jose's a real nice fellow," the now retired Davis remarked. "He's a reliable individual."

After his appearance at Rothman's trial, Aleman continued to meet regularly with his contacts at the FBI to report on exiles he suspected of being Castro agents. He also told them of an extraordinary series of meetings with Trafficante.

Trafficante's Indiscretion

WHEN ALEMAN'S FATHER died, his stepmother inherited most of the fortune and the inheritance taxes were so high that Jose Jr. (who had already lost his land holdings in Cuba to the revolution) was forced to sell the Miami Stadium and the Tradewinds Motel. By 1962 he was in debt, with his only asset the three-story Scott Bryan Motel, on Collins Avenue and 33d St., in Miami Beach.

Some time in September of 1962 an old revolutionary colleague who rented an apartment at the motel told Aleman that Trafficante wanted to see him. The colleague explained that Trafficante felt indebted to Aleman's cousin, Garcia Bango, and wanted to express his gratitude by helping Aleman out of his financial difficulties. He was prepared to arrange a sizeable loan from the Teamsters Union. Aleman's friend assured him that the loan was perfectly legal and that it had already been cleared by Jimmy Hoffa himself.

Aleman was understandably wary — particularly

since he had so recently testified against a Mafia leader. But sure enough, the Tampa godfather did visit Aleman at the Scott Bryan and offered him the loan — \$1.5 million to replace the ramshackle motel with a 12-story glass wonder, complete with a penthouse apartment for Aleman.

Aleman says that Trafficante spent most of the evening philosophizing. "He spoke almost poetically about democracy and civil liberties." But then he turned to the Kennedys: they were not honest, they took graft and they did not keep a bargain. He complained about their attacks on his friends, saying, "Have you seen how his brother is hitting Hoffa, a man who is a worker, who is not a millionaire, a friend of the blue collars? He doesn't know that this kind of encounter is very delicate. Mark my words, this man Kennedy is in trouble, and he will get what is coming to him." Aleman says that he argued that Kennedy would get reelected, and Trafficante replied, "No, Jose, he is going to be hit."

Aleman says that he reported this conversation to his FBI contacts, who expressed interest only in Trafficante's business proposals. Aleman assumed that they dismissed the Kennedy warnings as gangland braggadocio.

For the next year, Trafficante used the Scott Bryan as his business headquarters, renting an apartment whenever he came to town. Aleman met with him frequently to discuss the Teamsters loan and Trafficante soon began to lead Aleman into other kinds of conversations and to introduce him to other Mafia figures like Angelo Bruno of Philadelphia. Aleman, like his FBI contacts, could not quite figure out what Trafficante was doing. But he played along, hoping the loan would come through. Also the FBI considered his information valuable and he was pleased to be of service.

Starting in late 1962 and continuing through the summer of 1963, Aleman says that three Cubans he had known in Havana and at the Tradewinds, who had gone to work for Castro after the revolution, appeared in Miami and then left for Texas. He suspected them of being Cuban agents and he told this to the FBI. "I advised the FBI in long conversations that I thought something was going to happen. . . I was telling them to be careful." By this time Aleman says he was meeting quite frequently with his FBI contacts. They listened to what he said but rarely seemed interested in his speculations.

About the end of October, 1963, the same exile who had introduced Aleman to Trafficante asked Aleman to sign a petition bitterly critical of President Kennedy. Aleman was no great admirer of the Kennedys. He signed the petition but immediately had second thoughts, especially when it was reproduced in several Cuban newspapers in Miami.

On the day of the Kennedy assassination, Aleman arrived home to find that the FBI had telephoned. "I was worried that, because of the petition, they might suspect me." But what they were interested in was Trafficante's previous statement that Kennedy was going to be "hit."

"Two agents [Aleman is quite certain one of them was Paul Scranton] came out to see me. They wanted to know more and more. I finally had to tell them he didn't say he was going to do it. He just said Kennedy was going to get hit." The agents stayed until they had explored every possible angle and then told Aleman to keep the conversation confidential.

The only source for all of this is Aleman, who claims that he personally repeated everything to various officials of the FBI, especially George Davis and Paul Scranton in 1962 and 1963. Both agents acknowledge their frequent contacts with Aleman but both declined to comment on Aleman's conversations with Trafficante. Scranton explained he would have to have clearance: "I wouldn't want to do anything to embarrass the Bureau."

The Enemy of My Enemy

IN SEEKING to destroy both the Castro regime and the Mafia empire, the Kennedys had aroused two des-

perate enemies, each with a tradition of violence and covert action. No proof that either was connected with the assassination of President Kennedy has ever been produced. But their traditions and their predicament at the moment when Kennedy was cut down make either eligible suspects. And when the two-front war that the Kennedys were waging is viewed through the experience of Santo Trafficante, it becomes at least interesting to speculate on the possibility of these two powers operating in concert.

The possibility becomes even more intriguing if one chooses to take seriously a memorandum to the director of the CIA recently declassified from the Warren Commission files. It reports the conversation of a British journalist, John Wilson (also known as Wilson-Hudson) at the American Embassy in London just four days after Kennedy was killed. Wilson said that in jail in Cuba after the revolution in 1959 he had met an American, "gangster-gambler named Santos who could not return to the U.S.A. because there were several indictments outstanding against him. Santos opted therefore to remain in prison for a period of time paying Castro in dollars for his rather luxurious and definitely non-prisonlike accommodations... While Santos was in prison," Wilson says, "Santos was visited by an American gangster type named Ruby."

It is tempting to make much of such a document but more needs to be known about the English journalist, about the memo and about Jack Ruby's travels before any conclusions can be made. Probably the only witness who could help answer the questions raised here are the CIA's old Mafia associates. The Church committee only managed to interview one of them, John Roselli. Sam Giancana, due to give his testimony, was executed the day before. Santo Trafficante was never called as a witness. The committee staff claimed he could not be found.

None of the extraordinary possibilities that have surfaced here offer a documentable refutation of the sole assassin theory. As in all such explorations touching on the Kennedy assassination, the trail goes cold as it approaches Dallas. But that does not mean that there was not a conspiracy. There is simply no assurance that conspiracies, when they exist, must inevitably come to light. Many secrets prove not all that hard to keep.

Just consider the numbers of people who knew about the CIA's secret war against Cuba in the early 1960s — about the Agency's mammoth station in Miami with its 400 case officers, its 2,000 Cuban agents, its navy and small air force, its arsenals, safe houses, and its paramilitary operations against Cuba. Certainly thousands of people had a rather general knowledge of that massive campaign. And yet it was not until last year that the American public even learned that President Kennedy had gone on to wage a covert Cuban war after the Bay of Pigs. Similarly, nine years ago, Drew Pearson and Jack Anderson reported the CIA's assassination plotting with the Mafia. But no one paid any attention.

It is a well known psychological phenomenon that you can't see what your imagination is not prepared to accept. In a recent interview, Sen. Howard Baker (R-Tenn.) reflected on his experience over the past few years in exploring Watergate and the world of U.S. intelligence: "The great fear that I have is that I'll wake up 10 years from now, and it will all suddenly fall into place, and I'll realize what a damn fool I was."

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A U.S. Ambassador says the President of the country where he is stationed told him: "If I talk to you frankly, you will report back to the State Department, and soon everything I said will show up in Washington newspapers."

WASHINGTON STAR
28 MAY 1976

The FBI, CIA Cover-up of JFK Slaying Data

By Tad Szulc

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The FBI and the CIA engaged in a cover-up of highly relevant information when the Warren Commission was investigating President John F. Kennedy's assassination in 1963 and 1964.

President Lyndon Johnson and Atty. Gen. Robert F. Kennedy became party to the effort which consisted of withholding key facts from the Warren Commission.

The cover-up continues even now, 12 years later: The FBI still refuses to turn over to congressional investigators some of its most sensitive files on the circumstances of the killing in Dallas.

A delay of six months is expected before the new Senate Intelligence Oversight Committee decides whether to reopen the investigation into the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. Chairman Daniel K. Inouye, D-Hawaii, said yesterday.

Inouye, who spoke with reporters after the committee's first meeting yesterday, said the committee will concentrate first on drafting new charters for the CIA and other intelligence agencies.

Results of an investigation of the Kennedy assassination by the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, which spent 15 months studying the case, are expected to be made public within the next two weeks. Senators who have seen the report are predicting it will raise more questions than answers.

The 172-page report, drafted by a subcommittee, will focus on the performance of the CIA and FBI before and after the Nov. 22, 1963, slaying and will go into the possible motives of Lee Harvey Oswald.

The report is expected to detail both allegedly deliberate and accidental failures by the CIA and FBI to provide the Warren Commission with information.

The Warren Commission was never told that Robert Kennedy secretly formed — before his brother was killed — a special intergovernmental committee which included FBI and CIA representatives to look into the possibility that Cuban Premier Fidel Castro might organize attempts on the lives of high U.S. government officials.

THAT THIS committee existed has been kept secret although information about it reposes in FBI files.

The top-secret committee was created by Robert Kennedy presumably out of concern that Castro might

retaliate against CIA attempts on his life, carried out directly by the agency's operatives and with help from the Mafia.

That anti-Castro assassination plots were afoot in the early 1960s was unknown at the time (they were disclosed last year by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities) and the Warren Commission was not told of them. Only Allen W. Dulles, who had been CIA director, had knowledge of the anti-Castro plots.

In its ignorance the commission couldn't search more intensively into the possible motives of Lee Harvey Oswald in killing the President. The commission concluded that Oswald was the lone assassin in Dallas, but it acknowledged its inability to come up with the motive.

IT DOES NOT follow, of course, that the Warren Commission would surely have traced Oswald's motives had it known of the anti-Castro conspiracies and of the establishment of Robert Kennedy's secret group sometime before Dallas. There is no proof that Castro was behind Oswald.

But the cover-up made it impossible for the commission to seriously pursue a line of inquiry in this area even though there had been much discussion of the significance of Oswald's links with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee (a pro-Castro group in the United States) and his aborted effort to go to Cuba two months before he killed John Kennedy.

Robert Kennedy, the CIA and the FBI decided to keep from the Warren Commission the fact that the special group had been set up. To justify its existence, it would have been necessary to expose the CIA's own conspiracies against Castro. These were among the most closely held secrets of the Kennedy-Johnson period.

THAT THE CIA failed to inform the Warren Commission of anti-Castro plots — even though the agency was under presidential orders to provide maximum assistance to the commis-

sion — was confirmed in a memo on April 20, 1975, written by CIA Insp. Gen. Donald F. Chamberlain to CIA Deputy Director E.H. Knoche. It said:

"As far as we can tell from all of the materials at our disposition, no one discussed with the Warren Commission any alleged plan to assassinate Castro. There is also no evidence that anyone known to our records made a decision not to tell the Warren Commission anything about this topic or any other matter."

Chamberlain added that "we have no evidence in our material indicating Castro's knowledge or the possession of documentation of alleged assassination plots directed against him."

Two days later, on April 22, 1975, Raymond G. Rocca, then deputy chief of the CIA's counterintelligence staff, informed Knoche that "our records show at every point a marked intent to make as much available to the (Warren Commission) as was consistent with the security of the ongoing operations."

ROCCA ALSO reported that his files do not show whether the Warren Commission was informed of a 1962 report from the CIA's station in Guatemala according to which a statement was made at a Guatemalan Communist party meeting that "we need not preoccupy ourselves over the politics of President Kennedy because we know, according to prognostication, that he will die within the present year."

Although, as Rocca put it, the counterintelligence staff was the CIA's "working-level point of contact with the Warren Commission," plans to assassinate Castro were not "known to us in CIA staff."

In all likelihood Johnson, who knew of the anti-Castro plotting, also knew that Robert Kennedy had set up his special committee. But there is no indication that he shared that knowledge with Chief Justice Earl Warren when the commission was organized in

November 1963.

Robert Kennedy's testimony before the Warren Commission likewise omitted mention of his own fears that assassinations might breed assassinations.

BUT IT IS part of the public record that Johnson subsequently commented, without elaborating, that President Kennedy might have been killed in retaliation for his administration's anti-Castro policies. At the time, this remark was taken to mean possible retaliation for the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion and subsequent CIA operations against Cuba.

All these facts, secret at the time, may have influenced the Kennedy family in its decision to oppose any reopening of the assassination probe. Again, a new investigation might have led to public disclosures of the CIA plotting and tarnishing the memory of John and Robert Kennedy.

Robert Kennedy's interest in aggressive operations against Cuba was reported in a document written by John McCone, then CIA director, on Oct. 4, 1962, describing a top-level strategy meeting chaired by the attorney general. McCone wrote that "the attorney general reported on discussions with the President on Cuba; dissatisfied with lack of action in the sabotage field, went on to stress that nothing was moving forward, commented that one effort attempted had failed...."

ANOTHER ELEMENT of the cover-up was that in at least 50 instances the CIA had, according to an internal FBI memo, ignored materials supplied by the bureau on Oswald's foreign connections.

The responsibility for following up such FBI leads was in the hands of an ad hoc group built around the CIA's so-called "D Staff," a clandestine operations center then headed by William Harvey, a senior agency official. The CIA's counterintelligence office, directed by James Angleton, reported directly to Harvey's "D staff," and it too was involved in investigating certain aspects of the Kennedy assassination.

Sources contend that the CIA actually destroyed some of the materials provided by the FBI. Angleton, according to those sources, may have suspected Soviet "plants" in the FBI material. The Warren Commission never knew about any of it.

As has been reported

earlier, the FBI destroyed at least one letter Oswald sent to the Dallas police department shortly before the assassination. Oswald demanded that the FBI stop "harrasing" his Russian-born wife Marina and threatened to blow up the Dallas police headquarters if the FBI failed to desist.

THIS BECAME known only last year, and the FBI never offered a conclusive explanation for destroying the note.

Likewise, the FBI inexplicably failed to place Oswald on its "dangerous list" although it did so with other members of the Fair Play Committee.

A CIA memorandum to the Rockefeller Commission, which last year investigated CIA abuses, said that the agency still feels, as it did in 1964, that the Warren Commission should have given more credence in its final report to the possibility of foreign links in the conspiracy against Kennedy. The memo said that there were promising leads that were not followed up.

This statement contradicts the FBI memorandum now in the possession of the Senate Select Committee that the CIA refused to pursue leads obtained by the bureau. However acute rivalry between the CIA and the FBI already existed at the time — they actually stopped cooperating altogether in 1970 — and their estrangement could account for the contradictions.

THE COVER-UP is among the reasons the Senate Select Committee voted on May 13 to recommend a congressional inquiry into the role of the intelligence agencies in the Warren Commission investigation and into Oswald's motives.

The Senate committee first learned of the cover-up a few months ago. This is the new evidence the panel claims it has obtained about Oswald's motives. Sen. Richard Schweiker of Pennsylvania and Sen. Gary Hart of Colorado, who constitute a special subcommittee on the Kennedy assassination, have written a separate report on the subject.

Neither Schweiker nor Hart has publicly revealed thus far the nature of the new evidence. There is said to be great pressure to sanitize this report while the full secret information would be turned over to the Senate's new permanent oversight committee on

intelligence or whatever other panel might undertake the recommendation investigation of the Kennedy death.

The subcommittee report, to be issued in mid-June, will first be inspected by the FBI and the CIA to remove what they consider "embarrassing information."

ALTHOUGH senators are far from certain that the proposed inquiry would actually provide a conclusive answer about Oswald's motives — the trail has become cold in the opinion of many senators — the FBI and CIA could find themselves under charges of obstruction of justice for having withheld significant material from the Warren Commission.

Among the questions likely to be raised in a new investigation is why Dulles concealed from the Warren Commission, on which he served, the plotting against Castro by the CIA. CIA's own records, released in mid-May, show that the agency had already begun to plan Castro's assassination in March 1960, when Dulles was CIA director, and planning had by then begun for the Bay of Pigs.

Excerpts from transcripts of the Warren Commission's executive sessions (published in *The New Republic* on Sept. 27, 1975) show that Dulles informed his colleagues that there were certain CIA secrets that he would keep from everybody except the president. Dulles was addressing the still unclarified question of whether Oswald, as maintained by some assassination buffs, had been an undercover FBI informer.

A SIMILAR question could be raised with John McCone who was CIA director during the Warren Commission investigations and who should be called to testify in any new Senate inquiry. McCone was familiar with the anti-Castro plots and probably knew about Robert Kennedy's secret committee.

All the indications are that the existence of this committee was known to

very few people: Robert Kennedy himself, probably Dulles and McCone, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, and a few selected associates.

Several aides of Robert Kennedy, including a former assistant director of the FBI, said in interviews last week that they had not known of the committee. They said, however, that it was possible that the group could have been acting in secrecy out of the White House or attorney general's office before and after the Kennedy assassination.

The Senate Intelligence Committee learned of the cover-up in the course of its long investigation of the intelligence community. After references were made by witnesses to the Robert Kennedy committee in testimony touching on foreign assassination plots by the CIA, the Church Committee asked the FBI and the CIA for their relevant files.

IT IS UNDERSTOOD that the CIA made some material available; the FBI refused to do so for many months. Only recently did the bureau agree to allow Senate committee members to read parts of its secret files, but the senators have to do it at FBI headquarters.

It was in this manner that senators learned of the scope of the cover-up by the intelligence agencies. They've now requested additional materials from the FBI. Some senators are said to believe that further vital information on the Kennedy assassination investigation may turn up in the FBI files.

It remains unclear why, after 12 years, the FBI is still reluctant to let senators see all its files on the assassinations. There are no indications that the bureau has been under any pressure from the White House — President Ford was a member of the Warren Commission — to withhold material from the Senate. In fact, Ford himself now may be unaware of the contents of the FBI files. That raises again a fundamental question: Is the White House in full control of the intelligence agencies?

U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
7 June 1976

Administration officials report an "intelligence backlash" in Congress, with some members getting heat from home over their harsh attacks on CIA operations.

SATURDAY REVIEW

29 MAY 1976

CIA Reform: How Much Is Enough?

by George C. McGhee

The recent report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities provides an excellent basis for congressional action to reform the CIA. The President's *own* recent reorganization of the agency, however, ignores key issues that must be dealt with by Congress.

The very word *intelligence* is prejudicial in its own favor. Everyone agrees that a government should base its activities on the best available intelligence. The Central Intelligence Agency, which, as its name implies, has been the focal point for such activities within our government, has been brought into serious question. Yet it has important responsibilities which are vital to national security and must be continued. How do we separate the good in the CIA from the bad? How can we clarify, in the public mind, the difference? How can we build a new intelligence structure which can perform the essential functions with public confidence? In my view, the President's executive order has not answered these questions.

The present agency was spawned by the Second World War. It was created at war's end as a "grab bag" not just for the intelligence activities of the Office of Strategic Services but for a varied group of other covert activities. Protected by wartime security, these operations had not been under normal moral, legal, or resource limitations. In retrospect, it was, I believe, a mistake to have included such diverse operations under one umbrella. It was particularly misleading to call it an intelligence agency. Obviously, much of what it did went far beyond any ordinary definition of that term. Moreover, it provided continuity for wartime methods and objectives. War was succeeded by "cold war," with little change in outlook.

It should be understood, of course, that the CIA does not have a monopoly on intelligence. The Pentagon has its Defense Intelligence Agency. The Department of State, comprising some 7,500 people in Washington and 16,000 abroad, is in itself an enormous intelligence-gathering organization, not limited to its Bureau of Intelligence and Research. There is no obvious cutoff point between what should and what should not be done by the CIA. The agency has engaged in many activities, such as support for the National Student Association, because it could get the funds from Congress and State couldn't.

Nevertheless, as we continue to develop our overall intelligence capability, I believe we should also perpetuate an independent intelligence agency as a normal arm of government. There is, of course, the supporting theory that intelligence estimates by such an agency will be more objective in assessing the success or failure of policy. There is also

the need for expertise and continuity in particular specialties which can perhaps best be provided by an independent agency. A case in point is the analysis of aerial photographs from satellites.

It must be emphasized, however, that most CIA intelligence gathering is, like satellite photography, quite open and aboveboard. Only the results need be kept secret. Many data are obtained from passive radio intercepts made by the military National Security Agency. Provided one has a place to put one's aerial intercepts are an accepted tool. Often, however, in the search for intelligence, the line of legality must be breached. Covert means must be employed. Calculated risks must be taken. Spies are used. Someone is paid off. Forced entry is made. We must also protect ourselves—through counterespionage—from similar activities by other governments. In a dangerous world this is an accepted "gray" area in which all nations must compete, including, under appropriate restraints, our own intelligence agency.

BEYOND THIS, however, as everyone knows, the CIA has been engaged in a wide range of covert activities which do not constitute intelligence collection at all; indeed, they are separated by a deep chasm. What I speak of, of course, is the whole array of covert *operational* activities, or "dirty tricks." This includes all secret attempts to manipulate the rest of the world in our favor. This is what was on trial before the Church committee and world opinion. It is these activities which have, by association, blemished CIA's legitimate intelligence function. The principal rationale, moreover, for putting them under the same roof, i.e., that the same agents do both, is not believed to be overriding. Results could be more objectively analyzed by an intelligence successor to the CIA if the two arms were separated, yet closely coordinated.

I was amazed when I came back into the State Department in 1961, after an absence of seven years, to learn the extent to which the CIA had become involved in covert activities all around the world. The Bay of Pigs operation, which lay ripe for plucking on the drawing board, was only one of many. I considered most too risky for the possible meager gains involved. We were operating in many countries. Some were close allies whose friendship we were risking. We were still supporting democratic parties in Western Europe long after the countries involved had recovered economically. Most of our operations were relatively unimportant to our national security.

When a government agency goes operational covertly, there is, of course, a variety of choices. You start by subsidizing foreign magazines and newspapers to influence popular opinion, then progress to support for political parties and discreet bribes to officials. In the past little attention has been paid to such ac-

tivities; however, this is only the start. With know-how and funds available, you attempt to control elections, bring about the fall of governments, or even assassinate political leaders. On the macroscale this leads to what is, in effect, undeclared war. It was an open secret that in Laos the CIA for years ran a war involving large-scale air and ground forces. The CIA was deeply involved in Vietnam before our military took over.

Where do such activities start and end? What is their proper role? How can they be controlled? I believe that responsibility for covert operational activities must be separated from the intelligence function. These operations must also be reduced greatly in scope. They must constitute the exceptional rather than the usual instrument of policy. Any decision to employ them must take into account the long-range impact on United States and world opinion. People all around the world are now convinced that the CIA is manipulating their governments and people. Americans abroad are suspect as being under "cover" for CIA—our embassies, our companies, our professors, and our tourists. We are paying a high price for marginal gains.

Authority for covert operations must stem from our highest authority—the President—even if he may not always be forced to admit it. Those directing the operations must also be responsible to the Congress, preferably through one joint committee of the two houses. Every effort must be made to maintain secrecy. Guidelines must be set. Most Americans would insist, as a minimum, on a total taboo on assassination—and on undeclared war, that is, one not first approved by Congress. The joint committee itself could decide what should be approved by Congress as a whole. The agency devoted exclusively to intelligence should be an open operation, staffed by professionals. It should need little "cover." Covert operations beyond intelligence should be conducted by some new, anonymous agency reporting directly to the President. Any undeclared wars tacitly approved by Congress should be run by a branch of the military, upon whose expertise it would draw.

Most important, however, we must understand that today's world cannot be manipulated by us in such an obvious way. A prominent CIA official once bragged to me that their operations had saved 13 countries from communism. He did not mention countries where we are considered the enemy as a result of abortive CIA operations. We win dubiously in Chile, but we lose in Cambodia. We give Soviet arms to the Kurds and use the resulting appearance of Soviet intervention to justify furnishing arms to Iran. We give arms to Holden Roberto in Angola, and when the Soviet-backed Popular Front appears stronger, we feel compelled to raise the ante. What is cause and what is effect? How do you win such a game?

I recently heard a leading English jour-

Monday, May 17, 1976

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

nalist berate America for sabotaging our CIA just when it could have won the struggle against communism in Portugal. Does anyone really think a few million dollars can control the destiny of 10 million people?

If we are to produce the open and wise policies that will earn for us the place in the world we deserve, we must first rid ourselves of the delusion that we can win by the cheap and easy way of covert manipulation. At the same time, we must regroup and reform our varied intelligence activities—building what is appropriate into an independent and a respected arm of our government. When we venture into the murky area beyond, we should do so under new auspices, strict guidelines, and complete responsibility—not just to the President but, through the Congress, to the American people. For it is they who will have to pay the price of any failures, as they have done in Vietnam. □

TIMES HERALD, Dallas
2 May 1976



FELIX R. MCKNIGHT

One more chorus — with guts

ONE MORE CHORUS, now, with a little more pizzazz and guts from you citizen voices on the back row.

Newly named CIA Director George Bush is taking hold, as you expected, and he said something in Lawrence, Kan. the other day that really puts this whole intelligence ruckus down to the earth level where we concerned folks can read the message.

In muted answer to 1,000 plus critical pages from the ravenous Senate Intelligence Committee staff that accuses the FBI and his CIA of everything but effectiveness, Bush said simply, but tellingly:

"WE NEED a covert (hidden, secret) capability. I believe we can operate in as clean a fashion as we can. But there are some grubby things in this spy business . . ."

Certainly — and Congress knows it — there are some "grubby" things in intelligence operations. That's what it is all about or we wouldn't have a CIA and an FBI. You don't hand your card to the enemy, domestic or foreign, and say "Pardon me, old man, but . . ."

An agent knows when he acts that it is your nation, your society, your life — or his.

And the sooner we get off the whelped backs of CIA and FBI now trying to cleanse their houses of decades old questionable past practices the better chance for this society, this nation.

The opposition points have been made — and some were well made — but now the hunters had better start listening to very cold warnings from men like Bush and get realistic about

this endless donnybrook they have initiated.

Mr. Bush, a totally reliable man pushing to re-route objectives of the CIA into unassailable legitimacy, now warns that in the next decade international terrorist threats against the United States could be more dangerous than conventional military or political threats. He told his Lawrence audience that there is increasing danger, with proliferation of nuclear weapons and materials, that terrorist fanatics will acquire nuclear capabilities.

TO COMBAT this prospect of horror, there must be support — not endless carping.

Relentless pursuit — demonstrably past constructive remedial processes — could decimate the entire intelligence apparatus. It has been said here over and over again, but the congressional wolves have made their good and bad points and should now move to other areas that need repair far more than the FBI and CIA.

In fact, if the current bushwhacking continues the public might well demand to know precisely what is behind all this persistent clamor to "get" the FBI and CIA.

To repeat, valid points have been made and certain practices should be abolished as totally out of American character — notably foreign assassination plots and the misuse of the FBI by every American president back to Franklin D. Roosevelt — but we must not lose our perspective about overall intelligence in the headline frenzy of the moment.

The possibility of a link between the Kennedy shooting and U.S. plots to kill the Cuban leader is just too strong to ignore. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has reported that on the day Mr. Kennedy was assassinated, the CIA was outfitting an operative to kill Mr. Castro.

Now members of that Senate committee have called for a new investigation to go beyond the "who" to the "why," and this seems entirely called for, given the new information that has been revealed as well as growing public doubts about the original findings. It may not be necessary to entirely reopen the whole matter, but these latest questions should be answered.

President Ford, who was a member of the Warren Commission, some months ago agreed that such a limited reinvestigation is necessary. With the Senate about to consider a new intelligence oversight committee that could undertake such an investigation, now is a good time for Mr. Ford to reaffirm his support.

Sen. Frank Church, D-Idaho, who first chaired the Senate Intelligence Committee and then conveniently slipped into the Democrat presidential preferential race after getting rave notices from networks and big press, is making few ripples out among the people. If we properly read the public in the hinterlands, they are weary of Washington's daily blast and not supportive of continued attacks based upon very old information.

NOW WE read of the "chilling" Senate committee report that "documents" a 40-year pattern of "official lawlessness!"

In 400 pages prepared by eager young staff workers, we are told that Presidents since 1932 have been sleazy operators who used the FBI to track down political enemies.

Most of this adds up to a desire on the part of some members of Congress to take over intelligence operations by imposing strict controls from a single oversight committee.

This could be the blunder of the century if these same Congressional members handle other "secret" matters by leaking information all over Washington — and the world.

The Senate liberals have been temporarily choked off by a more sensible Rules Committee amendment that would require any oversight committee to share jurisdiction with other committees now involved in intelligence oversight.

If all worked together — and kept their mouths shut — intelligence could be steered in the proper direction.

FOREIGN POLICY
Summer 1976
REORGANIZING
THE CIA:
WHO AND HOW

In FOREIGN POLICY 22, Peter Szanton and Graham Allison wrote that the time had come to "seize the opportunity" and restructure the American intelligence community. In the exchange that follows, William E. Colby and Walter F. Mondale comment on their proposals and Szanton and Allison reply.—The Editors.

William E. Colby:

Indeed we have an opportunity to rethink and restructure American intelligence. A year of intensive investigation by a presidential and two congressional committees, worldwide concern over sensational accounts of CIA deeds and misdeeds, and a series of Constitutional confrontations between the executive and legislative branches cannot disappear into our history books without changes in American intelligence.

The first and easiest action would be to tinker with the organizational structure of intelligence. When in doubt, or under pressure, reorganize; this is an old bureaucratic ploy. It is also a tempting panacea for infinite problems. With due respect for the ideas suggested by Peter Szanton and Graham Allison, but without agreement with many of them, I believe this opportunity should be seized in more important fields.

The fundamental lesson of the year of investigation is that American intelligence is a part of and must operate under the American constitutional system. This perhaps obvious fact for Americans is a stunning novelty in the long history of intelligence. It is as startling an idea to many developed democracies as it is incongruous to totalitarians. It does not reverse any early American doctrine to the contrary, but it does overturn longstanding and comfortable practices which grew up before the question was squarely faced.

Three conclusions stem from this new status of intelligence. First, the place of intelligence in the governmental structure must be established and understood in open statutes and directives. The National Security Act of 1947 made a start in this direction, and the CIA Act of 1949 provided statutory authority for many of the essential attributes of our intelligence service. Both contain several vague and encompassing clauses, however. The resulting ambiguities led to actions which in retrospect fall below to-

day's standards.

President Ford's executive order of February 18 makes a major stride in the direction of providing a public charter for American intelligence, describing its structure and functions and clearly delimiting areas of authorized, and unauthorized, activity. Substantial parts of this order, however, should be enacted into law, our constitutional process of establishing and recording our national consensus on matters of public import.

George Washington once said that upon "secrecy, success depends in most enterprises" of intelligence. The past year has shown almost a total lack of consensus and even understanding of the role and limits of secrecy in American intelligence. What were leaks rose at times to flood stage proportions. Strong voices are heard advocating almost every variation on the spectrum from a modern version of "open intelligence openly arrived at" to the contention that an Official Secrets Act should protect an intelligence structure totally hidden in the recesses of the executive branch. President Ford has recommended legislation which will impose the essential discipline on intelligence personnel to keep the secrets they learn but leave untrammelled the First Amendment's guarantee of a free press.

We have laws and sanctions to protect many secrets necessary to the preservation and operation of our free society. The secret ballot box, the confidence between attorney and client, advance crop figures which might upset the market, all are protected by criminal sanctions against individuals who might disclose them. Intelligence secrets, however, are in effect only protected against the foreign spy. But their disclosure to our free society makes them available to the foreigner as well, and can cut our nation off from sources and information which are essential to its safety in a world which has not yet been made safe for democracy. Better protection of our sources through law would apply to the intelligence profession the same discipline that journalism has found essential to its functioning.

The second conclusion from the new status of intelligence under the Constitution is that it must be responsible and accountable. This burden must rest not only on those in intelligence: it lies with equal weight on all three branches of our constitutional structure. President Ford has moved to strengthen executive control and responsibility for intelligence. The stronger position of the director of central intelligence, the interagency committee structure for the review of the policies and programs of national intelligence, and independent review and supervision by the private citizens of The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, all will increase

the control and accountability of intelligence to the president himself and to the senior members of the executive branch.

Congress has an equal duty to arrange itself to exercise its constitutional role with respect to intelligence. It must assume its full responsibilities in all senses of the word. It must organize and carry out full and current reviews of the intelligence community, assuring that it not only remains within the guidelines set for it, but also that it is efficiently and comprehensively accomplishing the tasks assigned. Congress' other responsibility, however, is to do this without destroying the ability of intelligence to carry out its duties. Thus the secrets of intelligence must be protected on Capitol Hill as well as at the CIA's Langley headquarters. The minimum number of people, congressmen as well as staff, who truly "need to know" should be informed and should be subject to sanctions for improper disclosure. A single committee, in each House if necessary, should represent their colleagues in this function, ending the present requirement to brief at least six committees.

The third conclusion which derives from intelligence's advent to constitutional status is that it must *serve* the constitutional process. Traditionally and in other lands the servant only of the executive, it must now demonstrate its value to the Congress and to the public. It must earn the large investment needed by modern intelligence, the risks and inevitable occasional failures and embarrassments incurred, and respect for its professional discipline and secrecy. This must be accomplished by sharing the fruits of the enterprise with all participants in the American decision-making process.

Perhaps this is the most challenging task ahead for intelligence. It must develop the distinctions between protecting the secrecy of its sources and techniques and making available the substance of its information and conclusions. It must face public criticism and political challenge of its assessments. It must maintain the independence and objectivity of its judgments apart from the policies and programs they may support or question. Internationally, we must insist that an intelligence judgment is a step toward policy, not a reflection of it, whether relating to ally or adversary. In a political debate where knowledge can be power, intelligence judgments must be supplied impartially to all factions, to help the best solution to emerge, rather than a favored one.

This will require many changes in intelligence habits and concepts. The photographs must be published, the backgrounders attributed, the publications edited to protect the sources but circulate the substance of their reports.

With these changes, intelligence can be distributed regularly to all members of Congress, not held under such high classifica-

tions that it cannot be circulated and made conveniently available. The estimates will be debated and the sage unanimity of the intelligence cloister challenged by those close to the struggle and fearful of irrational and foolhardy, but real, surprises. Out of the process, however, will come a better understanding of the role and value of modern intelligence, as well as better intelligence itself.

"Seizing the opportunity" to implement these conclusions will mark a major turning point in the discipline and profession of intelligence. In its wake may come some of the structural changes suggested by Szanton and Allison and by others joining in the close examination of intelligence sparked by 1975's investigations. Some of their and others' ideas will not be adopted, and additional ones will arise for consideration. But the coming of age of intelligence as a full participant and contributor to the constitutional process will start a continual review and renewal of intelligence to meet the challenges of the future. Among more substantial substantive benefits to the nation and to American intelligence, this will make unnecessary another sensational and shattering updating of American intelligence.

Walter F. Mondale:

Like most Americans. I have strongly supported the necessity of our government's conducting intelligence activities. But after witnessing hundreds of hours of testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, I am also convinced that basic reform is necessary.

The committee heard respected former officials of our nation talk about institutionalizing an assassination capability in the CIA as though it were just another option. We studied how the United States has used bribery, corruption, and violence in almost every quarter of the globe, and saw how espionage is aimed at our friends as well as at our foes. The committee reviewed how our academic institutions, press, and religious institutions have been exploited for clandestine purposes, despite the special place these institutions must have in our democratic society.

It is clear to me that we have paid an extremely high price for any resulting secret success. American covert intervention often undermined the very democratic institutions we sought to promote. Because of our clandestine activities, the United States is regrettably regarded less and less as an example of democracy to be admired and emulated. Almost anything bad that happens in this world is attributed to the CIA—including the murder of King Faisal. And at home, the confidence of Americans in their government is weakened when our leaders use

covert intelligence operations to mislead the public and short-circuit our democratic process. I have come to believe that there must be some fundamental changes in America's intelligence activities or they will fundamentally change America.

The proposals of Peter Szanton and Graham Allison in the spring issue of FOREIGN POLICY go in the right direction. They improve upon similar recommendations I made last fall. I recognize the costs in such a reorganization, and George A. Carver, Jr., in his comment on the Szanton-Allison article, also in the spring issue, has pointed to certain aspects of them. But insofar as substantive problems can be met by structural change in the executive branch, I believe that the gains would outweigh the costs.

The problem, however, is deeper.

As the committee took testimony day after day on assassination plots, my first impression was that we were grappling with some of the darker forces of human nature: the undertaking of acts which would be unthinkable if not done in secret; the enthusiasm with which we emulated our enemy; how patriotism and loyalty could be perverted to the point of dishonoring the nation; the spectacle of men of great respect offering explanations and excuses at the margin of credibility.

My initial conclusion was that the answer lay in better accountability—vigorous congressional oversight plus a system in which officials cannot hide responsibility for their actions. To this end, I have supported a new Senate oversight committee with the power to authorize all national intelligence budgets.

But the problem, I am afraid, lies deeper still. It is not just a problem of means, it is a question of ends.

When America saw itself as primarily responsible for countering the Soviets and Communists throughout the world, our intelligence services responded. Since Vietnam, I believe America's view of its responsibilities has changed. However, there has been no redefinition of our role in the world, nor of the policies to be served by our intelligence activities.

As a start, I would suggest the following:

> Avoiding nuclear war is most important. It requires the best possible intelligence. The continuing suspicion and antagonism between the United States and the Soviet Union and the levels of nuclear weapons on each side, place a premium on the most accurate assessment of Soviet military capabilities and political intentions. Agreements to control nuclear and conventional arms need a strong intelligence base to ensure both sound agreements and compliance. To this end, I believe the Soviet Union and its allies

must remain our Number One intelligence priority.

> Containing Soviet adventurism is the responsibility of all free countries. Each nation must look to its own resources first. If U.S. help is needed, covert action could prove vital. But, in general, I see little reason why U.S. aid should go through covert intelligence channels. Except in extraordinary circumstances, nations wishing American support should be prepared to admit it. The American people and the Congress must not be left in the dark about new commitments.

> Support for democracy. America remains the greatest friend of liberty in the world, if no longer the sole defender of every regime that calls itself anti-Communist. But helping the shattered democratic parties of Western Europe survive in the late 1940s is one thing, and seeking to overthrow a democratically elected government in Chile in the 1970s is quite another. Moreover, despite possible short-term success, covert action can be the enemy of democracy. It often amounts to corruption and nothing is more destructive of a democratic political system than corruption, in particular from a foreign source. If American aid to democracy is essential to offset Soviet subversion, we should find a way to do this openly. Perhaps our political parties can assume some of this responsibility, much as European Social Democratic parties have in Portugal.

> Meeting the problems of hunger and deprivation and building a more equitable world economic system are urgent tasks unsuited to clandestine activity. A foreign policy which relies heavily on covert intervention and espionage will be self-defeating in this area, for it will cast doubt on the legitimacy of our cooperation and assistance.

> Clandestine activities may prove essential to protect and advance our national interests in certain critical situations, such as thwarting terrorism, controlling narcotics, and bringing truth to nations blinded by censorship. But it has been naive for us to think that we could change a country's history with a couple of lies, a few guns, or a packet of dollars. We have ignored the strength of nationalism and people's determination to shape their own destiny. The Marshall Plan and NATO, along with the underlying vitality of the countries themselves, saved Europe from the Communists, not the CIA. The Alliance for Progress contained Castro in the early 1960s, not Operation MONGOOSE. In most cases, I believe America can be more effective if we are direct about what we want. Diplomacy and economic cooperation, backed by adequate military strength—these are the tools that America uses best to secure its interests.

I find myself in the unhappy position of not being able to take the stand that U.S. covert action should be banned. With the

world as it is. I am afraid we may sometimes need it. But it is clear we have undertaken too much clandestine activity in the past. We need to control it through the kind of structural changes proposed by Szanton and Allison and make it accountable through strong congressional oversight. But beyond this, I believe we need a new statement of the role of clandestine activities in U.S. foreign policy. I hope that the next president of the United States speaks to the American people and the world as follows:

It will be the policy of the United States to conduct its relations with other countries on a straightforward basis. We will deal with other governments in confidence but not in stealth. We will be plain and direct about our own interests and concerns and about what we expect from others. We reject a policy of covert intervention into the internal affairs of other nations.

America will continue those intelligence activities essential to its security and that of its friends and allies. We will do what we can to check Soviet adventurism and to promote democracy on an open basis, but these are first the responsibility of the countries concerned. Covert action will be reserved for extraordinary circumstances in which the security of this nation or of its allies is in serious jeopardy.

The era of covert day-to-day manipulation of media, people, and events by the United States has ended. American intelligence activities will be restructured accordingly.

Peter Szanton & Graham Allison:

Surely, William E. Colby is right in asserting that the fundamental lesson of the past year is that American intelligence must operate within our constitutional system. And equally clearly, Walter F. Mondale is right in arguing that the deepest problem of American intelligence is one of ends, not means; a problem to be solved not by tinkering with the intelligence community but by rethinking and restating our values and objectives in the external world.

But two aspects of these attractive and

large-minded concepts are troubling. One is that Colby, after a professional lifetime in the executive branch, asks Congress to rectify the constitutional balance, while Mondale, a leading figure in the Congress, looks principally to executive leadership for improvement. It is hard not to conclude that the country would be far better off had Colby spent the last eight years in the Congress while Mondale occupied the White House. The second is that while focusing on constitutional and high policy issues is helpful in clarifying the transcending problems, it also tends to foreclose attention to lesser but still quite important questions.

This is the nation's first opportunity in a quarter-century to rethink what it wants from intelligence and how to get it. Absent further scandals or disasters, it will likely be the last such opportunity of this century. Once the constitutional balance has been struck, and once we have stopped asking our intelligence agencies to perform unjustified or repugnant or useless acts abroad, there will still remain the problem of how to improve the performance of these agencies at what has always been their major task: providing the U.S. government with early and authoritative understanding of developments abroad. In recent years, the community's analyses and assessments have proven highly variable in quality and far from satisfying. Their too frequent misuse and nonuse by policy-makers is a closely related problem. The already receding opportunity for reform should be used to insure not only that the community operates within constitutional boundaries and in the service of a supportable policy, but that it performs its hardest, least glamorous, and most important task to higher standards, and that the results are heard. Neither alertness in the Congress nor policy leadership in the White House, essential as both are, will solve those latter problems. Their solution will require far stronger incentives within the community to treat the work of analysis and assessment as paramount, and to enlarge the skills and preserve the neutrality necessary for such work. They will also require arrangements which more reliably confront decision-makers with the results. In short, organizational reform.

WASHINGTON POST
21 MAY 1976

Senators Named to New Unit on CIA

Senate leaders yesterday named the 17 members of the newly created permanent Senate Committee on Intelligence Activities, with a hint that Sen. Daniel K. Inouye (D-Hawaii) will become chairman.

Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.), announcing the eight Demo-

crats who will serve, gave Inouye's name first. There had been speculation earlier that he would become chairman.

Another Democrats: Birch Bayh (Ind.), Adlai E. Stevenson (Ill.), William D. Hathaway (Maine), Walter (Dee) Huddleston (Ky.), Joe Biden Jr. (Del.), Robert B. Morgan

(N.C.) and Gary W. Hart (Colo.).

Republican members, named by Minority Leader Hugh Scott (R-Pa.), are Clifford P. Case (N.J.), Mark O. Hatfield (Ore.), Barry Goldwater (Ariz.), Howard H. Baker Jr. (Tenn.), Robert T. Stafford (Vt.), Strom Thurmond (S.C.), and Jake Garn (Utah).

GENERALWASHINGTON POST
16 MAY 1976*Jack Anderson***Terrorist 'Fish' in a Sea of Tourists**

A terrorist group has rebuilt a common tanker truck into a modern Trojan horse to infiltrate America's bicentennial celebration and Canada's Olympic games. Confidential law enforcement reports show many terrorists have now fixed on these two events as their next battleground.

The terrorists have transformed the tanker truck into a rolling headquarters. On the outside, the truck looks perfectly normal. It even has spigots that can drip oil. But instead of petroleum products, the tank holds a terrorist office, dormitory and arsenal. It can accommodate 15 to 20 raiders from the hellish side of politics. American agents know about this mobile terrorist command post, but they haven't caught up with it yet.

Modern terrorists come from all sides of the political spectrum, but they share the concept that their cause will profit from disruption, disorder and bloodshed. Some are highly trained commandos, skilled in the nightmarish uses of our modern technology. The government reports warn ominously that terrorists might even use "nuclear materials" as radioactive poisons or to build bombs.

The United States and Canada are working together to prevent the terrorists from spoiling the bicentennial and Olympic spectacles. Both the FBI and Royal Canadian Mounted Police are redoubling their efforts to stop the terrorists before they strike. The Customs Services of both countries are watching for smuggled weapons. The State Department has appointed a "coordinator for combatting terrorism." An informal White House task force and the Canadian Ministry of External Affairs are also working on the counter-terrorist campaign.

The classified working papers of the two governments read like grim textbooks on insurgency warfare. The official documents show how the terrorists plan to follow classic guerrilla warfare stratagems, mixing with the local populace between hit-and-run attacks. The terrorists also employ smuggling techniques from the worlds of international

crime and espionage to move their weapons across borders.

The official reports discuss a variety of disguise-and-diversionary tactics that the terrorists are known to use. They convert the ordinary into a camouflaged weapon. For example, camera-laden tourists are a standard sight at such events as bicentennial pageants and Olympic games. But the official reports warn some "tourists" may be disguised terrorists, and their cameras may be deadly weapons.

Lawmen have discovered, for example, that the new Polaroid cameras with large film packs can conceal small pistols whose grips have been removed. The ordinary Kodak film box, one intelligence report says, may be used by terrorists to hide tiny lethal devices known as "Dutch mini-grenades."

Government agents have also learned that terrorists may conceal small machineguns in attache cases. Trigger extensions protrude from the case. What appears to be an ordinary briefcase can be held "under the arm (to) fire into a crowded area," according to one document.

Intelligence reports suggest that the terrorists are most likely to strike in July, the month that the bicentennial celebrations reach their climax and the Olympic games open. Enormous numbers of tourists are expected at these events.

U.S. and Canadian customs officials have pinpointed some of the terrorist organizations that are expected to cause trouble. The Japanese Red Army, as a prime example, is described in the confidential reports as a group of now more than 30 anarchists. Yet they succeeded in shocking the world by massacring 28 people at the Tel Aviv airport in 1972, hijacking a Japan Air Lines plane in 1973, bombing Shell Oil tanks in Singapore in 1974 and seizing the U.S. embassy in Kuala Lumpur in 1975.

There is also the Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion Nacional Puertorriquena, which ostensibly seeks Puerto Rican independence from the United States. According to the official documents,

this terrorist group blatantly claims credit for 10 U.S. bombings in October 1975. The official reports warn this group may work with the Puerto Rican Socialist Party, controlled by Fidel Castro, to disrupt the bicentennial.

An anti-Castro terrorist group, the Frente de Liberacion Nacional de Cuba, may "cause problems" at the Olympics because of Cuba's participation in the games. This group, according to the documents, "is known to possess a large amount of C-4 explosives, which it may use against pro-Castro and Soviet targets."

Perhaps the strangest group of terrorists, identified as a bicentennial and Olympic threat, is the "Rastafarian Movement." The intelligence data say the group is also known as "the Niyabingi Order, the Miyamen, the Beardsmen, the Locksmen, the Rude Boys and the Dreads."

The Rastafarians, one of the oldest of the terrorist groups, is an all-black cult originating in Jamaica in 1930. They believe "that the past Emperor of Ethiopia, Haile Selassie, was the living God . . . and that the ways of the white man are evil."

The documents say that the Rastafarians advocate the liberal use of marijuana and have been associated increasingly with violent rebellion and terrorism. In New York City alone, they have an estimated 3,000 members of varying levels of activity.

Law enforcement agencies on both sides of the border are beefing up their anti-terrorist campaign. But the key to defeating the terrorists lies with the populace. Terrorists need confusion, chaos and a submissive populace to operate successfully in any country. They describe themselves as the "fish" who will hide this summer in the sea of tourists.

If the people of the United States and Canada deny the terrorists the strategic hospitality they need, the fanatics among us will have more trouble and less success.

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Wednesday, May 19, 1976

The Washington Star

Soviet Military Spending Up 5 or 6%, CIA EstimatesBy Henry S. Bradsher
Washington Star Staff Writer

Soviet military spending has been rising for the past three years at an annual rate of 5 or 6 percent, the CIA says in a new study that predicts continued but perhaps slower long-term growth.

In what it called "a major revision of past estimates," the agency raised its calculations of military spending

from 6 or 8 percent of the Soviet gross national product to between 11 and 13 percent since 1970. In the coming fiscal year the United States plans to spend on defense slightly under 6 percent of a GNP roughly

two-thirds larger than the Soviet GNP.

A 17-page CIA study, which was circulated on Capitol Hill yesterday, said about 90 percent of the increase

in its estimates came from "changes in our understanding of ruble prices and costs," and the rest from broader information on Soviet armed forces. The estimate of Soviet military spending last year was approximately doubled, the study said.

THE REVISION "does not affect our appraisal of the size or capabilities of Soviet military forces," the study pointed out. Nor does it change earlier estimates that Soviet military spending in 1975 was about 40 percent more than American, when calculated in dollars.

But it does show Kremlin leaders more willing to give their armed forces priority over consumers than previously realized, the CIA said. It did not attempt to judge foreign policy attitudes which lay behind this.

The study emphasized the tentative nature of the conclusions drawn from "a major reassessment . . . undertaken in the face of an unusually large body of new information." The estimates have "a margin of uncertainty, which for some items could be substantial."

This uncertainty seemed certain to provide the basis of continuing dispute among various intelligence analysts and on Capitol Hill over the size and significance of the Soviet military effort.

THE NEW information has been available for a year. Pentagon analysts, who have long contended that the CIA was pegging the Soviet military effort too low, have argued for the agency to admit it has been wrong for years. But now the way the data is used could provide the basis for further argument.

WASHINGTON POST
5 JUN 1976

Atomic Fuel In Taiwan Not Inspected

By Don Oberdorfer
Washington Post Staff Writer

International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors checking Taiwan's research reactor early this year failed to inspect 10 fuel rods containing a total of one-half kilogram of plutonium, according to a report that has caused concern among governments acquainted with the case.

U.S. experts said this amount of plutonium would not be enough to make an explosive device, though it would be enough to provide some laboratory experience in handling sensitive materials that, in larger amounts, could be used for bomb-making.

American officials familiar with the incident said the Nationalist Chinese in charge of the reactor reportedly told the IAEA inspectors that the fuel rods had been taken to another location.

While this is not unusual in some nuclear operations, the governments hearing the report were surprised—and concerned—that the inspectors evidently did not insist on going to the other site to inspect the fuel rods.

David Fischer, assistant director for external relations of the Vienna-based international inspection agency, said the January inspectors' report from Taiwan showed "no significant amount of material unaccounted for" and "no reason to suppose any kind of irregularity."

Fischer said it is his understanding that inspectors would not normally see every fuel element during their semi-annual inspections. Such a physical inventory of all materials is required less frequently, he said.

The Taiwan Research Reactor, which was supplied by Canada, is similar to a Canadian-supplied reactor utilized by India to make a nuclear explosive device. The Indians secretly built a reprocessing facility to convert used fuel rods to weapons-grade atomic material.

Former Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger has in recent months said that on the basis of the new information the Soviet Union is devoting "at least 15 percent" of GNP to the military. Lt. Gen. Daniel O. Graham, who retired from running the Defense Intelligence Agency when Schlesinger was fired by President Ford last autumn, has put the figure at 15 to 20 percent.

Commenting on the new CIA study, Graham said he found it "to still be extremely conservative . . . I find it incredible that they didn't go to 12 to 16 percent" of GNP on the basis of information with which he was familiar.

"It is awfully tough for a group of analysts to admit that they were as wrong as they (the CIA) have been," Graham added. "It's nice to see that they do admit as much as they do."

SEN. WILLIAM PROXMIRE, D-Wis., whose subcommittee of Congress's Joint Economic Committee has held annual hearings on the Soviet and Chinese military effort, commented that "the revised intelligence estimate has little to do with the size or effectiveness of the Soviet defense program." These are unchanged, but the Soviet military machine has been shown to be more inefficient and wasteful, Proxmire said.

Proxmire and other congressional critics of Pentagon warnings about the growing size of the Soviet armed forces have often used a CIA estimate of a 3 percent annual growth in the Kremlin's military spending. It was based on dollar calculations.

The new study estimated the growth at less than 3 percent in 1971 and 1972. But new weapons, especial-

ly "a new generation of strategic missile systems," pushed it up to 5 or 6 percent for 1973-75, for an average over the five years of 4 to 5 percent.

Procurement of those missiles probably has peaked and the annual rate of growth will taper off until the next generation, the study added. Pentagon officials have reported that next generation now under development in the Soviet Union.

THE ARMED forces are now "absorbing almost 20 percent of the output of Soviet industry," the CIA estimated. Other sources said this and other calculations of the military effort had not yet been coordinated with CIA estimates of the entire Soviet economy, however, and thus the new study was considered very tentative by economic analysts.

"Because the resource impact of the defense effort on the Soviet economy has been considerably greater than we previously recognized," the study said, "we now realize that Soviet leaders have been more willing than we thought to forgo economic growth and consumer satisfaction in favor of military capabilities."

"Nevertheless, we see no evidence that economic considerations are deterring the Soviets from continuing the present pace and magnitude of their defense effort."

In recent weeks there has been evidence that a majority in the Soviet leadership is seeking to restrain military spending. This has developed since the death last month of the powerful defense minister, Marshal Andrei A. Grechko, and his replacement with a military production expert rather than another soldier.

U.S. officials said they are confident Taiwan possesses no such reprocessing operation. They said that the United States is concerned about the case of the uninspected fuel rods primarily because it seems to demonstrate inadequate procedures and a lack of zeal on the part of the international inspectors.

Nuclear material and facilities supplied by the United States and most other advanced countries are sold on condition that they be used only for authorized purposes and that they be subject to periodic on-site inspection by teams of the Vienna-based international agency.

The IAEA has been sharply criticized in some quarters for having only 60 inspectors to police more than 300 nuclear facilities around the world. Congress has added \$5 million for IAEA to a pending military assistance bill in an effort to improve the inspections.

Nationalist Chinese Premier Chiang Ching-kuo said last September that "we admit we have the ability and the facilities to manufacture

nuclear weapons, but we will never manufacture them."

Taiwan has formally agreed not to make an atomic bomb by ratifying the nonproliferation treaty.

Taiwan is in the early stages of a multibillion-dollar nuclear power program that seeks to generate nearly half of the island's power needs through nuclear power plants by 1985. The United States is selling Taiwan the nuclear fuel and most of the reactors and other necessary equipment.

American experts pointed out the extensive Taiwan nuclear power investment is in a sense a hostage against weapons production. This is because the United States has the ability to shut off the required flow of uranium fuel if there is evidence that Taiwan is cheating on its international commitments.

The United States did not stop shipments of essential nuclear fuel to India after that country's atomic explosion. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is holding hearings to determine whether the fuel shipments should be stopped.

WASHINGTON POST
9 JUN 1976

Opium Poppy Fields Said Destroyed

Mexico Heroin Flow Slowed

By John M. Goshko

Washington Post Staff Writer

The United States and Mexico announced yesterday that almost all the opium poppy fields in Mexico—the source of most of the heroin entering the United States—have been destroyed by an intensified eradication program.

The announcement was made jointly here by Attorney General Edward H. Levi and Mexican Attorney General Pedro Ojeda-Paullada. They said that the eradication campaign can be expected to reduce the availability of Mexican heroin in the United States by late this year.

Their statements were made in an atmosphere of cordiality. But they came against a background of reports that efforts to stem the cross-border drug traffic may be endangered by growing rancor between narcotics agencies of the two countries.

Washington Post special correspondent Marlise Simons reported from Mexico City that Mexican officials are extremely angry at what one characterized as the "insolent and inept behavior" of U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration agents operating in Mexico.

Simons quoted Mexican official sources as saying that "American agents and agents provocateurs are acting against our will and behind our backs" to engage in entrapment of narcotics dealers and other activities that are against Mexican law.

The charges were denied here in Washington by Ojeda-Paullada and by DEA Administrator Peter B. Bensinger. Ojeda-Paullada told

WASHINGTON POST

22 MAY 1976

The Washington Post:

"There is no crisis in our relations, because Attorney General Levi and Mr. Bensinger have accepted fully that U.S. officials in Mexico must act in strict accordance with Mexican laws and authority. There have been — and I am sure there will continue to be from time to time — differences of opinion at lower levels. But there is absolutely no crisis."

Some DEA officials said privately that the Mexicans had certain complaints about U.S. activities but they have been acted on by Washington and resolved. Bensinger said, "These reports are false on each count. The only ones who benefit from something like this are the drug dealers."

Still, the reports of friction have been so persistent that many law-enforcement sources are inclined to believe that they have some basis in fact. There were hints, in the guarded comments of some officials, that the Mexicans might have been angry but had agreed to withhold open criticism in exchange for Washington's promises to correct the situation.

In any case, the atmosphere yesterday, both in the appearance of the two attorneys general before the press and in a subsequent visit by Ojeda-Paullada and Justice officials to President Ford at the White House, was almost determinedly upbeat.

Levi and Bensinger put particular stress on how the Mexican government's expanded drive against poppy growing had greatly reduced production in the Mexican fields.

They said that the most significant features of this campaign involved the use

of aerial reconnaissance to spot poppy fields and their subsequent destruction by herbicides sprayed from helicopters.

In addition, the American officials added, the Mexicans have increased their campaign from a once-a-year, four-month effort to a year-round program. Since it takes only 90 days to cultivate a poppy crop, the officials noted, year-around surveillance should hinder narcotics traffickers from reusing fields or finding new locations.

Figures released by the Mexican government say that, as of the end of May, approximately 30,500 poppy fields covering an estimated 18,500 acres had been destroyed. By contrast, Bensinger pointed out, during all of 1975, the Mexicans, using searches on foot, succeeded in destroying only 4,700 fields.

DEA officials estimate that Mexican brown heroin—a term denoting drugs processed from Mexican fields into heroin—accounts for roughly 85 to 90 per cent of the heroin currently entering the United States. They say that this has been the case since 1972, when the supply of poppies grown in Turkey and processed into heroin in France was curtailed drastically by diplomatic and law-enforcement action.

Officials at DEA said that no one can estimate with any accuracy the actual amount of heroin coming into the country annually. Their belief that from 85 to 90 per cent currently originates in Mexico is based on the fact that Mexican heroin accounts for a similar percentage of the amount seized by U.S. narcotics agents.

Despite predictions that

the eradication program will reduce the supply of Mexican heroin by late in the year, Levi and Ojeda-Paullada both cautioned that it will probably "take somewhat longer before the effect of the program on the U.S. heroin market is fully felt."

Bensinger said that this is because there is no way of telling how much Mexican heroin is already in the United States in storage or in the smuggling pipelines that bring it across the border.

The DEA head noted, however, that the price of Mexican heroin—a key indicator of its availability—has been going up recently. The "street price" of a milligram—the amount that it brings when sold by retail dealers to addicts—has gone from \$1.15 in December to \$1.26 at present, he said.

In her report from Mexico, Simons said, approximately 30 DEA officials are assigned to that country to perform liaison work and exchange information with their Mexican counterparts.

Under the cooperation agreements between the two countries, their activities are supposed to be carefully circumscribed. The DEA agents are permitted to carry guns, for example, only when actually operating with Mexican agents; and capture of drug sellers by arranged "buys," a common tactic in the United States, is forbidden by Mexican law.

However, Simons reported, the American agents in Mexico are alleged by Mexican officials to have violated these rules with ill-disguised frequency—a factor that she said forms the basis of many of the Mexican complaints.

Heroin Hits at Home

Use by Burma's Youth Invigorates Control Effort

By Lewis M. Simons

Washington Post Foreign Service

MANDALAY—Burma, the apex of Southeast Asia's Golden Triangle and a major source of illicit heroin, is now facing a serious drug addiction problem at home, particularly among the children of top government officials.

The domestic crisis has added impetus to the government's drive to destroy opium poppy fields and jungle heroin laboratories. Until recently, the sole motivation behind the government's efforts was that drug trafficking funded the widespread insurgency along the Burmese border.

"The army has always taken the drug problem seriously," noted one knowledgeable Burmese in this northern city, "because they have to face the weapons the insurgents buy with drug income. But now that some ministers and colonels find their children are hooked, the government is

suddenly paying a lot more attention to the matter."

Among those children of top officials believed to have a drug problem is one of President Ne Win's three eldest sons. According to reliable Burmese and Western sources, the young man is said to be a heroin addict.

Capitalizing on the growing addiction problem in Burmese towns and cities, and the drugs-insurgency link, the United States has given Burma 12 helicopters and a small spotter plane under a \$13 million grant

for use against growers and traffickers.

An additional grant for six more helicopters has run into U.S. Congressional opposition led by Rep. Otto Passman (D-La.) despite assurances earlier this month by Sheldon B. Vance, special adviser to Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, that Burma had achieved an impressive record in the last nine months with the assistance of the U.S. helicopters, which are unarmed civilian versions of the Huey helicopters.

Passman, sources in Rangoon said, apparently is convinced that the Burmese armed forces are using the helicopters against insurgent armies of minority ethnic groups that are striving for autonomy or independence from the central government in Rangoon.

The Burmese counter that while it is often impossible to differentiate between traffickers and insurgents, they do not use the helicopters against minority forces as such.

"In most cases, they're one and the same," said Kyaw Min, the author of a recent series of articles on Burma's drug problem.

To illustrate his point, Kyaw Min displayed to a visitor a stack of photographs taken by Burmese army photographers following a raid on April 26 near the eastern border town of Mong Hsat.

The photos showed modern mortars, Browning automatic rifles, grenade launchers, light machine guns, rockets and bandoliers of ammunition.

Next to the arsenal were large quantities of either and drums of other chemicals, heaters, basins, buckets and other equipment used to convert raw opium into refined heroin.

The raid, which was carried out with the assistance of the U.S.-donated helicopters, netted 30 pounds of heroin and 288 pounds of raw opium, said Kyaw Min.

Government officials said 230 rebels were manning the camp. Two soldiers and nine insurgents were reported killed.

U.S. sources like to stress that the United States provides no assistance or advice to the Burmese. "The helicopters represent our only form of aid to this government," one source said. "They maintain and fly them themselves."

The helicopters, based at Meiktila, 90 miles south of Mandalay, have also been used heavily against opium poppy farmers, members of minority groups who are not directly active in the insurgencies. So far this year, according to U.S. sources, helicopter-borne troops have destroyed 17,000 acres of the 70,000 acres used to grow poppies in Burma.

By contrast, the United States hopes to help the gov-

ernment of Mexico wipe out just 10,000 acres of poppy fields in all of 1976. Mexico is the major source of illicit drugs entering the United States.

Burma's policy, unlike that of neighboring Thailand, is to destroy the poppy fields first and worry about providing farmers with a substitute crop later. The system is quick, but it increases minority groups' hatred of the central government.

The United Nations is expected to begin a \$6 million crop substitution program in Burma soon. A smaller but similar program in Thailand has so far produced limited results.

The U.S. interest, according to an American source in Rangoon, is limited to helping the Burmese government stem the flow of heroin out of Burma, through Thailand, and into the United States, where it comprises between 10 and 20 per cent of annual consumption.

According to an informed source in Mandalay, a pleasant, sleepy city of half a million on the Irrawaddy River, the local addiction problem is "serious and growing quickly." No figures are available, the source said, but a drug treatment center has been established at a local hospital.

In the capital, Rangoon, with its population of 2 million, official figures show

that as of last year there were 994 registered addicts, with 12,134 in all of Burma. Total population is 31 million.

An article in the Rangoon Working People's Daily said an official survey revealed that of those registered for treatment, "the majority of the addicts are the children of affluent people such as merchants and traders."

"This is nonsense, exclaimed U Ba Gyaw, head of the government's news and periodical corporation. "We have no real problem. There may be a few youngsters who smoke marijuana or use heroin once or twice, just for a kick, but addiction is small-scale indeed."

But a Rangoon attorney said that based on his discussions with government doctors and the number of drug-related cases he has handled, "I wouldn't be surprised if the addiction figures were 18 to 20 times higher than the official statistics."

Although U.S. officials profess to be "reasonably optimistic" about Burma's chances of reducing its drug output, the odds on eliminating the traffic are virtually nil. As one U.S. source put it, "As long as a kilo of heroin can be bought for \$325 in northeastern Burma and sold on the streets of New York for a quarter of a million, there's no way they're going to dry it up."

NEW YORK TIMES
27 MAY 1976

U.S. Seems to Let A.F.L.-C.I.O. Veto Union Visitors

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 26—The State Department has apparently given the A.F.L.-C.I.O. the right to veto all applications by Soviet and other Communist trade union leaders to enter this country.

This practice, reportedly of long standing, was acknowledged today by the State Department after a Soviet newspaper complained that the United States was not living up to the Helsinki agreement's call for wider East-West exchanges.

The paper charged that four Soviet trade unionists were barred from accepting an invitation from San Francisco Bay unionists to visit this month—in reciprocity for trips by the Americans to the Soviet Union in 1973 and 1974.

In confirming that the visa applications had been denied, the department conceded in effect that A.F.L.-C.I.O. national leaders were given an unofficial veto authority.

It has long been assumed in Washington that George Meany, president of the A.F.L.-

C.I.O., and his fiercely anti-Communist executive council had influence in denying Communist entry visas, but this was the first time the State Department had publicly acknowledged this practice, which apparently goes back at least to the 1950's when the cultural-exchange program began.

Visa Rejection Confirmed

Frederick Z. Brown, the department spokesman, confirmed that the four visa applications had been rejected.

"In handling the visa applications, we gave due weight to the view of the mainstream of organized labor in the United States," Mr. Brown said. "The national A.F.L.-C.I.O. is firmly opposed to labor exchanges with Communist labor officials on the grounds that such exchanges would equate our free trade unions with Government-controlled trade unions."

Later, in answer to further questions, the department said that it had never given permission to any Soviet or other Communist trade union official to visit this country in that capacity, although some such officials many have come as tourists or in other guises.

Ernest Lee, director of international affairs of the A.F.L.-C.I.O. confirmed in a telephone conversation that the A.F.L.-C.I.O. routinely opposes visas to any trade union leader from the Soviet Union because such an official is only "a Government trade front" who does not really represent Soviet workers.

Mr. Brown said the view of the A.F.L.-C.I.O. was "very important" to the State Department. Privately, officials said that the A.F.L.-C.I.O. has always had what amounted to a "veto" right on any Communist union leader.

George eMany Won't Have It

"It is a unique situation," one department official said, adding: "You may notice that in all the exchange agreements with the Russians, there is no mention of trade union exchanges. There are exchanges of doctors, teachers, businessmen, editors, publishers, farmers, young people, language teachers, but no labor leaders. That is not accidental; that is because George Meany won't have it."

In practice, another official said, if a Soviet trade union official applies for a visa to

visit this country, the request is routinely rejected. Under the current law, any Communist Party official, or representative of an organization controlled by the party, is automatically denied entry unless a waiver is granted.

Such waivers have never been given to trade unionists coming to meet American trade unionists, the official said.

The denial of the visas this time, however, has attracted more attention because of the strong backing the invitations had in the San Francisco area.

David Jenkins, a labor leader in San Francisco, said in a telephone conversation that in November 1973 and in November 1974 delegations of labor leaders and some others from the bay area had visited the Soviet Union and spent considerable time with Soviet trade unions.

He said the San Francisco building trades council adopted a resolution inviting a delegation from Soviet trade unions to return the visit this month.

The San Francisco sponsors were notified that four Soviet representatives had applied for visas: Georgi Y. Kanayev, dep-

uty chief of the international department of the Central Soviet Trade Union; Vitaly P. Provotorov, chairman of the Leningrad district trade union; Aleksandra P. Reksna, secretary of the Odessa district trade union; and Igor Y. Yurgens, a consultant in the central international department.

Late last month the department decided against the application on the usual grounds, noting that "the national A.F.L.-C.I.O. is opposed to such visits on principle."

As a result of the rejection, the two California Senators and the bay area Congressmen were asked to appeal the decision, but they were told last week that the decision was final.

WASHINGTON POST
11 JUN 1976

Role in India Atomic Blast Laid to U.S.

Router

Sen. Abraham A. Ribicoff said yesterday there were "disturbing indications" that the United States supplied an essential ingredient used in India's first nuclear explosion in 1974.

He said in a strongly

worded statement that, despite public assurances by U.S. officials that no American material was involved, there were signs that India used U.S.-supplied heavy water in its nuclear test program.

The Connecticut Democrat is chairman of the Senate Government Operations Committee, which has been investigating the adequacy of safeguards in transferring nuclear material to foreign countries.

Committee investigations

show that 21 tons of heavy water supplied by the United States was used by India in nuclear reactors supplied by Canada to produce plutonium, "which is atom bomb material," Ribicoff said.

"The United States has never publicly acknowledged exporting heavy water to India," he said. "Instead, U.S. officials said only that Canada supplied the research reactor used by India to produce the plutonium for its explosion."

NEW YORK TIMES
8 JUN 1976

SALT 'Violations'

For more than a year conservative critics of the strategic arms limitations talks (SALT II) with Moscow have sought to discourage agreement by charging that the Soviets had been violating the 1972 SALT I treaty in order to gain military advantage over the United States. These charges have been rejected not only by President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger, but by former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger.

The disclosure that Moscow now has acknowledged a violation does not alter that picture. The violation, which occurred in March, was a technical one. Moscow had informed the United States in advance that it would occur. And measures have been taken to rectify the two-month infraction.

That was not the way it was leaked, presumably by some Pentagon source, to Aviation Week and Space Technology, which has taken the lead in the past in charging Soviet SALT I violations. That publication's report made no mention of the fact that the treaty gave Moscow four months to dismantle 51 old land-based missiles after new missile-launching submarines, their replacements, took to sea. Nor did it indicate that the issue had been resolved through the Soviet-American Standing Consultative Committee, that Moscow had agreed in April to put no further new submarines to sea until the dismantling had proceeded apace and that the dismantling was now virtually finished.

The Soviet Union blamed bad winter weather for the fact that by the end of March only 11 of the 51 missile silos had been destroyed, a complicated process, but gave assurances—verified by American intelligence—that all 51 had been taken out of operation.

This episode is typical of the confusion stirred by previous charges of SALT violations. None of the half-dozen alleged violations of the past has been proven. The Soviet Union undoubtedly disregarded some unilateral American interpretations of the SALT I provisions, which Moscow had never accepted, and also took some advantage of treaty ambiguities. None of these issues was of major importance, and Moscow backed off when challenged in the Standing Consultative Commission.

What is proven by the alleged violations—and, the outcome of their investigation by the United States Government—is that unilateral American verification by satellite and other intelligence means does work and that the Standing Consultative Commission is effective in resolving ambiguous and disputed occurrences. The experience gained in the process shows that mutual limitation of strategic arms is possible and should be pressed vigorously to the further stage of missile reductions.

NEW YORK TIMES
30 May 1976

MOYNIHAN CITES U.N. VOTE-BUYING

By KATHLEEN TELTSCH

Special to The New York Times

UNITED NATIONS, N.Y., May 29—Daniel P. Moynihan, former United States representative at the United Nations, says he was aware his term here last fall that vote on critical General Assembly resolutions were bought and sold by diplomats.

There were not many cases, perhaps only a half-dozen instances, but in one a vote went for as little as \$600," Mr. Moynihan said in a telephone interview.

It should not be too surprising that such sales go on, he said, considering the high cost of living in New York for delegations from poorer countries, and especially for delegates below the rank of ambassador, who cannot get by on their salaries. "There was a lot of loose money around and an influx of small, impoverished countries to U.N. membership at about the same time," he said.

Mr. Moynihan declined to identify those involved by name or by country.

Other Inducements Cited

According to delegates, there are few cases of money's actually changing hands. There was no suggestion that votes had been bought by any major power such as the United States or the Soviet Union. "When the larger countries go after support, there are other ways of doing it such as an offer of a loan or profitable trade agreement," one diplomat remarked.

Another delegate said there were more subtle ways of obtaining supporting votes than bribery. One of the most common is to invite the leader of a small country for a state visit during which a friendship pact is approved and an offer of technical assistance may be thrown in.

Mr. Moynihan said he did not find it shocking that countries

engage in bargaining and saw not much difference in whether votes went for cash or wheat. "All countries sell their votes in one way or the other," he commented. "I don't find it surprising or shocking what countries do to maximize their interests."

The former United States delegate made a similar statement about bribery in an interview with CBS News when he was asked whether votes were bought at the United Nations.

A number of other delegates said they were certain that votes had been sold for thousands of dollars on some critical issues.

Two diplomats from widely different regions and political groupings, who asked not to be identified, gave similar accounts of one attempted transaction:

A delegate from one of the poorest countries was said to have been approached and handed an envelope by a North Korean representative with an urgent request that he pay careful attention to its contents. This occurred at a time when both North Korea and South Korea, which are not members but have observer status, were pressing General Assembly members to vote for rival resolutions on the situation in Korea.

When he opened the envelope, the delegate found that it contained not only propaganda material but also \$3,000 in \$100 bills. The diplomat involved could not be reached for comment, but the two others acquainted with the affair said they were certain that the money had been returned.

A North Korean spokesman at the United Nations, when asked about the report, said the accounts were absolutely untrue.

CBS News said in a broadcast Friday night that diplomats at the United Nations had offered \$1,000 to an Argentine diplomat and an envelope full of money to an Arab diplomat, but that the money had been refused in both cases. A spokesman for the North Korean observer termed the reports completely false.

Western Europe

DAILY TELEGRAPH, London
9 May 1976

How smack of soft Government and improvised Russian spy tactics make a mockery of safeguards

By NORMAN KIRKHAM,
TOM DAVIES
and the Close-Up team

Foreign eyes in Britain

RUSSIAN plans to build a huge new embassy complex in the leafy "Millionaire's Row," Kensington—London's biggest property development since the war—seem likely to bring substantial increases in the small army of men from Moscow already based here.

It takes a minimum of eighteen trained men to mount a full scale watch on a suspected spy and it is with that and other figures in mind that the men responsible for Britain's security are looking at the project.

Strict control on the numbers of Russian diplomats has been maintained since Lord Home's expulsion of 105 of them in 1971.

Nevertheless many Conservative M.P.'s fear that with the Russian plans for expansion and present efforts to push trade between the countries, Whitehall may have to consider easing restrictions on the envoys and commercial officers.

This concern is growing after the Foreign Office decision not to expel two bungling Hungarian spies who were caught photographing the atomic weapons establishment at Burghfield, Berkshire, two weeks ago. This lenient approach is not uncommon now when dealing with Russian and Czech diplomats involved in spying operations.

Russia now has 354 men posted to Britain compared with 550 before the 1971 expulsions. There are 87 diplomats and officials at the Embassy; 56 in the Soviet Trade Delegation; 102 with quasi-official agencies; 71 factory inspectors; 15 officials of international organisations and 23 journalists. In addition there are some 500 diplomats and officials representing Communist satellite countries whose security agencies are directly controlled by the K.G.B.

After Lord Home dealt so forthrightly with the 105, who were not mere names picked out of the hat but were proven spies, the Russians in their constant efforts to rebuild their organisation turned to their Eastern European satellites and the Cubans to carry out missions for the voraciously inquisitive K.G.B. and its supporting military and political intelligence organisations.

Military attachés have always been regarded as legalised spies and Lt. Col. Lajos Hajma and Captain Andras Toth of the Hungarian embassy were merely carrying out a mission which British military attachés might well attempt to carry out in Hungary.

Russian representatives cannot travel more than 35 miles from the centre of London—a piece of tit-for-tat because of the restrictions imposed on Britain's 82 diplomats and officials serving in Moscow. But these restraints do not apply to the Iron Curtain diplomats or the Cubans whose D.G.I. espionage setup is controlled from the Kremlin.

It is because of this Communist evasion of the restrictions which are strictly applied to Western diplomats in Russia that Lord Home told us: "It is a false calculation that if you catch spies on the job you will impress the Russians and their satellites by dealing with them leniently. These men should have been sent packing at once."

"I have no doubt that detente or not, the Russians and East Europeans will go on with intelligence operations here. We must not relax our guard. The leopard does not change its spots."

But it is the cost and complexity of maintaining that guard which is making life so difficult for our spy catchers. In Moscow the British Embassy uses Russian chauffeurs and handymen, but they bring their own doormen and chauffeurs to Britain and it has long been a rule of counter-espionage that the most important man in a Soviet Embassy is usually not the Ambassador but is the K.G.B. chief who could be anything from First Secretary to one of those lowly chauffeurs.

There are other types of spy as well. Espionage these days is not confined to military affairs; industrial espionage and agents of influence are just as important.

Mr. Cranley Onslow, Tory M.P. for Woking, is particularly concerned about the activities of the 71 Russian industrial inspectors who have privileged access to many sensitive aspects of British goods, systems and are sent over when a deal is concluded to supply Russia with British goods, systems and machine tools. Their ostensible function is to train in the use of equipment and to keep quality controls on goods. They sometimes live in industrial towns with daily access to the factories

over periods of some months.

Britain exported £210 million worth of machinery, transport equipment, textiles and other goods in 1975 and there are firm promises that trade between Britain and Russia will move forward dramatically in the next few years. This means that inevitably there will be yet more factory inspectors coming to live and work here.

They are already in position in every aspect of British industry. They are at Vickers, which makes tanks and warships, they are at the Swan Hunter ship-building firm, they are at the John Brown Engineering works, they are at precision machine tool companies, computer laboratories and chemical works.

The companies involved are obviously aware of the dangers involved in their presence and take care to keep them away from secret areas, but as anyone who has worked in a large concern knows, it is only too easy for an inquiring mind to collect details of military and industrial processes.

Another equally important aspect of the modern spies' work is to act as an agent of influence a man who can drop into the pub for a pint and then not only report back what his workmates' attitudes are but can attempt both political and cultural subversion. It is this aspect of an agent's work which the West finds so difficult to carry out in Moscow because of the barriers interposed between Western representatives and the Russian people.

An analysis of the Institute for the Study of Conflict points out that Soviet intelligence activities are continually increasing. This fact emerged from an examination of the growth of official Soviet representation in Western Europe. It has doubled since the early Sixties to well over 2,000 throughout Europe and that does not include the satellites.

Professor Leonard Shapiro, Chairman of the Institute's Council told us: "We have estimated that around half of those accredited as diplomats to N.A.T.O. countries are usually engaged in intelligence operations of one kind or another."

"Russia's policy of detente has, in fact increased, for the Kremlin, the importance of subversion in the West. Apart from industrial and military spying, the aim is to spread propaganda and sow disinformation. They are out to create a favourable climate of opinion."

Apart from the problem created by the sheer number and industry of the Russian agents legally operating in this country, our counter-espionage teams have the problem of the divided opinion which exists in the

Foreign Office about what to do with spies when they are caught.

There were many senior men in the F.O. who were horrified when Lord Home brought off his mass expulsion and for a long time before that they had carried out a softly-softly policy. This policy was in accord with Sir Harold Wilson's own policy of pursuing detente with Russia during his early years in office before detente became fashionable.

This was a situation which infuriated our hard-worked spy-catchers who more than once caught Russian spies red-handed and were forced to let them go in the interests of higher policy. They were especially furious when we gave back the Krogers, the expert man and wife spy team, in exchange for Gerald Brook who had got himself jailed for acting as an agent of an anti-communist emigre organisation.

The Russians brutally mistreated Brook to force us to give up the Krogers. We did so.

It may have been the correct decision on humanitarian grounds. But it did no good to our counter-espionage agents who saw two of their prize catches being given back.

It was the softly-softly protagonists who won again over the question of expelling the Hungarians—and were promptly rewarded by a diplomatic clout round the ear from the Hungarian government.

There are in fact a number of intriguing aspects of this affair. The first is: what were they doing there in the first place? For the Russians have an excellent spy-satellite system and undoubtedly have fine quality pictures of every brick of the Burghfield establishment taken from their Cosmos satellites.

Is it then the people who work in the factory who interest the Hungarians and not the bricks and mortar or the shape of the chimneys?

Or is there a John Le Carré twist and did the Russians send the Hungarians there knowing that they would be picked up—our own reporter was quickly questioned by a friendly but firm policeman last week—in order to hurt Anglo-Hungarian relations which have been steadily improving in recent months?

And if the British authorities really wanted to keep the affair quiet precisely not to disturb this new relationship how did the story get out? Was it a proud local man anxious to claim credit? Was it a disgruntled spy-catcher trying to make sure that the Hungarians didn't get away with it?

There are many juicy permutations to delight Le Carré fans, but the reality is deadly serious: Britain is under continual attack by an army of Soviet agents, an army which, because of detente, is likely to grow rather than decrease, an army with a new headquarters planned—surely with a conscious irony—for Millionaires' Row.

Sunday, May 30, 1976

THE WASHINGTON POST

Communism in Italy

By George W. Ball

HAUNTING EUROPE today is a specter of communism less ectoplasmic and more substantial than the one conjured up in the Communist Manifesto of 1848. On June 20 and 21 the Italian people may cast such a large vote for the Communist Party as to provide it with a dominant place in an Italian coalition government; two years from now a left-of-center majority with a Communist component could force a constitutional crisis in France.

Though the prospect disturbs the chancelleries of Europe, it upsets Washington even more, creating nervous palpitations in the White House and deepening Henry Kissinger's Spenglerian gloom. If Communists were to participate in Western governments, "there would," he told a meeting of our ambassadors, "be a shocking change in the established patterns of American policy." It would, he implied, mean the effective end of NATO and — according to a State Department spokesman — require the United States to "reassess" its policies toward Europe.

In contrast to most Americans (and particularly to the secretary of state and his staff), many Europeans are intellectually reconciled to the prospect of Communists in the Italian government. Their more relaxed view of the prospect reflects the fact that the Communist Party has been a familiar feature of the Italian political scene for many years.

What has made its entry into government an imminent possibility is the coincidence of a number of factors. Most important, no doubt, are the economic recession and inflation, aggravated by the quadrupling of oil prices which has borne heavily on a country with almost no indigenous energy. In addition — for America is by no means without blame — our efforts to milk the theatrical potential of detente have helped give Western Communists respectability and led the Christian Democrats to be less fearful of a dialogue with the Communists. If the President and the secretary of state can hobnob with Brezhnev and his cronies on the television screens of the world, what is wrong with Italy sharing governmental power with the Communist leader, Enrico Berlinguer, and his colleagues, who are, after all, good Italians and — at least in Berlinguer's case — of distinguished family?

Such a conclusion would find little support if, regardless of the Communists, the Italian political structure were not already near collapse from decay and corruption. To many Italians the Communists appear not as conspirators seeking to seize control of the government, but rather as the only plausible alternative to the Christian Democrats and a few small parties that no longer seem capable of running the country. "If we had not already tried fascism and thus knew how frightful that was," an Italian friend recently told me, "that is where we would be turning now."

Musical Chairs

THOUGH ITALY has had 37 governments in the past three decades, they have all been Christian Democratic variations on the tawdry theme of power — a few gray men playing monotonously at musical chairs. Meanwhile, the locusts have eaten the years: Italian industry, the Christian Democrats, the Catholic Church — all have failed to adjust their parochial interests to the conflicts and pressures building up in a society marked by massive economic and social changes.

Ball, a former under secretary of state, is now a New York investment banker. His latest book is "Diplomacy for a Crowded World."

During Italy's "economic miracle" in the 1950s and 1960s, the booming industrial cities of the Piedmont and Lombardy attracted a vast migration of young peasants from the bleak, rocky farms of the Italian boot. Torn from the tutelage of family and priest and subjected to the squalor of the slums, these young migrants became easy prey to a Communist Party that filled a vacuum. Much as ward bosses assisted the greenhorns during the great waves of American immigration, the Communist Party provided a substitute for family and church, paternalistically helping workers find jobs and housing, organizing festivals and arranging leisure activities and, at the same time, conducting an incessant indoctrination. As a result, in the last regional elections, the Communists won 33.4 per cent of the vote, only 2 per cent less than the Christian Democrats.

Meanwhile, the Church led the Christian Democrats into bitter and divisive controversies. Incited by the Vatican to oppose the modernization of Italy's medieval divorce laws in 1974, the Christian Democratic Party suffered defeat in a referendum. Today it faces another disaster over a similar issue, that of abortion.

With the Church discredited as its central defining element, the Christian Democratic Party has largely lost its identity. In addition, through years of indulgence in shabby politics, the party has spawned an overgrown bureaucracy quite incapable of collecting direct taxes, administering anti-inflation measures or imposing industrial discipline on an anarchic labor force that is completely out of hand. The enfeebled Christian Democrats have had to rely on tacit Communist approval to stay in power, although the Communists themselves have been barred from formal participation in government ever since 1947.

The "Historic Compromise"

THE COMMUNISTS have their own thoughts about participation in government. Even if a Communist-Socialist coalition had become mathematically feasible, the Communists would have resisted coalition with only a small majority. Atavistically sensitive to Mussolini's destruction of the growing Communist Party in 1926 and the recent experience of the Allende government in Chile, Berlinguer and his colleagues fear that, without the acquiescence of a large segment of the electorate, their assumption of authority might trigger a right-wing reaction.

To assure adequate support, and a sharing of the risks, Berlinguer has pro-

posed an all-embracing coalition government to include not only Communists but Christian Democrats and Socialists, an initiative he has called the "historic compromise." The concept is not new; it has been prevalent in Communist circles under different labels since the days of Palmiro Togliatti, the party's first post-war leader. But Berlinguer's personality has helped give the proposal credibility.

The scion of a Sardinian land-owning family, he is almost the antithesis of the archetypal Communist thug. Presenting himself as a patriotic Italian, he has professed acceptance of Italian participation both in NATO and the Common Market for the time being. He has from time to time spread the message that labor should work hard and has made the ultimate pledge to democratic principles by announcing support for "alternation," which means that, if voted out of office, the Communists would submit to the will of parliament and the electorate and retire from power. Moreover, he has tried to make clear that he would never play the sedulous ape to the Kremlin but would conduct an Italian government in the interests of the Italian people.

Though he has rejected Moscow's claim as world communism's "leading center" and has repeatedly announced the independence of the Italian Communist Party, pressures on him to support broad Soviet policies are obviously great. Berlinguer himself has said that "there is no no-man's land in the great arena of the class struggle," and he has added that, if it were not for "our unbreakable ties of solidarity with Soviet Russia, the other Socialist states and the whole revolutionary working class of the world . . . we should lose our identity as a Communist Party."

He and his colleagues have left little doubt that they would support the Soviet proposal to trade off the liquidation of the Warsaw Pact for the liquidation of NATO. They would almost certainly oppose the continuing outlays necessary to maintain adequate NATO defenses and would make increasingly difficult the maintenance of American military bases and installations in Italy. (13,000 of our own fighting forces with 45,000 civilians are now stationed there.) One need not underline the resultant impairment of effectiveness of the 6th Fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean, where American interests are vitally touched by the Arab-Israeli conflict and the troubles between Greece and Turkey.

A further, but rather desperate, assumption from which many Italians draw comfort is that, even if the Communist Party should achieve a role in government, it would still be only a minority within a larger amalgam and, hence, could be kept in its place. But to argue, as some do, that Communist participation holds no peril because Italian Communist voters are not "real Com-

munist" quite misses the point. For the party's representatives in the government would not be a cross-section of the Communist electorate but disciplined professionals, rigidly committed to a party line and party tactics. While the Communists might cultivate the appearance of responsible behavior for a period of time, the *apparatchiks* could well use that period in an effort to further the spread of Communist control.

But what of the widely held argument that the Communists are needed to restore Italy's flagging economy? For a period they might, to be sure, try to arrange a respite from industrial strife, since Berlinguer has himself suggested the need "to combat attitudes that negate the human and social need to work" and to restore "the competitiveness" of Italian industry. This is beguiling stuff for some Italian industrialists whose predecessors admired a man who could make the trains run on time.

Long-Term Goals

YET, EVEN though the Communists might make a show of reliability for a brief period, that does not mean either that they could effectively control Italian workers over the long pull or that they would be prepared to go very far down that road. Italian labor today is the most militant in Europe and within its ranks are strong extremist elements. Thus, if Communist leaders within the Italian government acted to salvage the rapidly disintegrating Italian economy, it could well mean that, as the American journalist Claire Sterling has pointed out, Moscow itself might undertake to finance and incite a more radical Communist faction, since it dares not risk a Western Communist party moving towards "bourgeois collaborationism" for fear of creating deep disquiet among the uneasy Communist regimes in Eastern Europe.

Still, even without the fear of their own left wing or of mischief from Moscow, Berlinguer and his company would not play a role of moderation very long. They are by no means mere "agrarian reformers" and the party has made its long-term objectives clear. It is committed, according to the party weekly *Rinascita*, to bring about a radical liquidation of the Christian Democratic power structure, impose "penetrating controls on the use of profits and investments" and employ a "new use of representative democracy" to bring about a "profound social transformation" leading to a "new social hierarchy" and the "hegemony of the working class." If retrograde groups prove too "recalcitrant," Berlinguer has made clear that "we Communists will never be afraid to resort to the scalpel when needed."

Thus, in spite of all the fine talk of "the many roads to socialism" and of "humanist Marxism" — which rejects the domination of the Party in favor of

"social self-management" or "pluralist socialism" and would tolerate free debate and free access to information — there is no reason to think that the Italian Communist Party, once in power, would adopt such heresies. Berlinguer's professions of liberalism are clearly a tactic by which power is to be gained; once it is achieved, they would be promptly jettisoned.

One has only to read the party's literature carefully to note that every avowal of democratic purity has been regularly countered by a reassuring message to the faithful that interprets or qualifies what has been said to bring it into accord with Leninist orthodoxy. All such statements must, therefore, be understood for what they are intended to achieve. They are tactical moves to advance a relentlessly pursued objective, the dictatorship of the Italian state by the party which, as in the Soviet Union and other Communist countries, is a totalitarian structure organized on the principle of "democratic centralism." There is no room for dissent in party procedures, no tolerance of opposition voices. Once the hierarchy has made a decision, further debate is ruled out and anyone who tries to organize a dissident faction risks expulsion.

Nonetheless, public opinion is unpredictable, whether in America or Italy, and it would be a mistake to take it for granted that the forthcoming elections will necessarily show an increase in the Communist vote or that Communist participation in government is inevitable. Though some Italians may vote Communist in the conviction that the Communists are the wave of the future, some of my Italian friends who voted Communist in last June's regional elections will, so they tell me, "hold their noses and vote for the Christian Democrats" when control of their country is at stake.

It is, of course, possible that, if the Communists do pile up the largest vote, the Christian Democratic Party might split, with the party's left wing agreeing to join the Communists and most of the Socialists and Social Democrats in a watered-down version of the "historic compromise." If, on the other hand, the Communist vote should be less than expected, Berlinguer might prefer to stay out of the government, continuing to exercise a veto by private treaty with the Christian Democrats.

In a situation with so many variables, American policy should be subtle, flexible and realistic. Instead, our approach to the problem so far has been distressingly haphazard. To be sure, the secretary of state has announced that we would regard the entry of Communists into the Italian government as "unacceptable," but that sounds as though America were Queen Victoria rebuking the lower classes. To reject as "unacceptable" an event we can only margin-

ally affect is a kind of diplomacy of the absurd we have tended to practice all too frequently in recent months.

Nor was Kissinger any better advised when he said ominously, "If Communists should enter European governments, the political solidarity of the West, and thus NATO, would be inevitably weakened, if not undermined. . . . And in this country, the commitment of the American people to maintain the balance of power in Europe . . . would lack the moral base on which it has stood for 30 years." Earlier, in his speech to American ambassadors, he had stated that "it is inconceivable that the United States could maintain ground forces in Europe if there is major Communist participation in Western governments."

Presumably, Kissinger hoped that, by pointing to America's anxieties, he would deter some Italians who might otherwise vote for the Communists, but on balance the effect of these messages was probably adverse. Some Europeans have interpreted the secretary's statements as further evidence of the unreliability of American security commitments. Others resented them as an effort to meddle in European internal affairs.

To Communist leaders, Kissinger's concern about the disintegration of NATO and the diminished American role in Europe could only be taken as a spur to action, since the removal of the United States from Europe has long been a central objective of Kremlin strategy. Thus, by assuring the Communists that their entry into European governments would do the trick, we showed them the way to their heart's desire.

However, though warnings based on threats to Europe's security probably did more harm than good, the Italian people should still be put on notice that Communist entry into government would jeopardize their economic well-being. To be effective, such a warning should come from Italy's European neighbors rather than the United States, though it should be part of a coordinated strategy. Unfortunately, the habit of coordination has largely atrophied during recent years of American unilateralism. And in this case — apparently with no trans-Atlantic consultation — the secretary of state has by his solemn finger-shaking elicited an angry riposte from German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt. Thus, instead of a concerted strategy, as a result of our go-it-alone policy we have produced bickering among Italy's friends that could only encourage the Communists.

Today the member nations of the European Economic Community are in a position to send their fellow member, Italy, a clear, forceful message. Although the member states of the Community cannot tell the Italian people how to cast their votes, they can, and should, make clear what would happen if the inclusion of Communists in the

government were to lead to anti-democratic political measures or to something approaching a centralized, regimented economy.

After all, the Treaty of Rome explicitly states that the Community is dedicated to strengthening the "safeguards of peace and liberty" and the whole function of the Common Market assumes the free movement of the factors of production.

Action to head off a Communist takeover should not, however, be confined to threats of economic sanctions. Within the structure of the Community a complex network of relationships transcends national lines — relations among members of different professions, relations among political parties and politicians, relations among scientists, farmers and industrialists. Now is the time for the Community to use its influence and resources to help rebuild an effective counterforce to the Italian Communists.

Certainly, the Community has much to offer — such as a more liberal treatment of Italy's agricultural products, development funds for the underdeveloped south and credits through the Community's newly developed special lending authority. But, most of all, there must be an urgent dialogue between the center parties of the Community nations and the Christian Democrats to provide advice and encouragement and help heal the parochial divisions that prevent common action.

The French and German governments showed their effectiveness within a European framework by bolstering Mario Soares and the Portuguese Socialists; now, by concerted action within the framework of the EEC, they might well slow the drift in Italy, particularly if the effort took the form of affirmative help as well as negative threat.

This is clearly a case where America should do everything possible to develop a concerted strategy with its Western allies, while contenting itself, for once, with a silent supporting role. Clearly, the EEC has the capability of reducing the level of economic activity in Italy seriously by a whole range of devices — from imposing restrictions on agricultural imports to stopping the flow of regional assistance funds. As the ultimate sanction, the other members could expel Italy from the Community.

The extent, if any, to which measures of this kind should be taken presents serious philosophical and moral questions. Few would argue that the mere inclusion of Communists in the Italian government should, by itself, provide the occasion for economic actions against Italy, but the EEC member countries should make it known that they are holding a watching brief. If it should once become clear that the Communists were systematically destroying democratic institutions and regimenting the Italian economy in vio-

lation of the principles of the Common Market, the question would assume a different aspect. It would not be whether the EEC countries should penalize a member nation that elected Communist leaders by its own democratic processes, but rather whether sanctions should be used to prevent the destruction of democracy by the traditional methods of communism — subversion, intimidation and conspiracy.

The secretary of state made a tactical blunder when, without consultation with our principal allies who are much closer to the situation than we, he announced that the entry of Communists into a European government could jeopardize the whole structure of Atlantic security arrangements. He also ignored both logic and experience when he contended that such an event in one country will "be likely to produce a sequence of events in which other European countries will also be tempted to move in the same direction."

No Dominoes

WHAT, IN FACT, would happen if the Communists should join an Italian coalition government? Even the prospect of that event has already triggered a mass capital flight; its actual occurrence would mean the exodus not only of capital but of many of Italy's leading financial and industrial figures. Investment would dry up; multinational companies would try to extricate themselves from their Italian commitments, even at the cost of closing plants and increasing unemployment. The Italian government would be forced to impose tight defensive controls. If the EEC were to take no action under the "mutual help" provisions of the Rome Treaty, and if the EEC nations, together with the United States, failed to support a rescue operation through the International Monetary Fund, Italy could quickly find herself in a severe financial panic, with mounting inflation, labor strife and increased unemployment. Faced with a financial panic, the Communists in government would almost certainly opt for repressive measures that would unequivocally disclose their antidemocratic instincts.

Far from inducing other European states to follow Italy's lead, the resulting uproar might rather be expected to induce a sense of fear and revulsion. If it were clear that Italy was on the way to isolating itself from the rest of Europe, communism for other European countries could rapidly lose its appeal.

Certainly, one might expect such a reaction in France, where the situation sharply differs from that of Italy. In France the economy is basically healthy; the government, while experiencing troubles, is still strongly in command, and the Communists are a minority of only one-fifth kept in check by a rapidly growing Socialist Party that commands 27 per cent of the vote and is strongly led by Francois Mitter-

rand, an ambitious and effective politician.

By contrast, Georges Marchais, the French Communist leader, is an unpopular party wheelhorse, an ex-Stalinist now engaged in a political St. Vitus dance, recanting traditional Communist principles and loudly shouting halloo as he totters down the sawdust trail toward democratic redemption. Repudiating the dictatorship of the proletariat, he expresses shock at internal repression in the Soviet Union. Announcing his devotion to "pluralism," to "alternation" and to all the civil rights of a free society, he is more a comic figure than a persuasive convert to democratic principles.

Nor are events phased favorably for the French Communists, since they will probably have no chance to join a

French government prior to the parliamentary elections of 1978. By then, with any luck, the French economy will be ticking over more rapidly, unemployment will have declined and the Italian experience may have been absorbed for good or evil.

To be sure, unexpected developments could radically change the sequence of events. The most disturbing might well be the passing of the Tito regime in Yugoslavia or some serious outbreak of violence in Spain. Of these two, the Kremlin's meddling in a post-Tito Yugoslavia could have the most direct and explosive consequences, and it is an imponderable that cannot be overlooked in charting the evolution of European politics. Although the Red Army's entry into Yugoslavia without a fight is improbable — no matter how

well contrived the pretense of an invitation by some dissident group — the possibility of a dominant Kremlin influence in Yugoslav affairs is a haunting nightmare for the West. Given the geographic factor, Yugoslavia's continued independence of the Kremlin is of particular concern to all Italians — Communist and non-Communist alike.

It is well that Kissinger has taken note of this possibility and warned the Soviets that America would regard any interference in Yugoslavia with great concern. But here again a strong case could be made for a concerted warning to be given through NATO itself. For, though technically outside the NATO defense area, a Yugoslavia independent of the Kremlin is a significant factor in the European power balance. It is one the West dare not neglect.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, SATURDAY, MAY 29, 1976

Why NATO Is Losing the Edge

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

By C. L. Sulzberger

PARIS—The North Atlantic alliance, whose ministers have just finished meeting in Oslo, is not only in a condition of political anxiety but its military forces increasingly reflect the failure of any sensible arms standardization to evolve. As a result, the impressive economic-industrial base and qualitative technological advantages of the coalition over the Soviet-dominated Warsaw Pact have to a sad extent faded away.

Because of nationalistic rivalries among the Western allies, competition in developing their individual ordnance industries to seek export markets causes needless overlaps. And a failure by NATO itself to agree on basic requirements for such things as aircraft missions, antitank and anti-aircraft defense needs, leaves the alliance with a costly hodgepodge of far too many types of equipment.

The political will needed to harmonize this situation is lacking. Yet almost every partner agrees that hundreds of millions of dollars could be saved with proper rationalization of the Atlantic arms industries and that more and better equipment could thus be made available for less money.

A comprehensive draft study of this situation has been prepared for the Atlantic Institute by Dr. Gardiner Tucker, former Assistant Secretary General of NATO. In the study's preliminary version, Dr. Tucker deplores "extreme duplication of effort with different countries performing similar research, carrying out parallel developments of essentially equivalent weapon systems."

The resulting waste of resources, he says, has allowed the Soviet bloc to close the qualitative gap in many weapons and pull ahead of the West in others. Moreover, "proliferation has seriously degraded the capability of our forces to operate together or to supply one another."

As examples of this he cites: (1) 31 different types of antitank weapons

when five suffice; (2) seven types of aircraft, six types of recoilless rifles, four types of wire-guided antitank weapons, three types each of mortars, rifles and machine guns in the small (5,000-man) Ace Mobile Force (A.M.F.) created for deployment to crisis areas.

The latter profusion means each of A.M.F.'s seven national units must maintain its own logistic services and it takes more than twice the necessary emergency time to deploy. Likewise NATO's standing naval force in the Channel and Atlantic lacks common frequencies for data transmission and standard systems of identification of friend and foe. Half the so-called "friendly" planes shot down in a recent maneuver were "destroyed" by their own side's weapons.

Although the alliance has at last standardized fuel for its tactical aircraft, the nozzles which inject it are still different. NATO navies possess 100 varying types of ships from destroyer-size up, 36 types of radar for fire-control, 40 different types of gun larger than 30-caliber. Therefore nearly 40 types of ammunition must be manufactured for and distributed to an allied flotilla.

In no sense are the alliance's forces today interoperable. Each depends to an unhealthy degree on the

national support, habits and dogmas of the major contributing partners. We worry immensely about the quantitative superiority of Warsaw Pact tank forces yet there are 30 different types of antitank missiles in NATO inventories.

The resulting proliferation of confusion, duplicated research and financing, overburdened support systems and doctrinal assumptions on how to use which weapons greatly hampers development of a rational defense force. And, Dr. Tucker says:

"As modern weapons systems may require a decade or more from the initiation of development to full deployment, and as weapons once introduced may remain in the active inventories for one to three decades, standardization can only come slowly even when the objective is fully supported."

The evidence assembled by Dr. Tucker is deeply disturbing. Although the population of the North Atlantic partners, their wealth and their industrial capacity considerably exceed those of Warsaw Pact members, they lag far behind in the quantitative forces maintained by the two blocs, especially in the size of conventional armies and numbers of tanks and artillery pieces.

But time and again Western Pollyannas have soothed worriers with the assurance that the Atlantic alliance's smaller armies, based either on volunteers or short-term conscripts, are better-trained and motivated than those of the sullen reluctant East; also that our well-known technological superiority gives us an immense qualitative edge.

The first assumption is at best dubious. The second is rapidly becoming untrue. And the Western partners have no one but themselves to blame. All they must do is demonstrate the political sense to use their talents more efficiently.

'Proliferation has seriously degraded the capability of our forces to operate together.'

Friday, June 11, 1976

THE WASHINGTON POST

CIA, Not Mercenaries, Target of Angola Trial

By Robin Wright

Special to The Washington Post

LISBON, June 10—"The Americans, they are nothing. We are not out to get them, only the people who sent them in."

In saying this, Rui Monteiro, Angolan prosecutor for the trial of 13 foreign mercenaries in Luanda, zeroed in on the government purpose in holding the trial, which has become a media event in Angola, even overshadowing coverage of the new nation's first election two weeks from now.

The real "verdict" at the end of the tribunal is expected to be a strong warning to Western powers—issued in the name of all new and "progressive" governments—that they can no longer expect to be able to promote their systems or sympathizers through military involvement and mercenary troops.

The 13 mercenaries, including three Americans, were captured in the last days of the Angolan civil war which pitted the pro-Soviet Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola against two pro-Western groups. As to the Americans, Monteiro said, "They were there only a few days and committed no atrocities. One is a baby." Technically all are threatened with death sentences.

Perhaps the most ominous sign of the tone of the event is the official attitude toward the foreign press.

London Daily Telegraph reporter Gerald Kemp was officially reprimanded by Angolan Director of Information Luis de Almeida, yesterday, for an editorial his paper ran on the trial.

The authorities resent any charges that the tribunal will be a "show" affair. They have struggled to give it legitimacy by inviting the foreign press to attend, allowing an American lawyer to defend two of the mercenaries and a British official to witness the trial, and by establishing an international commission of inquiry to observe the event and afterward write a report on the "mercenary phenomenon."

The government asked me to testify at the trial about information I obtained when

I spent four days with the mercenaries in San Antonio do Zaire in early February. One of them, Derek Barker of Aldershot, England, is among the 13 going on trial Friday.

"It gives special credibility to the evidence to hear from a Western journalist who saw them in action," the state prosecutor explained during one of three interviews when he demanded my testimony.

I refused on grounds that I went to Angola as a journalist, not as a participant, and that it would break the journalists' code of professional ethics to get involved in an event I was covering. I added that all the information I had was published and on public record.

On Tuesday, four days after the third interview I was arrested and detained for 28 hours by the secret police, or DISA, who tried to intimidate me into giving testimony.

The DISA official who interrogated me for four hours yesterday used several tactics to coerce agreement. At first, he said the government was still considering pressing charges against me for being with the mercenaries and that they believed I was an American intelligence agent.

He said I could bargain for my freedom only by testifying. I refused.

He also said I would be released if I agreed to provide regular intelligence reports to his office on developments in the United States and the southern African countries I cover. I refused.

The official, who would not divulge his name, then said he would let me see the entire seven volumes of evidence if I agreed to verify the material with which I was familiar. I refused again.

At that point he abruptly left the room without telling me my status or how much longer I would be detained.

Before my return to Luanda, officials of the victorious Popular Movement for the Liberation were aware that I had reported from the north on the alleged execution of 14 British mercenaries by mercenary commander "Colonel Cal-

lan," the war name of Cyprus-born Costas Georghiou. One MPLA official even congratulated me on the story shortly after my arrival June 1.

There was never any attempt to harm me bodily. I was allowed a meal from the Tropico Hotel, for which I had to pay. I was even allowed to call my parents in Michigan when I expressed concern about how the news of my detention would affect my father's heart condition. I was expelled early this morning.

The best explanation for the action may have come from the MPLA army commander who escorted me to the airport—and who led the attack on San Antonio do Zaire.

"This trial is very important to us and our progressive allies," he said. "At the most important time, when we are trying to tell the big powers that they cannot force their ways on new nations through military aid to our enemies or mercenaries you refused to help verify the facts."

"That weakens our case in the eyes of the people we are trying to send a message to. If you won't help us tell the truth, we can't let you stay."

That message was clear. Far from centering on specific criminal charges against 13 individuals, the trial will pointedly focus on "mercenaryism"—foreign intervention. It will be a political trial, Almeida admitted this week, "with a message your people should listen to."

News agencies reported these other developments:

Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro welcomed a unit of about 100 Cubans returning from Angola, the Yugoslav news agency Tanjug reported. Castro said Sunday night that Cuba was gradually withdrawing its forces from Angola.

In Brussels, U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said at a meeting at NATO defense ministers that there was no concrete evidence yet of any significant Cuban withdrawals from Angola. Five other ministers, citing their own intelligence reports, concurred in Rumsfeld's assessment.

East Asia

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CHINESE POLITICS AND AMERICAN POLICY: A NEW LOOK AT THE TRIANGLE

by Roger Glenn Brown

The triangular relationship between the United States, the Soviet Union, and China remains at the very heart of the foreign policy calculations of each country. But at least in the case of China, according to the following article, that relationship also plays a critical role in the internal power struggle.

The author, a senior analyst at the CIA who is presenting his own views and not an official position of his organization, traces the complex interrelationship between domestic politics and foreign policy in the formative period between 1968 and 1972 when the contours of the Sino-Soviet-U.S. triangle began to emerge. His analysis focuses on two major turning points which are still only dimly understood: the 1969 border crisis with the Soviet Union, and the fall of Defense Minister Lin Biao and most of China's top military leaders in 1971. He uses the insight gained to offer perspective on the unexpected eclipse of Teng Hsiao-ping earlier this year and to forecast in general terms the direction China's foreign policy will now take.

The author's conclusions carry major implications for American foreign policy. They suggest that our present relationship with Peking may not be stable enough to survive the intensified power struggle which is likely to follow Mao's death. Time becomes more important, and hard choices on the status of Taiwan and relations with the Soviet Union become more urgent. Even if this presidential election year sees no movement in Sino-U.S. relations, 1977 is almost certain to become a year of decision. —The Editors.

On March 2, 1969 an unusual incident occurred on the frozen Ussuri river near the desolate island which the Chinese call Chen-pao and the Soviets call Damansky. On numerous occasions since the early 1960s, there had been periodic nonshooting skirmishes in this and other areas along the disputed

Sino-Soviet border. On March 2, 1969, for the first time, Chinese soldiers opened fire on a Soviet patrol, killing 7 soldiers and wounding 23. On March 15, the Soviets retaliated with a full-scale military engagement in the same area during which hundreds of troops on both sides were killed and injured. Following these conventional military exchanges, Soviet spokesmen hinted in a number of forums that a nuclear attack on China might become necessary. By August 1969, the situation had deteriorated so badly that some Western observers were convinced that war was inevitable in the near term. In short, the events of 1969 marked the most serious crisis in the entire history of Sino-Soviet relations.

The Role of Internal Politics

The 1969 crisis has always been difficult to explain. On the face of it, the Chinese attack at Chen-pao seemed irrational. Why should Peking risk even local hostilities with the Soviets to assert an historical claim to a useless island? And if Peking's goal was to demonstrate that China could not be pushed around, then why was an area chosen where Soviet troops were heavily concentrated and, as the March 15 clash showed, quite capable of humiliating the Chinese in pitched local battles? Most critically, why would China's leaders want to plunge into a foreign policy crisis when they were in fact preparing for a major domestic political event: the Ninth Party Congress which opened in early April?

Perhaps no completely satisfying explanation of the origins of the crisis will ever emerge, but a good case can be made that the initial Chinese attack on the Soviets was the outcome of intense political infighting within China, both over who would set Chinese policy and whether Peking should execute a major departure in its foreign policy by improving relations with the United States.

For some years prior to the crisis, radical elements in the Chinese Communist party had been dominant in China, and foreign policy had been characterized by a xenophobia which had left Peking isolated internationally. During 1968, however, a number of events, including the opening of the Paris peace talks on Vietnam, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, and the election of a new American president, gave more pragmatic Chinese leaders a chance to argue

for a shift in Chinese policy toward an opening to the United States.

“... prolonged stagnation in Sino-U.S. relations could well contribute to undermining the political power of those individuals and groups within China which are favorably disposed toward Washington. . . .”

In the fall of 1968, Premier Chou En-lai convinced Chairman Mao Tse-tung to move in this direction, but this decision was apparently reversed in February 1969 because of intense opposition from China's military establishment and radical leaders like Chiang Ching and Yao Wen-yuan who had gained prominence during the Cultural Revolution.¹

The radicals opposed the opening for ideological reasons: Defense Minister Lin Piao and the military opposed it because it would have been a triumph for Lin's principal rival, Chou, and because they wanted to leave the door open for improved relations with Moscow. In retrospect, it appears that Mao and Chou were reversed on an initiative in which they had invested considerable prestige, and, given the advances made by Lin just two months later at the Ninth Party Congress at the expense of pragmatists and radicals, one can make a case that both Mao and Chou were in a precarious political position in early 1969.

Under these circumstances, a clash with the Soviets would serve the interests of Mao and Chou in a number of areas. Most important, it would be a strong reassertion of Mao's personal authority following the February setback on U.S. policy and the trend toward greater power for Lin and the military. Second, it would be a setback for those within China, like Lin and his supporters, who were arguing that Sino-Soviet relations should be improved. Third, the resultant increase in Sino-Soviet tension would provide dramatic justification for a future opening to the United States. In short, it would serve both the foreign policy and domestic political purposes of these key Chinese decision-makers.

This line of explanation, however, raises some very difficult questions. If Lin and his supporters on the politburo had been strong enough to reverse Mao and Chou on the question of the first steps toward the opening to the United States, why would they not have had enough clout to prevent military action which was not in their best in-

terests? Moreover, since Lin was in charge of the defense bureaucracy, how could a decision requiring a military action be taken without his approval?

While it is possible that Mao and Chou confronted Lin directly on this decision and simply ordered him to take steps to implement it, it seems more likely, given the internal political situation, that they pursued their goals by circumventing the normal chain of command and directly ordered Chen Hsi-lien, commander of the Shenyang military region, to attack the Soviets. Because Chen's own personal ambitions were well served by an increase in tension on the Sino-Soviet border, it is likely that he would have obeyed an order from Mao, even at the risk of involving himself directly in the internal power struggle in Peking.² In retrospect, it appears that the attack was not carefully planned by China's central defense establishment, but, instead, was arranged on short notice and executed without the knowledge of higher military authorities in Peking.

“... Washington should consider recognizing Peking before the aged chairman leaves the scene in the hope that this might influence . . . the succession struggle. . . .”

This interpretation of the March 2 clash, in short, has Mao and Chou acting hastily for highly political reasons rather than making a rational and detached determination of what China's national interests required. That they were prepared to risk the death of hundreds of Chinese soldiers, and even war with the Soviet Union, is thus a measure not only of how high they calculated the stakes in the internal power struggle, but also of how badly they wanted to discredit those within China who opposed the opening to the United States. Certainly the message that Mao could count on the loyalty of China's second most powerful military regional commander would not be lost on Lin in the continuing power struggle.

While there were ups and downs in Chinese propaganda throughout the remainder of 1969, tension in Sino-Soviet relations remained high. Nationwide demonstrations began the day after the clash, and by March 7 over 200 million Chinese had participated in mass rallies denouncing Soviet revisionism and vowing vigilance along the border. The intended impact on the domestic rivals of Mao and Chou was unmistakable. Anti-Soviet sentiment was strong among the Chi-

¹ For details on this period and a similar argument, see Robert W. Sutter, “Toward Sino-American Reconciliation” (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1975).

² Chen Hsi-lien was subsequently made a commander of the crucial Peking military region, was named a vice premier in 1975, and is a key figure in the succession struggle now underway.

nese people and anyone favoring lessened tension with Moscow was treading on very unpopular ground. Moreover, the Chinese continued aggressive border patrolling until August when the Soviets responded by dropping veiled hints about a possible nuclear strike. The crisis atmosphere reinforced the position of the Chinese pragmatists who were receptive to the overtures for improved Sino-U.S. relations which were coming out of Washington.

In what was almost certainly a compromise between the pragmatists and their opponents, the Chinese agreed in October to open negotiations on the border dispute with Moscow, and then in January 1970 announced they would be willing to reschedule the aborted February 1969 Warsaw talks with the United States. While it quickly became apparent that they were not taking the Sino-Soviet border talks seriously, the Chinese tried to keep up momentum in relations with the United States by meeting in Warsaw in February 1970 and then scheduling another session of the bilateral talks for May 1970. Thus, the policy of an opening to the United States was well served by the March 2 crisis; though, as discussed below, Lin's drive to expand his power and influence in party affairs was not derailed but only slowed. In this context, the Sino-Soviet clash of March 1969 was a prelude to the decisive confrontation between the pragmatists and the military which came to a crisis two years later.

Watershed: The Fall of Lin Piao

By almost all surface criteria, Lin won a stunning victory at the Ninth Party Congress, primarily at the expense of Chou. Chou's power base was in the governmental bureaucracies, and of the six men drawn from this sector on the politburo in 1968, all but two, Chou and Li Hsien-nien, lost their positions at the Congress. Eleven military men were added to the politburo, a majority of whom were apparently Lin supporters. Lin's close ally Chen Po-ta was added to the crucial Standing Committee of the politburo, and, more importantly, the Congress formally adopted a new constitution designating Lin as Mao's successor. Lin, it appeared, was well on his way to supreme power within China. And yet, just over two years later, China's most powerful defense minister had fallen from office following an intense and ultimately violent struggle within the Chinese leadership.³

Lin's fall was far more than the purging of a single individual. It was preceded by an elaborate conspiracy against Mao that involved a large number of individuals and was followed by a purge of virtually all of China's ranking central military leaders. In

retrospect, the Lin Piao affair represented a crisis stage in the struggle for power between the pragmatists and elements of the military that had been under way since the winding down of the Cultural Revolution in 1968. In relative terms, the radicals played only a marginal role.

Many previous explanations of the Lin Piao crisis have played down the role of foreign policy issues.⁴ In contrast, I believe that these issues and, more specifically, their effect on resource allocation and the balance of power between the pragmatists and the military, are central to explaining the events that preceded Lin's abortive 1971 coup.

In brief, Lin appears to have consistently opposed any steps toward rapprochement with the United States throughout 1969 and 1970. He apparently seized on the U.S. invasion of Cambodia in the spring of 1970 to persuade Mao both to cancel the scheduled Sino-U.S. talks in Warsaw and to make a series of reconciliatory gestures toward Moscow.

This shift in China's foreign policy was reversed following the Second Plenum of the Ninth Party Congress in August 1970, when the balance of internal political forces began to tilt against Lin. New and authoritative anti-Soviet pronouncements were made and an ideological justification for improved relations with the United States was endorsed publicly by high foreign ministry officials.⁵ By December 1970, Mao felt strong enough to extend the historic invitation to President Nixon.

By early 1971, Lin and his military supporters were faced not only with rapid progress in Sino-U.S. relations, but also with another major foreign policy change: improving relations with Japan, a nation that virtually all Chinese military men looked upon as an historic enemy and as a potentially very powerful future enemy. This issue, also, was hotly debated by the Chinese leadership.

Policy Issues and Power

At a critical point in any policy debate between leaders at the pinnacle of power, differences over issues become so intense that it is not the policy itself which is paramount, but rather the authority, power, and influence of the leader advocating the policy. And at this juncture, the debate over policy is transformed into a struggle for who will hold the ultimate power to decide the issue. Debates over foreign policy issues occur fre-

³ By far the best analysis of the changing balance of forces within China at this time may be found in Doak Barnett's outstanding study, *Uncertain Passage* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1974).

⁴ See, for example, Philip Bridgman, "The Fall of Lin Piao," *China Quarterly*, July/September 1973.

quently in China; but if one opposes a whole series of decisions, one becomes a prime candidate for being stripped of all power and purged from the party and government.

In this context, the key question is not whether Lin opposed the openings to the United States and to Japan, but *why* he judged these issues important enough to risk strong and repeated opposition to policy that clearly had the approval of Mao himself.

Part of the answer to this question lies in the rivalry between Lin and Chou. Very early in the protracted debate over policy toward the United States and the Soviet Union, Lin put his prestige on the line and argued that the United States would remain deeply involved militarily in Asia and would therefore remain a principal enemy of China. Chou made a different estimate which eventually proved correct. Lin also probably argued that in the proper circumstances Moscow would be willing to make a significant move to decrease Sino-Soviet tension and that this option should be explored. Chou countered that Moscow would offer only unsatisfactory gestures; and in this, also, events proved him right. So in policy debate after policy debate, a certain dynamic propelled both Lin and Chou to attack each other, in order to discredit the policy-maker as well as the policy.

The roots of Lin's intransigent position, however, probably lie even deeper. He and his supporters realized that the power they had attained, as well as the even more exalted status they were seeking, were jeopardized by the implications of the policies advocated by their rivals, the pragmatists. The increased sense of security that would grow out of improved relations with Japan and with a nuclear power like the United States, Lin and his supporters reasoned, would lead to pressures for smaller military expenditures, especially in the areas they believed to be critical—nuclear weapons, missiles, and aircraft. Their influence and authority would also decline. Thus, rather than see their power drained away by the pragmatists' program, Lin and his supporters first

opposed this program at every possible juncture, and, when this failed, attempted to seize power. This attempted coup led to Lin's death when the plane in which he was escaping to the Soviet Union crashed.

The Politics of Resource Allocation

Discussion of the parameters of China's Fourth Five Year Plan (1971-1975) began in late 1970 and continued after Lin's death in late 1971. Allocation of China's scarce resources was a subject of much debate—a debate which inevitably became entangled with the foreign policy issues.


Like many policy debates within China, this one found its way into the media, though in slightly disguised form. Throughout the summer of 1971, numerous articles in *People's Daily* as well as some Radio Peking broadcasts focused attention on the problem of whether "electronics" or "steel and iron" development should be given priority. An article that appeared in *People's Daily* in June argued that one group of "political swindlers" within China (i.e., Lin and his group) saw "atomic technology and jet engine technology" (i.e., electronics) as the key to enhancing China's power and status in world affairs. A Radio Peking broadcast on August 20 was even more pointed. It charged that the same group of "swindlers" believed that advanced weapons were the "key to victory," and that once China possessed them, "all imperialists will be finished and overthrown." Significantly, these views were sharply contrasted with those of Mao, who was quoted as condemning any strategy premised on the concept that "weapons decide everything."

Recent intelligence studies on expenditures for procurement of new military equipment bear out this interpretation.⁵ Indeed, the rise and fall of the influence of Lin's military coalition is starkly reflected in the statistics presented in these studies. During the period when Lin and the military were in an ascendant position—roughly from 1968 until the end of 1971—military spending on procurement in all fields increased dramatically, with a growing proportion going to aircraft and missiles combined. Following Lin's fall from power in 1971, while amounts expended for procurement of land arms and naval forces declined only slightly, expenditures on new aircraft and missiles fell dramatically. In overall terms, the reallocation of resources is shown by the fact that since 1971 military procurement has decreased in relation to total industrial production (see chart below).

⁵ A major doctrinal departure was apparent in a November speech by Chou's close associate Chiao Kuan-hua, now China's foreign minister. Chiao reformulated and expanded the concept of peaceful coexistence by stating that it applied to relations between "all countries whether they had the same or different social systems." This contrasted sharply with the previous authoritative statement on the subject made by Lin at the Ninth Party Congress. Lin at that time had made an important distinction between the principles to be applied to capitalist and socialist countries, stating that the former should be dealt with on the basis of peaceful coexistence while relations with the latter should follow the principle of "proletarian internationalism." Chiao's statement marked a clear and unambiguous shift away from an ideologically based foreign policy to one emphasizing state-to-state relations, and thereby constituted a major victory for the pragmatists.

⁶ The findings of these studies have been declassified and are available in U.S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Subcommittee on Priorities and Economy in Government, Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union and China—1975, Hearings, June 18 and July 21, 1975 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), pp. 44-45.

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I do not mean to imply that foreign policy issues were more important than the more general issue of civilian versus military rule in Lin's fall from power. But foreign policy issues were an integral part of the struggle between the pragmatists and Lin's military coalition. Mao and Chou were undoubtedly engaged in a broadly-based campaign to prevent Lin and the military from expanding their power further, and to do so they not only confronted this issue specifically, but also used the thrust of their foreign policy program to focus the debate on the concrete issue of resource allocation. Thus the debate over resource allocation and foreign policy was the immediate catalyst for Lin's fall because it brought the question of the continued predominance of the military in Chinese politics and society to a head.

Just as Mao and Chou used a foreign policy crisis to further their domestic goals in 1969, so in 1971 they used their diplomatic program for the same purpose. In the unsettled period following Lin's abortive coup, Mao and Chou systematically exaggerated the threat of war with the Soviet Union to create a crisis atmosphere conducive to party unity during the purge they conducted of pro-Lin military figures, a tactic similar to the one they used in the 1969 Sino-Soviet border clashes.

All of this leads to the view that there is not as wide a division in China as there is in the United States between the worlds of the foreign and domestic policy-maker; indeed, it is reasonable to conclude that the small number of men at the apex of China's political structure do not make any significant distinctions between the spheres of domestic and foreign policy.

Implementing the Pragmatists' Program

In the aftermath of Lin's fall from power, China's pragmatists, under the skillful leadership of Chou, implemented a wide range of policies designed to enhance China's

power and status in world affairs. On the diplomatic level, Chou moved to exchange representatives with the United States following Nixon's 1972 visit to Peking and to fully normalize diplomatic relations with key nations such as Japan and West Germany. Ideology in foreign affairs was deemphasized, and China's main preoccupation was the orderly expansion of state-to-state relations. During the Cultural Revolution, China had diplomatic relations with only a handful of states; within two years of Lin's fall, China had normalized relations with virtually every nation in the world.

In the economic sphere, Chinese planners projected savings from the cutback in military spending following Lin's fall, anticipated earnings from the export of oil, and made a case for major technology imports from the West to contribute to the modernization of China's economy.⁷

This drive began in early 1973 and by the end of 1974 the Chinese had signed contracts with Japanese and Western European businesses and U.S. subsidiaries in Europe for over \$2 billion in turnkey manufacturing plant technology, an amount which (allowing for inflation) comes close to the total of all Soviet plant technology transferred to China in the 1950s. Across the board, China's trade with Japan and the West has expanded dramatically in the 1970s.

This expansion of economic ties with the West has significant political implications since it represents a substantial relaxation of the doctrine of "self reliance," an ideological code phrase for policies aimed at avoiding long-term economic dependence on external powers. Indeed, the technology transfers involved financing through deferred payments and the stationing of between 2,000 and 3,000 foreign technicians in China between now and the end of this decade.⁸ This emphasis on economic modernization through expanded ties with Japan and the West is an extremely controversial issue in China, periodically attacked by radical critics of the pragmatists. In terms of foreign policy, expanding China's economic ties with Japan and the West is the most concrete symbol of its emergence from the isolationism of the Cultural Revolution period. These ties are

⁷ The political implications of China's petroleum exporting capabilities are discussed in the fall 1975 issue of FOREIGN POLICY: See Selig S. Harrison, "Time Bomb in East Asia," and Choon-ho Park and Jerome Alan Cohen, "The Politics of the Oil Weapon."

⁸ An excellent article on this subject is Alexander Eckstein's "China's Trade Policy and Sino-American Relations" in Foreign Affairs, October 1975.

extremely significant because as China's economy is geared more and more to reliance on the non-Communist world, moves toward expanded economic ties with the Soviet Union become more difficult, decreasing the chances of a Sino-Soviet reconciliation.

The Rise and Fall of Teng Hsiao-ping

While these policies were being implemented, Chou's health began to fail and Teng Hsiao-ping, an able, flexible, and pragmatic administrator who had been purged during the Cultural Revolution, was groomed to succeed Chou as premier. At the National People's Congress (NPC) in January 1975, Teng was elevated to the Standing Committee of the politburo, named a vice chairman of the party and the highest ranking vice premier in the government, and given the key post of chief of staff of the People's Liberation Army. The NPC also appeared to place a capstone of legitimacy on the pragmatists' program, both in the domestic and the foreign policy areas. With managerial skill and enthusiasm, Teng threw his strength into implementing and expanding this program. As did Lin, following his triumph at the Ninth Party Congress, Teng appeared to be on his way to a position of power in China second only to Mao.

And yet when Chou died of cancer in mid-January 1976, Teng dropped abruptly and unexpectedly from public view, and in February Hua Kuo-feng, a relatively junior member of the Chinese hierarchy, was named acting premier. Following two months of intense infighting which included massive public demonstrations, Teng was stripped of all his party and government posts and Hua was named premier as well as vice chairman of the party.

Many of the circumstances preceding Teng's unexpected fall are similar to those which preceded Lin's fall in 1971: Just as in 1971, planning for China's Five Year Plan (1976-1980) was underway in 1975, and an intense debate over expenditures for advanced military technology broke into the media, this time complicated by the issue of whether China should import large quantities of Western military technology.⁹ Just as in 1971, when policy toward the United States and the Soviet Union was in question, the debate over resource allocation became intertwined with the discussions over foreign and defense policy which must have preceded President Ford's visit in November, the surprise release in December of a Soviet helicopter crew previously charged with espionage against China, and the invitation to former President Nixon to make a return visit to China.

A full explanation of Teng's unexpected

eclipse will have to await further evidence. What appears clear at this juncture is that like Lin, Teng attained a position which, if he had succeeded Chou as planned, would have made him Mao's designated heir apparent, an extremely dangerous slot in view of the fact that everyone who has previously attained it has been purged. Like Lin, Teng had been rapidly expanding his power base by placing his supporters—most of them rehabilitated after having been disgraced during the Cultural Revolution—in key party and provincial posts.

In short, Teng may well have provoked a coalescence of forces against him precisely because he was so rapidly expanding his power and influence. Whatever differences there may have been over issues, these may have been reinforced by the power struggle, seemingly a permanent fixture of the Chinese political system. Once a leader appears to be gaining too much power, his opponents gain the powerful support of Mao and move against him. In 1971, that leader was Lin Biao; in 1976, it was Teng Hsiao-ping.

Hua Kuo-feng

Hua Kuo-feng is a relatively unknown quantity in Chinese politics. He appears to be a compromise candidate, acceptable to pragmatists and radicals as well as to key military leaders, who enjoys the trust of Mao himself. After rising in the ranks of the party in Hunan—Mao's own native province—Hua was called to Peking in late 1971, and may well have gained the confidence of top officials by playing a role in the investigation and purge of pro-Lin elements in the military establishment. While his position between 1971 and 1973 is not known, he became the eleventh ranking member of the politburo at the Tenth Party Congress in 1973, and was named sixth ranking vice premier at the NPC in 1975. He is in his mid-fifties and far younger than any of China's other senior leaders, a factor which may have been influential in his attaining his present position.

Since January 1975, Hua has also held the key government post of minister of public security, an especially important fact since this has placed him at the center of successful efforts throughout 1975 to maintain public order by preventing various political campaigns from getting out of hand. Hua presumably either still runs the security ministry personally, or has named one of his close deputies as acting chief of police

⁹ This question is obviously of major concern to the United States. For a discussion of whether the United States should export military technology to China, see Michael Pillsbury's "U.S.-Chinese Military Ties?" in *FOREIGN POLICY* 20.

and security operations. Given this background and responsibility, it is highly unlikely that Hua was chosen to preside over a return to the disorder of the Cultural Revolution, though he may well preside over the purge of those who have become too closely aligned with Teng.

Hua's pronouncements to date on foreign policy issues suggest that, at least for the immediate future, he plans no major departures. In his banquet remarks during Nixon's visit in February, Hua stated unequivocally that the Soviet Union was the main threat to world peace, and that Peking wanted to see the implementation of the Shanghai Communiqué and further improvement in Sino-U.S. relations. In his remarks at the close of the Nixon visit, Hua was careful to toast Ford, an apparent effort to reverse the negative reaction in Washington to the timing of the Nixon visit. Hua's views on the key question of continued importation of Western technology are not clear, and any statements or actions he may take in this regard will be a key indicator of the future course of Chinese policy.

Implications for U.S. Policy

While predictions on Chinese politics and policy are extremely risky, the evidence available to date indicates that the pragmatist's foreign policy program will not be seriously impaired by recent events. The United States can expect to deal with leaders like Hua who are basically favorably disposed toward maintaining and expanding ties with Washington and the West. At the same time, it is reasonable to presume that Hua's administration, lacking the prestige of the Chou-Teng administration, will be more vulnerable to pressures from its domestic opponents. These pressures are likely to intensify further when Mao passes from the scene, an event certain to usher in yet another—and even more intense—struggle for power in China.

With these observations in mind, it is possible to offer some comments on the implications of U.S. action—or inaction—with regard to China. Since a premise of U.S. policy since 1969 has been that relations between Peking and Moscow are likely to remain hostile, these comments must begin with a discussion of the level of Sino-Soviet tension.

Overall, tension in Sino-Soviet relations between 1970 and late 1975 remained relatively low compared to the crisis atmosphere following the border clashes in 1969. This reflected the extension of the pragmatists' control, the fact that the domestic situation was fairly stable, and the greater recognition China received from the international community. Since the jockeying for power that preceded and followed Chou's

death in January, however, anti-Soviet propaganda has intensified, and at some point during the protracted and delicate succession process now under way, it is not inconceivable that a group that would judge its interests served by a provocation such as the 1969 border clash could become predominant in China—perhaps led by Hua himself. Whether or not such a situation evolves depends, in part, on events outside China, particularly on the actions of the Soviet Union and the United States.

U.S. moves to establish full diplomatic relations with China would probably strengthen the pragmatists' position and Peking's commitment to expanding ties with non-Communist countries. Paradoxically, such developments would probably also lessen the tendency toward periodic crises with the Soviet Union. Not only would there be less need for China's leaders to play up the Soviet threat in order to deflect attacks from domestic critics, but—with increased self-confidence in the international arena—these leaders would probably be more willing to enter into serious negotiations with the Soviets over the border issue. If Moscow were careful to take Chinese sensitivities into consideration by making a substantial conciliatory gesture (such as a sizable drawdown of its forces in the border area), some form of mutually acceptable border arrangement could conceivably be worked out.

A Sino-Soviet border agreement should not, in the long run, be counter to U.S. interests. In fact, it would be of some benefit. The primary effect would be to decrease substantially the chances of some future border incident—a development which is obviously in Washington's interests. In any case, China's own interests are at odds with those of the Soviet Union throughout Asia, and a border agreement would not end the Sino-Soviet struggle for influence and power there or in the rest of the world.

Furthermore, even if there were some improvement in Sino-Soviet relations, the United States would still have leverage for maintaining competition between the two powers. The Chinese pragmatists, having been strengthened by normalization of relations with the United States, would probably pursue even further their search for power and prestige through conventional diplomacy and economic development. Indeed, given the right circumstances, a pragmatic Chinese government might in the future be amenable to expanding substantially its cultural, economic, and perhaps even military ties with non-Communist countries in general and with the United States in particular. The recently completed purchase of Rolls Royce fighter aircraft engines and

manufacturing technology from Great Britain is a clear indication of Peking's strong interest in purchasing Western military technology. Should the Sino-U.S. relationship advance along these lines, there is little doubt that there would be serious Soviet concern and that this would express itself in increased Sino-Soviet tension, thus inhibiting any moves toward Sino-Soviet reconciliation.

At the same time, expanded ties with the United States would directly or indirectly provide greater resources for meeting the military coalition's goal of strengthening China's military capabilities. An amelioration of internal antagonisms on this issue would be likely to increase support for the pragmatists among at least some elements of the military, a development which in turn would contribute to the strength and stability of a Chinese leadership with vested interests in maintaining good relations with the United States.

Alternatively, prolonged stagnation in Sino-U.S. relations could well contribute to undermining the political power of those individuals and groups within China which are favorably disposed toward Washington, and lead to an increase in the relative power of either pro-Soviet elements in the military, the radicals, or some coalition of both groups. If this happens, China might well revert to a self-imposed isolationism similar to that of the Cultural Revolution or seek a general accommodation with Moscow. While these developments are unlikely as long as Mao lives, once he dies they could emerge as the consequence of a post-Mao power struggle.

Since these eventualities are clearly not in the best interests of the United States, I believe that Washington should consider recognizing Peking before the aged chairman leaves the scene in the hope that this might influence the present configuration of political power within China and thereby the succession struggle certain to intensify following Mao's death.

Obviously, in formulating U.S. policy toward China, a number of complicated problems other than the internal political balance in Peking must be taken into consideration. With respect to the difficult issue of Taiwan, the United States could follow

the "Japanese model," formally recognizing Peking while maintaining a close economic relationship with Taiwan. The Soviets have almost certainly resigned themselves to U.S. recognition of Peking at some point, and their opposition is likely to amount to little more than pro forma objections and a minor propaganda blitz. Indeed, some policy-makers within Moscow might even welcome Sino-U.S. diplomatic ties, especially if they believed this would reduce the chances of Chinese adventures like the 1969 border clash. Finally, recognition of Peking would be applauded by Japan as well as the major powers of Western Europe, all of which have long since established formal diplomatic ties with China. In short, the negative repercussions of breaking diplomatic ties with Taiwan could be mitigated and in any case would be more than offset by positive responses from our most important allies in Asia and Europe.

Writing in 1970, the noted French scholar Michel Tatu argued that "there will have to be a Washington-Peking dialogue, even at the risk of... offending the Soviet Union. When this takes place the triangular setup will have become fully operative, and the United States will probably be in the most advantageous position of the three powers. Being less fettered by ideological prejudice than the others, having no need for permanent adversaries and seeking none, the Americans should be in a better position to react to the hostility of each of the other two and bring about the world equilibrium which is their main objective."¹⁰

Tatu's observations and the gradual improvement in Sino-U.S. relations since 1972 suggest that at some point the very logic of the triangular relationship will lead to a U.S. decision to follow through on the Shanghai Communiqué and formally recognize Peking as the sole government of China. The only serious question is whether or not the United States will continue to delay this decision until the balance of internal forces within China alters and Peking embarks on a policy of isolationism or accommodation with the Soviets, which in effect would undermine the logical underpinnings of the entire triangular equation.

¹⁰ Michel Tatu, *The Great Power Triangle: Washington-Moscow-Peking* (Paris: The Atlantic Institute for International Affairs, 1970), p. 26.

WASHINGTON POST

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Saigon's Secrets Seized

Thieu and U.S. Didn't Destroy Classified Files

By Don Oberdorfer
Washington Post Staff Writer

North Vietnamese invading Saigon took over virtually complete files of the South Vietnamese armed forces, national police and secret intelligence agency, including highly classified data which had been furnished by the United States, according to the last chief CIA analyst of Communist strategy at the U.S. Embassy there.

Frank W. Snepp, who left Saigon on the final day of U.S. evacuation last year and resigned from the CIA this January, said the secret files of former South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu were also left behind.

Calling these unintended legacies "a tragedy," Snepp said they may reveal to Communist authorities a great deal about U.S. intelligence operations and permit them to identify well-placed U.S. agents behind Communist lines as well as "anyone who helped us in the slightest degree."

Snepp's statements in an interview confirmed portions of an extraordinary book-length memoir, recently published and broadcast in Vietnam, by the North Vietnamese Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Van Tien Dung. Dung was Communist field commander for the final campaign of the war.

At South Vietnamese police headquarters and military general staff headquarters "we found that top-secret files and documents of the puppet commanders were intact," Dung wrote. "A modern enemy computer containing the records of each officer and enlisted man of the puppet armed forces of more than a million was still operating."

"Giai Phong!", a recent book on the fall of Saigon by Tiziano Terzani, an Italian journalist who remained in the capital after the takeover, reported that double

agents inside South Vietnam's Central Intelligence Organization were able to save "all the dossiers that had been compiled over the years by the secret police in collaboration with the American CIA."

Snepp, who is writing a book of his own on the collapse of South Vietnam, attributed the failure to destroy vital documents and other records to mistaken belief by senior U.S. Embassy officials in "smoke screens" and "ambiguous signals" which suggested that a negotiated settlement was possible. This "wishful thinking," shared in Washington, put off the destruction of files and evacuation of key intelligence agents until it was too late, Snepp said.

Snepp said the CIA's chief in Saigon, Thomas Polgar, as well as Ambassador Graham Martin were deceived by hints of a negotiated deal in April 1975 and were encouraged in their belief by high officials in Washington. At the same time, however, "consistent intelligence from the ground was that there would be no negotiated settlement, and this was from the most reliable sources," Snepp said.

The North Vietnamese general's account of decision-making in the Communist command gives no indication that a negotiated deal was considered during the final Saigon drive, and every indication to the contrary, Dung relates that the order for quick liberation of Saigon came from the North Vietnamese Politburo in the third week of March, 1975. He reports successive orders after that for the Saigon attack with no sign of letup.

Dung refers contemptuously to "perfidious diplomatic maneuvers to check our troops' advance and avoid total defeat." He attacks the "U.S. CIA clique in Saigon" for conducting what he claims were "many insidious plots." CIA station chief Polgar, who is of Hungarian extraction, was a key figure in Saigon contacts about a negotiated deal with Hungarian and Polish delegates of the International Control Commission.

Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger evidently placed credence in the possibility of a negotiated deal to forestall the attack on Saigon. Kissinger has said publicly that North Vietnam "changed their signals" and "appeared to shift suddenly to a military option" on April 27, three days before the fall of the capital. But the Dung account—and the intelligence reports cited by Snepp—indicate there was no possibility of negotiations

and thus there was no shift in signals.

Snepp said several key points in the recent detailed memoir by the North Vietnamese general have convinced him that the Communist side had a spy with access to the most important information of the South Vietnamese government. At the same time, he added, the United States had accurate intelligence within days about Communist strategic decisions cited in Dung's account.

The crucial difference, Snepp suggested, was that the Communists believed the intelligence they were getting, but the United States chose to ignore its accurate intelligence data in a concentration on "smoke screens" and "wishful thinking" about negotiations.

According to Snepp, the account by Dung gives these indications of Communist intelligence powers:

• Dung reports receiving a "flash cable" at his field command post March 13 from Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap in Hanoi saying that the Politburo and high command believed South Vietnam might abandon the Central Highlands in a "strategic retreat." Dung was instructed to quickly encircle Phubon, a key area in a retreat path.

According to Snepp, Thieu had been seriously considering such a retreat in great secrecy for only a few days before that, and secretly informed his cabinet and the Joint General Staff March 13 that he had decided to execute the withdrawal plan. The South Vietnamese general in charge of the withdrawal was informed March 14. The pull-out began March 15.

The United States knew nothing of Thieu's order until March 15, Snepp said. By then, Dung's troops were already moving to cut off the retreat at Phubon. The quick North Vietnamese maneuver led to the destruction of nearly the entire force being withdrawn from the highlands—the equivalent of two divisions. This was to be Thieu's strategic reserve. "That loss spelled the end of South Vietnam," Snepp said.

• Dung quotes "our intelligence reports" on a major assessment session held by Thieu on the fourth floor of the presidential palace in Saigon Dec. 9-10, 1974. This assessment, which predicted only moderately big Communist attacks during 1975, was quoted by Dung in his memoir. Snepp said the quo-

tation was a remarkably accurate summary of a U.S. CIA estimate—which he himself drafted—supplied for Thieu's use in the year-end assessment.

After learning of the Saigon assessment, the Hanoi Politburo amended its plan for a two-year campaign to liberate the South. While still planning for a 1975-76 campaign, the Politburo added a guideline for liberation in 1975 "if opportunities presented themselves," according to Dung.

This was done in Hanoi on Jan. 9, 1975. According to Snepp, the United States obtained an accurate intelligence report within 10 days of this decision.

• Dung quotes a secret report sent by Ambassador Martin to Washington on April 19, 1975, "on the true situation" in the South. Accurately summarized by Dung, this report was drafted by Snepp for Martin to use in persuading Thieu to resign the presidency and thus make way for the rumored "negotiations."

According to Snepp, Martin took a copy of the report to Thieu at the presidential palace on April 20, while carrying another copy to Washington. The report was a decisive factor in Thieu's decision to resign, which he announced April 21.

Snepp said he helped prepare—but does not stand by—another classified U.S. report which was quoted in the North Vietnamese general's account of the final days of the war. This estimate, cited as evidence that Thieu was "forced to fight a poor man's war," said that South Vietnamese firepower had decreased by nearly 60 per cent due to bomb and ammunition shortages, and that South Vietnamese mobility was cut in half by shortages of aircraft, vehicles and fuel.

Snepp said these estimates were prepared by U.S. officials in Saigon early in 1975 in an effort to sell Congress on the need to appropriate additional aid to South Vietnam. Snepp said the phrase, "a poor man's war," was originated by the United States for this purpose.

The former CIA official said these estimates were "billingsgate"—numbers pulled out of the air for U.S. political reasons. He said he did not know whether or not North Vietnam believed these numbers when its spies obtained them in Saigon.